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Man is increasingly assuming conscious control over his physical environ-
ment. The impact of rapidly accelerating scientific and technological 
progress has resulted in the environment being increasingly man-made and 
man-influenced. The growing urban population has necessitated building 
at a rate and quantity greater than ever before. Enormous resources, 
both human and material, are being channelled on an unprecedented scale 
into the planning, designing and construction of new environments for 
human use. 
Whilst this tide of energy and activity continues to surge forward, crea-
ting vast urban and suburban. developments, very little energy and re-
sources have, by comparison, been directed towards critically assessing 
the impact that these built environments have on people, and the extent 
to which they are responsive to human needs and aspirations. It has be-
come critical for the architect to be made fully aware of the human impli-
cations of the physical environment he is creating. 
Concern for the human element has ~een eclipsed by the current pre-occupa-
tion of the design profession with technology and economics which have be-
~ome the dominant design imperatives. Environmental problems are inter-
preted in terms of a narrowly defined scientific rationality instead of a 
1. 


































































































































































socially responsible and humane rationality. (Burnett-Prinsloo & 
Prinsloo, 1978, p.12). 
Much attention is focused on the structure itself - the cost of construc-
tion, the integrity of the materials, the technical performance and method 
of construction, the physical layout and harmony with the site - with re-
latively little in-depth analysis of.human needs and aspirations. The 
architectural press shows evidence of the profession's lack of real con-
cern for the people who will occupy and use the buildings which it pro-
duces. The photographs in architectural journals usually show empty 
rooms and circulation spaces. Furniture is formally arranged but no in-
dication is given of how the building is actually used by people. 
The idea that architecture has human implications is not new. Planners 
and architects have long been aware that the form and appearance of build-
ings are related to social and psychological factors. The interplay be-
tween man and his environment has been observed by architectural historians, 
who have shown that man's structures in every era and in every land reflect, 
and are an expression of his personal, social and cultural context. How-
ever, only in relatively recent years, has there been a systematic attempt 
to investigate the relationship between man and his physical environment. 
2. 
In the last three decades there has been growing concern (amongst layme~ 
and professionals) about the quality of the built environment and its 
impact on human life. - It has been heightened by instances in which 
housing projects and institutional structures which have been highly 
praised by the architectural profession have proved not viable as healthy 
living environments. The high rise Pruitt-Igoe housing scheme in St. 
Louis, Missouri, which won an award from the American Institute of Archi-
tects when it was designed by Yamasaki in 1951, provides a good example 
of this. A section of this scheme had eventually to be demolished by 
dynamite in 1972 since it supported a crime rate higher than any other 
development and was continuously vandalized. 
Psychologists, sociologists, human geographers and a growing number of 
architects have been brought together as a consequence, to undertake 
research into the complex relationship between human behaviour, feelings, 
attitudes and preferences, and the built environment. This relatively 
new field of enquiry is generally referred to as "man-environment studies". 
The field of environmental cognition has developed as a sub-section of man-
environment studies and as such, shares the same ultimate goal of under-
standing the relations between man and his physical environment. Two 
fundamental assumptions are generally made by researchers working in this 
3. 
3 Pruitt-Igoe public housing scheme. 
Built in the 1950's, part of it 
had to be dynamited less than 20 
years later. 
field: firstly, that what is known and believed about a particular en-
vironment, that is, how that environment is ''seen'', influences human 
behaviour, preferences and attitudes with regard to that environment 
and, secondly, that an understanding of this knowledge and belief base 
which underlies individual and group action, needs and desires is essen-
tial if planning and architectural practice is to be at all effective in 
contributing to an improved quality of human life. (Moore and Golledge, 
1976, p.xi; Downs and Stea, 1977, pp.12, 241-246). Basil Honikman 
(1976a) articulates the need for an understanding of environmental cog-
nition if architects are to play a positive role in society. 
The question of quality of life is of particular importance. 
I believe that the major (and perhaps only) justification 
for the profession of architecture is that it should contribute 
to the ~uality of life by improving the quality of the physical 
environment. Without understanding the meanings people give 
to environments, it is very difficult to know what constitutes 
"improvement" or "quality". (p.98) 
1.2. THE CURRENT CRISIS IN ARCHITECTURE 
Architecture seems to have reached a crisis point regarding its place 
in contemporary Western society. 
The architectural profession constitutes a sub-culture with its own 
4. 
system of beliefs, values and norms which guide all architectural activity. 
However, the beliefs and values held by the profession are often at variance 
with those held by the public. The imagery of contemporary architecture 
has been developed within the profession and foisted on the public who find 
themselves living in an apparently hostile, inhuman and alienated man-made 
environment. The architect has become alienated from society; his decline 
in effectiveness has led to a general loss of confidence in the profession. 
Sir Hugh Casson (as quoted by MacEwan, 1974, p.11) describes in an article 
in The Times (27th February, 1973) the crisis of public confidence which 
expresses itself in widespread criticism of planners and architects: 
This disenchantement with architecture amounts today almost 
to a paranoia. Whatever the reasons, a situation has been 
created which is dispiriting and disturbing. 
In order to understand the shortcomings of contemporary architecture the 
operant ideology of the architectural sub-culture needs to be examined and 
re-assessed. However, it must be noted that this ideology is not solely 
responsible for architectural theory and practice - the architectural pro-
fession operates within the context of the dominant ideology of the larger 
cultural group, and this ideology plays an important part in determining 
the nature and quality of the architectural product. 
5, 
The Functionalist doctrine is still very much the current paradigm of 
architectural practice. Although it has recently been declared obso-
lete by numerous theorists (Jencks, 1978; Venturi et al, 1977; Brolin, 
1976 and others) it is still adhered to by the majority of practicing 
architects and is particularly prevalent in South Africa today. 
Functionalism is based on rationalist ideals; its basic premise is that 
the purpose or function of a building should define its form in the most 
direct manner and without any wasted effort. This doctrine, with its 
moral undertones, evolved from the puritanical spirit of pioneers such 
as Mies van der Rohe - "God is in the details" (Bonham, 1962, p.154) -
and Adolf Loos - "ornament is crime" (Bonham, 1962, p.31) - to produce 
buildings which, supposedly stripped of artistic subjectivity, were 
obeying the demands of "truth". Reason and the machine aesthetic were, 
and still are, dominating principles: buildings are seen as the inevi-
table result of a logical process of design, and machines, venerated by 
~ 
the leaders of the Modern Movement for their rational functionalism, 
remain the model for the current aesthetic (excluding the small avant-
garde e.g. Venturi, Graves, Charles Moore and others). 
Brolin (1976), in appraising the failings of modern architecture, argues 
that it has been 
6. 
Reason and the machine aesthetic 
are dominating principles of the 
Functionalist doctrine 
4 (left) Lake Shore Apartments, 
Chicago, 1957. (Mies van der Rohe) 
5 (above) One-family house for Werkbund 
Exhibition, Stuttgart, 1927. 












considered a movement of "truths" for so long that we 
are unable to think of it as a set of arbitrary, syste-
matized aesthetic choices. By now, it has become an 
idealogical prison that traps professional and non-
professional alike as soon as they are initiated into 
its rules. (p.13) 
Popular taste was rejected by the Modern Movement. The architect was, 
and still is to a large degree, seen as one who transcends the "fickle-
ness" of popular taste; at the same time he was a potential leader and 
as spokesman for the "spirit of the times", would lead the masses, show-
ing them the proper and "true" forms for modern times. The architect, 
in breaking away from the popula~ ideal, is out of touch with contem-
porary human aspirations and popular preferences. 
Symbolic content was rejected in principle. (However, the protagonists 
of the Modern Movement failed to realise that by its very nature, func-
tionalist architecture symbolizes a mechanistic image of man and society). 
An attempt was made to break architectural tradition and eradicate sym-
bolic and historical association from architecture. This has been one 
of the most destructive ideological tenets of the Modern Movement; it 
has resulted in an alien architecture with very little human content and 
has frustrated man's innate desire for continuity with his past. Most 
7. 
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Modern architects have been obsessed with, to quote Aldo Van Eyck (re-
ferred to by Venturi, 1966, p.19), "what is different in our time to 
such an extent that they have lost touch with what is not different, 
with what is essentially the same". 
This break with tradition has led to the disappearance of prototypes, 
and the syndrome of change for its own sake, which is characteristic of 
the Western civilized world. Christopher Alexander (1964) argues that 
it is this which has been largely responsible for the problem of "misfit" 
in contemporary architecture. The houses of simpler civilizations 
usually have better "fit" and clarity of organization. He gives the . 
Mousgoum hut of northern Cameroun as an example. This, according to 
Alexander, is the result of an unselfconscious approach to the design 
process, which is to a large extent mimetic in that typical designs, 
based on traditional patterns, evolve by trial and error over an extended 
period of time. Myths and legends, social rituals and taboos connected 
with the dwelling resist change for its own sake. Today the designer 
attempts to solve problems from the beginning, working from scratch 
rather than building on to already established prototypical solutions. 
However, the intuitive resolution of contemporary design problems lies 
beyond the single individual's integrative grasp. Prinsloo (1978) 
refers to the problems inherent in the "disappearance of prototypes": 
8 •. 
The architect has been launched into a position where he 
has to invent for each project. Not only this, but his 
ability to sustain a high l~vel of inventions is given a 
high value in the profession and repetition is seen as 
some kind of failure. There is in this an important 
shift that has ocurred, from the idea of the architect 
as the developer of prototypes and renewer of principles 
to that of "free-hand" inventor with reference to: what? 
••••. Design and invention from scratch is too diffi-
cult and design with reference to programme only is in-
adequate. (p.39) 
Where people have the choice and a greater role in determining their 
environment, as in the private housing sector, one finds the overwhelm-
ing majority chooses the single family house of suburbia. A brief sur-
vey of suburban houses, where the architect's impact has been moderated 
by the direct mediation of the home owner in the design process, reveals 
physical evidence of popular preferences and symbolic references to his-
torical precedent and the idealized life: Cape Dutch style gables and 
shutters; Spanish style arches, rough plaster and timber beams; the 
traditional formal foot path leading to the front door (originating in 
European formal gardens); wagon wheel "vibracrete" walls and gas lantern-
type outside light-fittings. These elements of suburbia, which at the 
same time serve as a means of self-expression, betray a conscious sense 
of the past and of romantic aspirations. The architect can no longer 
9. 




9 Popular taste is 
reflected in suburbia. 
(Houses in the Western 
suburbs of Port 
Elizab e th) . 
afford to ignore or censure the fundamental human value~ expressed here. 
Robert Venturi has stressed this in his writings (1966, 1976, 1977) and 
embodies these concepts in his buildings. His essentially humanistic 
theory of architecture is espoused in his "Gentle Manifesto" (1966). 
Here he eschews the "puritanically moral language of orthodox Modern 
Architecture" (p.22) developing his polemic around the notions of popu-
lar taste and architectural history. 
The Modern Movement arose in response to the limitations of academic 
architecture and in the context of the socio-political conditions in 
Europe after the First World War. It was linked to the movement at 
that time against Fascism, hunger and unemployment and was thus based 
at its inception, on humanistic concerns. In its attempts to trans-
form the living conditions of the people (especially the poor) for the 
better, it called for the systematic examination of human needs and the 
use of technology to serve these needs. However, these optimistic and 
humanistic ideals have been debased and disto~ted over the years, largely 
due to economic and political forces of the Post World War II era; the 
Modern Movement has degenerated into a mere style, lacking the social 
content that formed the basis for its "raison d'etre". With the ideo-
logical basis dr~ined away, Functionalism in architecture is still being 
10. 
justified today in terms of its so-called economy, efficiency and 
rationality. It is not surprising that an a.rchitecture based on 
these "attributes", and on a mechanistic analogy of man and society 
fails to bring much joy and satisfaction to its users. 
There is an urgent need to build a new theory of architecture, based 
on the salvaged humanistic and social concerns which formed the ori-
ginal impetus for the Modern Movement, but taking the whole of man 
into consideration i.e. not only his physical quantitative needs but 
also his consciousness and his experiental, qualitative needs. Human 
consciousness must be recognised and the modes of human experience 
investigated. The questions must be asked: "How do people experience 
their environment; how do they "see" their environment and what does 
it mean to them?" Pawley (1969) decries the functionalist doctrine 
with its neglect of concern for human consciousness: 
The environment designer's recognition of function or role 
instead of consciousness (author's italics] as the basis 
for such "human engineering" as he attempts, is a contribu-
tory cause of the anxiety of meaninglessness which is a well 
documented neurosis of our time. (p.129) 
MacEwan (1974) has argued that, to solve the current crisis in archi-
11. 
techture requires ''not so much public relations to burnish the 
architect's image, as acceptance by architects of their social 
responsibilities" (p.7). Architecture must be consciously re-
invested with a symbolic dimension, in an effort to respond to the 
many levels of human life, such as the personal, social, cultural 
and historical context. The emphasis on simplicity espoused by 
the Modern Movement belies the complex social reality of living. 
Norberg-Schulz (1969) emphasizes the need for a more "meaningful" 
architecture: 
We are no longer satisfied with making our buildings 
.functional, but we want them also to be "meaningful" 
•.•• Architecture gives visual expression to ideas 
which~ [author's italics] something to man because 
they "order" reality. Only through such an order, 
only by recognizing their mutual dependence do things 
become meaningful. Such ideas may be social, ideo-
logical, scientific, philosophical or religious. 
(p.223) 
He stresses the importance of supplementing the physical milieu with 
a "symbol-milieu", that is, an environment of meaningful forms. 
Architecture, as a "synthetic activity" (p.226) unifies diverse fac-
tors in a single synthetic form. 
the form of life as a whole. 
As such it must adapt itself to 
12. 
1.3. OBJECTIVES 
1.3.1. Scope of this Enquiry 
1. 3.1.1. The long-range objective of this research document is to gain 
an insight into the nature of man-environment relations so that the 
knowledge thus acquired can inform the decision-making process of 
architects, as well as planners, policy makers and others involved 
in the making of physical environments for human habitation, and 
thus contribute towards the realization of an improved quality of 
built environment, and hence ultimately to the enhancement of 
human life. 
1.3.1.2. The relationship between man and his environment can be exa-
mined from numerous perspectives, such as: 
the study of overt behaviour in particular environmental 
settings, that is, patterns of use, etc. 
the study of environmental manipulation, that is, how 
people adjust the physical environment to meet their 
requirements (this includes professional desig~)~ 
the study of human adaptation to the built environemnt -
stress, modification of life style, etc. 
13. 
the study of environmental experience, that is, what the 
built environment means to people; what attitudes, values, 
beliefs and symbols influence this experience. 
It is this latter perspective which will be used in this thesis. 
This area of concern recognises the complexity of the relations 
between man and the physical environment, a complexity which is 
becoming increasingly evident from ergonomic studies (such as 
Chapanis, 1959) and work on the effects on people of temperature, 
lighting, sound, etc. and other physical variables (Canter & Lee, 
1974, p.10). These studies indicate that single variables or 
stimuli cannot simply be linked with specific subjective responses. 
The environment is not something "out there" acting on man; rather 
the environment and man form a complex interacting system involving 
man's experience and cognition of that environment. 
1.3.1.3. This thesis aims to build a theoretical model, collating 
and organizing a vast body of research and theory from numerous 
academic disciplines, and at the same time expressing a particular 
point of view. It is intended that the theoretical framework es-




1.3.1.4. According to a rudimentary survey (conducted by the author 
in 1979) of ~11 human science departments, as well as all archi-
tecture and planning departments at every University in South 
Africa, very few formal research projects in the field of man-
environment relations have been carried out at South African uni-
versities. 
The University of Cape Town's Postgraduate Unit of the School of 
Architecture is however currently involved in studies which relate 
to this field: "Urban problems and urban structure" - Ivor Prinsloo, 
Jane Burnett-Prinsloo and Richard Hepner - is a study of community 
facilities and services, considered as instruments for social policy 
in developing areas, which provides the field of study from which 
broader goals relating to the occurrence of urban problems and their 
relationships with urban structure may be generated. A second pro-
ject, "The urban public environment" - Ivor Prinsloo and others -
is a study in the evaluation of the social and physical performance 
of existing urban areas with a view to the development of strategies 
for intervention which will lead to conditions of social and environ-
mental health, with a special focus on design criteria supporting 
social learning and environment performance. Another study in the 
area of man-environment relations is that currently being under-
15. 
taken towards a do~toral thesis by Professor T. Lamont of the 
Sociology Department, UNISA. He is investigating the nature of 
existential residential space, tying together the theories of 
Talcott Parsons and Norberg-Schulz. 
It is evident that South Africa is at an early stage in its explo-
ration of man-environment relations. This thesis attempts to 
contribute to the development of the field of man-environment, 
studies in South Africa. 
1.3.1.5. It is intended that the proposed comprehensive nature of 
this thesis will bring together findings and theory from numerous 
diverse disciplines, thus drawing architecture closer to work done 
in these fields, an exercise from which it can only benefit. 
1.3.2. Specific Objectives 
1.3.2.1. This work aims to investigate how the individual conceives 
of, or "sees" the physical environment, how he gives meaning to it, 
what mental processes come into play in the structuring of the en-
vironment in the mind. 
It sets out to examine the nature of the resulting cognitions; how 
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they arise and how they are influenced and modified by socio-cultural, 
personality and other variables. 
This work attempts to understand how these subjective mental construe-
-
tions influence human response with regard to the built environment, 
that is, behaviour, preferences, feelings and design. 
These aims thus imply the application of a cognitive framework (rather 
than, say, a behaviorist model) to the exploration of man-environment 
relations. It is concerned with both the processes and products of 
cognition and considers the subjective beliefs, knowledge and im-
pressions about the built environment which people carry "in their 
heads" in the course of their daily lives. 
1.3.2.2. An important objective of this thesis is to define the nature 
of the built environment in terms of a theoretical framework. Alter-
nate conceptions or definitions of the physical environment would 
result in different findings and conclusions with regard to man°s 
relationship with the environment; thus a specific model of the en-
vironment will be proposed. 
1.3.2.3. It aims to maintain a holistic perspective, employing a general 
systemic approach. 
17. 
1.3.2.4. Work in environmental cognition has been carried out by 
numerous researchers in a wide range of disciplinary fields, inclu-
ding geography, psychology, sociology, town planning and architec-
ture. (For a detailed account of environmental cognition studies, 
cf. Chapter 4). However, most of the research has been conducted 
on an urban scale, with very little reference to the architectural 
level of environment. This thesis will focus on the cognition of 
the physical environment at the scale of buildings. 
It should be noted at the outset that this thesis does not attempt to 
\ 
provide an in-depth and detailed study of ci particular, narrowly de-
fined area of concern. Rather, it provides a broad general perspec-





This chapter spells out the general methodological approach adopted 
in this enquiry. This approach embraces: a cognitive referential 
framework which gives structure to the question .of man's relationship 
to the built environment; a holistic perspective, drawing on aspects 
of Talcott Parson's intersystems theory of human action; a multi-
disciplinary orientation; and the use of the dialectical model to 
explain the relations between phenomena. 
2.1. THE COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK 
A theoretical frame of reference is postulated which links human ex-
perience and behaviour to the built environemnt. This framework is 
needed to synthesize and give structure to the numerous issues in-
volved in the investigation of the man-environment interface and, to 
the diverse array of ideas and findings from many different 
disciplines. 
A cognitive frame of reference is employed; this ionstitutes a viable 
and relevant framework for the examination of man's relationship to 
the built environment. It provides a reasonable parameter within 
which to explore the field. It is sufficiently defined, yet not too 
limited in its scope and potential for revealing the nature of the 
structures underlying man's environmental response. 
' 
19. 
10 Cabalistic analysis of the mind 
and senses, symbolizing man's 
thinking process and sensory 
intake (from Robert Fludd, 
Utriusque ... Cosmi Historia, 1617). 
A conceptual model is developed within this ~ognitive framework which 
presents the components and their interrelationships in such a way as 
to reveal certain aspects of the nature of man-environment relations. 
2.2. A HOLISTIC APPROACH 
Man's experience of the built environment will be examined using an 
intersystems perspective. This implies holistic thinking and the 
recognition of the total context within which environmental cognition 
occurs. 
This systemic approach stresses the examination of the interrelations 
and mutual influence among interacting elements, as opposed to the more 
linear causal approach that strives towards the isolation and analysis 
of independent elements as they relate to a limited set of variables. 
The linear causal mode of thinking has led man to think of objects 
and phenomena (including ourselves) as independent, atomistic entities 
separate from one another and linked by simple causal connections. On 
the other hand, systems thinking, or holistic thinking, is based on 
the fundamental maxim that everything is interconnected with every-
thing else in one ecological system, (for a concrete example of the 
difference between linear and systems thinking, cf. Leff, 1978, 
pp. 7-10). 
20. 
The person-environment system is a complex and dynamically structured 
system of physical and non-physical variables whi~h operate as sub-
systems. These interrelated and interdependent subsystems together 
form the total environment (Burnette-Prinsloo & Prinsloo, 1978, p.13). 
The physical environment includes both the natural world and man-made 
artefacts and structures; the non-physical environment incorporates 
the cultural, social (including political and economic) and psycho-
logical dimensions of our lives. The total environment is seen as a 
system of interrelationships such that any structure or subsystem 
within it derives its characteristics and function from, and in turn 
has consequences for, the nature and function of all other subsystems 
within the total system. 
Man is an integral part of the complex web of interlinking processes 
in both the physical and non-physical environment and consequently of 
the total environment. Our experience, cognitive processes and overt 
behaviour arise from and can only be understood in relation to the 
total environmental context. In examining the interrelations of en-
vironment and experience, Leff (1978) notes that, 
people come to think in given ways because of a huge 
number of interacting [author's italics] factors in-
cluding the structure of their language; the beliefs 
21. 
of their parents, teachers and peers; the things they 
are rewarded and punished for expressing; their intelli-
gence and ability to imagine new things; feedback about 
the usefulness of a particular way of thinking; their 
willingness to tolerate uncertainty and to depart from 
the views of other people; the way they were brought up 
as children; the things they have read; and so on for 
an obviously long list. (p.9) 
This study rejects the conception of simple cause-and-effect relation-
ships. The scientific paradigm, which still dominates much research 
in the human science fields, of the causal analysis of behaviour in 
terms of single independent and dependent variables is abandoned here 
in favour of a more holistic perspective, embracing the total environ-
ment in all its complexity. This implies that the man-physical en-
vironment interface must be examined and described within the context 
of the broader sociocultural system which defines it. (Proshansky, 
1976, p.303). 
The idea that the total environment, including ourselves, is a uni-
fied system of interlinking processes has been recently referred to by 
numerous environmental psychologists, and others involved in environ-
mental issues. Altman (1973) calls for a social-ecological approach 
which recognizes that "man is at one with his environment and that the 
22. 
appropriate unit of study is a behaviour-environment or organism 
environment unit" (p.108). Ittelson et al (1974) adopt a similar 
ecological approach: "the person has environmental properties as 
well as individual psychological ones. He is himself an environ-
mental component, and how he interacts with his setting helps de-
termine the nature of that setting and its effect on his actions'' 
(p.12). Kenneth Craik (1976) also supports the application of a 
systemic approach to man-environment studies: "The conceptual- · 
izations of systems, system boundaries, and system relations offers 
a usefully broad perspective upon man-environment relations and upon 
the direction of research in this area" (p.73). Others who advo-
cate a holistic approach and use it in their theoretical formula-
tions include Leff (1978), Moos (1976) and Michelson (1970). 
The holistic approach, which gives rise to the concept of man as an 
integral and interdependent component of the total environment and 
thus closely intertwined with the physical environment, has since 
ancient times been a fundamental element of Eastern philosophical 
and religious doctrines, as well as being basic to the religious 
rituals and world views of most primitive, or non-technological 
societies. It may be suggested that it is the Judea-Christian 
doctrine with its emphasis on man as the centre of the universe 
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and standing apart from and distinct from, the rest of "The Creation" 
(i.e. a non-holistic view of man) which is responsible for the aliena-
tion of man from his environment. It is only in relatively very re-
cent times that an intersystems approach has been consciously re-
adopted and employed in academic pursuits by Western man. 
For pragmatic purposes (because it would be impossible to study the 
total environment, giving equal emphasis to every component part) it 
is necessary to isolate and focus on particular subsystems and their 
interrelationships. Those variables specifically dealt with in this 
study are the social and cognitive systems, and the built environ-
mental system. 
2.3. TALCOTT PARSONS AND THE "HUMAN ACTION SYSTEM" 
A theoretical scheme which offers a useful referential framework by 
which to study the man-environment interface holistically is provided 
in the work of the sociologist, Talcott Parsons. Parsons is a sys-
tems theorist who is concerned with the study of "societies as wholes" 
(1966, p.l); his recent works are generally cited as the best, socio-
logical example of general systems theory (Poloma, 1979, p.112). His 
theoretical scheme is interdisciplinary, requiring a knowledge of at 
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least biology, psychology, economics and political science for an 
understanding of how society as an "open system" (i.e. a system which 
is interdependent with its environment) qperates (1970a). It is the 
interdisciplinary, systems approach of Parson's work which is of par-
ticular importance to this thesis. 
Although it is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss in 
detail the strengths and weaknesses of Parson's "grand theory", it is 
important to see his work in a critical perspective. The work of 
Parson's has come under attack from numerous sources, in9luding con-
flict theorists (C. Wright Mills and others) and social psychologists. 
The primary criticism is levied against the conservative bias inherent 
in structural functionalism (Structural functionalism, like all theory, 
rests on particular assumptions about the nature of society and the 
nature of human beings. However, these assumptions tend to be con-
servative, i.e. they focus on the existing social structure rather 
than on social change) and its inability to deal adequately with re-
volutionary or rapid social change. Although Parsons has attempted 
to move towards a revision of his functionalist model through general 
systems theory (his cybernetic model (1970b) represents an attempt to 
infuse the concept of change into his structural model), it appears 
that his revisions can still account for only slow changes within the 
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system, still failing to account adequately for violence and revolution 
(Poloma, 1979, p.121). Objections to his work have also focussed on 
the problem of empirically verifying his abstract theoretical formula-
tions •. (Raison, 1979) 
Nevertheless, whilst recognizing the inherent problems in his macro 
theory, the attitude is taken here that Parsons has contributed sub-
stantially to t~e development of sociological thought and that although 
the possibilities of applying his theories in their total and pure 
forms are more limited than he himself has claimed, many of his con-
ceptions do provide valuable perspectives and guidelines. 
In the context of this thesis certain aspects of Parson's work are re-
!event and useful, specifically his "human action system". This pro-
vides a theoretical scheme of intersystem relationships, incorporating 
the physical and non-physical aspects of the total environment. 
Parsons (1966) defines "human action" as consisting of 
the structures and processes by which human beings form 
meaningful intentions and, more or less successfully, 
implement them in concrete situations. (p.5) 
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(He uses the word "meaningful" to imply the symbolic or cultural level 
of representation and reference; "intentions" and "implement" taken 
together imply a disposition of the action system to modify its re-
lation to its situation or environment in an intended direction). 
He uses the term "action" rather than "behaviour", since he wishes to 
emphasize, not the physical events of behaviour for their own sake, 
but rather the patterning of events, their patterned meaningful pro-
ducts (ranging from implements to works of art), and the mechanisms 
and processes that control such patterning. 
Parson's scheme emphasizes the situational factors contributing to 
human action and is based on the idea that the "human action system" 
comprises 5 primary, interacting subsystems, namely: 
1) the culturalsystem 
2) social system 
3) personality system 
4) behavioral organism 
5) the physical-organic environment 
Parsons treats each of these subsystems as fulfilling a functional im-
perative of the general action system. These subsystems, which in-
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elude the political, economic and technological aspects of society, 
provide environments for each other. Each of the subsystems is 
subject to influence by, and capable of influencing each of the 
other subsystems. Parsons (1970a) emphasizes the interdependence 
of each of these subsystems whe~ he observes: 
Concretely, every empirical system is all of them at 
once; thus there is no concrete human individual who 
is not an organism, a personality, a member of a social 
system, and a participant in the cultural system. (p.44) 
William Michelson (1970) a sociologist who has contributed a great 
deal to man~environment studies, has examined the interdependence 
of physical structure and social structure using a Parsonian frame-
work. His "intersystem congruence" model is applied mainly to the 
study of how well different environments actually accommodate the 
characterittics and behavior of people who use them. This Michel-
son refers to as "experiential congruence". However, he also intro-
duces the notion of "mental congruence" which deals more with the 
cognitive aspects of environmental experience: "Mental congruence 
exists if an individual thinks that particular spatial patterns will 
successf~lly accommodate his personal characteristics, values, and 
style of life" (p.3Q), regardless of whether they can be empirically 
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substantiated or not. He cites the example of the large number of 
people who believe that the suburbs are a good place to raise families. 
This state of mental congruence between "familism" and "suburbanism" 
can exist even though a state of experiential congruence between the 
two may not. Thus, although Michelson does not develop this theme, 
he does recognize that people's perceptions and conceptions of their 
environment are often more important than the realities of the en-
vironment itself. 
Parson's "human action system" serves as a general frame of reference 
within which the theoretical formulations of this thesis are developed. 
2.4. A MULTIDISCIPLINARY ORIENTATION 
The holistic intersystems perspective proposed in the previous section 
requires that the traditional boundaries between the academic disciplines 
be transgressed. The rigid adherence to these artificial demarcation 
lines, tends to limit the advancement of knowledge and understanding. 
Similarly, Bruhn (1974) suggests that there is no single best approach 
to the study of human ecological problems and that single disciplinary 
studies of man~environment interrelationships, and processes that affect 
these relationships can provide only a small glimpse of the total eco-
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logical complex (pp. 105-125). 
An important objective of this thesis is to draw on theories and re-
search· findings from numerous disciplines and thus to bridge many 
arbitrarily defined boundaries separating fields, which at least 
potentially, can contribute to a greater understanding of the way 
people experience their physical environments. 
2.5. THE DIALECTICAL MODEL 
The dialectic is a conceptual model of universal relations and their 
transformation.through. time. All phenomena are seen as being in 
motion, in a process of perpetual change. Transformations in the 
total environment develop by a process of: thesis7 antithesis7 
synthesis~ Each event or phenomenon (thesis) contains within it 
internal contradictions (the "seeds of change") which then generate 
the development of the antithesis which is synthesized to form a 
new thesis. This thesis again contains within it internal contra-
dictions, and so the process repeats itself, not in a linear nor a 
cyclical pattern, but rather in a forward-moving spiral-like pattern. 
The idea of dialectic oriqinates in the work of Hegel. However, its 
impact in the intellectual forum was significantly heightened when 
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Marx and Engels, having liberated it from Hegelian idealism, applied 
it to an interpretation of man in society •. The dialectical model 
forms a fundamental framework for Marxist theory and it is in this 
context that it ·is most widely known. However, the dialectical 
model, as a doctrine of the universal laws governing the development 
of nature, human society and thought, is in no way bound specifi-
cally to Marxism; it has a more general application. 
The dialectical model is a useful contruct by which to explain the 
nature of relationships between ceitain phenomena. It is used in 
this thesis to explain and describe the underlying structure of the 
relations between human experien~e and the built environment. It 
emphasizes the mutual influence between these phenomena and the 
dynamic nature of their relations over time. Man is viewed as 
being in a dialectical relationship with the built environment; he 
is not a passive product of his environment but rather, he inter-
acts with the environment, shaping it and in turn being shaped by it 
in a spiralling creative process. 
The adoption of the diafectical model to explain the relations be-
tween human experience and the built environment represents a de-
parture from Parson's cybernetic model of intersystem relations 
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which stresses a cyclical and hierarchical structure (1970b and 
Parsons et al, 1961). Whilst his general categorization of sys-
tems and their interdependent nature are accepted here, the spe-
cific pattern of relationships which Parsons proposes and the 
cultural deterministic position which he adopts is rejected in 

















) 3 -· en (D . en 
. 
Very little attention has been given in the literature on man-
environment studies to the implicit "models of man", definitions 
of "environment", epistemological bases, etc. on which specific 
ideas and investigations are based. However, whether or not 
acknowledged and made explicit, assumptions on these issues are 
implied in all research on the relationship between the built 
environment and the human condition. 
This section examines some of the basic premises underlying the 
theoretical postion outlined in this study. Certain important 
assumptions which guide the work are made explicit. This exer-
cise follows Popper's belief (according to Bryan Magee, 1973) 
that 
we, all of us, take a great number of things for 
granted, and many of these assumptions are of a 
philosophical character; we act on them in pri-
vate life, in politics, in our work, and in every 
other sphere of our lives - but while some of these 
assumptions are no doubt true, it is likely that 
more are false and some are harmful. So the cri-
tical examination of our presuppositions - which 
is a philosophical activity - is morally as well as 
intellectually important. (p.15) 
33. 
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Presuppositions are discussed regarding 1) the ro~e of theory, 
2) the nature of man, 3) the extent of environmental influence 
on human behavior and experience, and 4) a definition of reality. 
3.1. THE ROLE OF THEORY 
It is important to put the entire body of theoretical work pre-
sented in this thesis into perspective. This section explicates 
some ideas about the notion of theory which underly this thesis; 
ideas about the function of theory, the limitations of theory and 
what can be reasonably expected from a theory. 
The pri~ary objective of theory building is to organize apparently 
unconnected ideas and knowledge into a coherent framework capable 
of 1) explaining phenomena, - 2) predicting probable patterns of 
phenomena and 3) forming the foundation of new research. Moore 
and Golled_ge (1976) define the role of th~ory: 
Theories organize and systematize bodies of knowledge 
by carefully itemizing the relationships between bits 
of knowledge... Once the basic theorized relation-
ships are made clear, further knowledge accumulates by 
unpacking sets of interrelationships [authors italics] 
among the bits of knowledge and examining their mean-
ing and use. (p.28) 
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They also point out that problems peculiar to researchers attempting 
to construct theories related to environmental cognition arise from 
the fact that they must be concerned not only in the external socio-
physical environment and the internalizing of human actions, but also 
with the interface between the two (p.28). 
However,to explain the phenomena in question is not merely to show 
that. they are instances of well-established regularities; theories 
need to explain those regularities. The necessary connections be-
tween phenomena must be sought by acquiring knowledge of the under-
lying structures and mechanisms at work. Thus, in this sense, a 
theory can be defined as a description of the structures and mecha-
nisms which contribute towards the existence of a particular pheno-
menon. 
The well-known conclusion of the French physicist and historian of 
science, Pierre Duhem (1954, Part 2, Chapter 6) that there can be no 
crucial test to prove or refute a hypothesis or theory has had far 
reaching implications and is widely accepted in the academic fra-
ternity: 
no matter how many tests are carried out, the law cannot 
be said to be certainly verified since there always re-
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mains the possibility that then+ 1th observation, 
following a finite series, will be inconsistent with it. 
(Giddens, 1976, p.140) 
/ 
Since no theory can be subjected to all possible tests to prove its 
truth, Kuhn (1970) notes that "few philosophies of science still 
seek absolute criteria for the verification of scientific theories •• 
they ask not whether a theory has been verified but rather about 
its probability in the light of the evidence that actually exists" 
(p.145). Theories are not true or false - they are only more or 
less useful in their explanatory potential. Theories can be com-
pared according to their ability to explain the evidence at hand. 
When one theory is no longer as convincing as another, it is re-
placed by a theory with more explanatory probability. 
Feyerabend (1978) takes the point further. As a self-proclaimed 
"scientific anarchist", his guiding principle is "anything goes" 
(p.28) which indicates his general attitude towards theories. "We 
can only speak of what does, or does not, seem appropriate when 
viewed from a particular and restricted point of view" (p.21). 
Kuhn (1970) notes that it has been repeatedly demonstrated "that more 
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than one theoretical construction can always be placed on a given 
collection of data" (p.76). Since there can be.no "absolute" 
theory which represents the "truth" as such, the theories subscribed 
to at any given time must be held tentatively, with the awareness 
that they are valid only insofar as they are useful, that is, as 
long as they continue to offer the most convincing explanation of 
the particular ph~nomenon being exa~ined. 
The related notions of theory and practice have co-existed over the 
centuries in all disciplines, fluc~uating in importance and emphasis. 
Architecture, as both art and science, has traditionally placed its 
emphasis on practice and shown relatively little concern with aca-
demic theory building. Very few fully fledged and developed theories 
of architecture are to be found in the literature. Theory is, how-
ever, essential to direct the practical activity of architectural 
design and planning. At the same time it is not enough to remain 
at this abstract level; abstract concepts must be imbued with life. 
Theory not confirmed in praxis - that is, action based on critical 
theory with the intention of transforming reality - is relatively 
impotent. 
Theory plays a necessary role in bridging the gap between human science 
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research and environmental design. A theoretical framework is 
needed to link human experience and behavior to its environmental 
context. Theory, however, plays a different role within the human 
sciences from that within the design professions. For the behavioral 
scientist, theory integrates diverse experimental findings and indi-
cates which variables should be explored in further experiments, which 
variables must be·controlled in these experiments and which ones can 
be safely ignored. For the designer, a theory provides the grounds 
for making predictions about design solutions that have not been the 
object of specific research. It is through theory, as well as in-
tuition, that the designer can anticipate the impact of a proposed 
design project before it is actually implemented. 
The theoretical model and concepts outlined in this work do not re-
present a complete and fully resolved theory but rather can be seen 
-as moving toward such a theory, that is, certain theoretical notions 
are discussed which might lead to the advancement of our understanding 
\ 
of man's relationship to the built environ~ent. 
3.2. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MAN 
Any theory of man-environment relations must be based, at least im-
plicitly, on certain assumptions about both the nature of man and the 
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12 Any theory of man-environment 
must be based on a particular 
model of man. 
nature of the environment. Different views about human nature (and 
about the environment) lead naturally to different conclusions about 
the role and significance of the environment in human life processes, 
and subsequently to different decisions in planning policy and the 
design of man-made environments. 
Since these assumptions are integral to the formulation of a theoreti-
cal model of man's relationship with his environment (including his 
experience of that environment), and act as a point of departure in 
the processes of environmental planning and design, it is important 
that the particular view of man underlying the theoretical postula-
tions of this thesis should be defined and made explicit. 
There is much controversy regarding the appropriate model of man upon 
which to base theoretical and practical procedures. It has also been 
argued, especially by Sartre, (1948, p.28) that "there is no human 
nature" about which there may be true or false theories. This is a 
typically existentialist rejection of general statements about man. 
Man simply finds himself existing and then has to decide what to make 
of himself; he has not b~en created for any purpose, neither by God, 
nor evolution·nor anything else. He has the freedom to decide what 
to make of himself - ''Man is·nothing else but that which he makes of 
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himself" (p.28). However one could argue that Sartre does not mean 
to deny that there may be certain properties which are universal to 
human beings, e.g. the need to eat in order to survive. His central 
assertion that "man is condemned to be f:ree" is itself a general state-
ment about the human condition. Presumably what Sartre means is 
that there are no "true" general statements about what all men ought 
to be (which ~sin keeping with his rejection of any notion of objec-
tive values (1957, p.38). 
Different models of man have been held during the course of man's 
history; not only are these different views of man time-related, but 
they are also culture-bound, e.g. the traditional Western view of man, 
is rooted in the Greek philosopher, Protagoras' dictum, that "man is 
the measure of all things", as opposed to the oriental view of man as 
being an integral part of nature, rather than the centre of the uni-
verse. These differing conceptual attitudes about man have had a 
definite impact on thinking, as can be seen in the history of science, 
religion and the arts. 
Different conceptions of mdn are prevalent within the human science 
disciplines. Altman (1975, p.201) has isolated four different models 
of man that have an important influence on current research and prac-
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tice in the man-environment field of study: 
1) The "mechanistic model" - which views man primarily as a task-
orientated, performing organism - it places emphasis on per-
formance-related behaviours. This model was popular in the 
1950's and early 1960's but is no longer widely recognized 
today. 
2) The "perceptual-cognitive-motivational model of man" is pre-
valent and dominates much thin~ing in man-environment studies 
at thP. present time. This approach conceives of man as an 
organism with several internal processes (perceptual and cog-
nitive responses, motivational and emotional states, etc.); 
it is more concerned with subjective psychological processes 
than with overt behavioral responses. 
Various techniques are available for the measurement of how 
man "sees", feels and evaluates the environment, e.g. Osgood's 
Semantic - Differential method (Osgood et al, 1957), Kelly's 
Repertory Grid Tech11ique (Kelly, 1955) and the use of "cogni-
tive maps" as described by Downs and Stea (1977). 
3) The "behavioral model of man" defines man as an essentially 
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behaviorally functioning organism. This approach to man em-
phasizes the study of overt behavior rather than internal psycho-
logical processes, that is, the unobservable feelings, thoughts, 
images, etc, which people have. 
4) The "social" - systems, ecological model of man" is a relatively 
unexplored approach in man-environment studies. A central theme 
underlying this model is that people-environment relations are 
part of a complex ecosystem. There is a reciprocal relationship 
between man and his environment; each influences and shapes the 
other in a dynamic time-linked sense. Man is thus seen as an 
environmental change agent, not merely a recipient of environ-
mental influences. Altman (1975) has adopted this model in his 
analysis of the relationship between the built environment and 
social interaction. 
It should be noted that the "model of man" presented in this 
thesis is not a formal theoretical structure with a fully deve-
loped, integrated and articulated network of principles and con-
cepts, but rather a set of general assumptions about man as he 
.relates to the physical environment. The assumptions proposed 
serve merely as a broad general approach, a working strategy, for 
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the study of man's experience of the built environment, and as 
such, has distinct implications for how the environment should 
be conceptualized. 
These assumptions represent a synthesis of ideas from both the 
cognitive-motivational and the ecological models of man dis-
cussed above. 
3.2.1. The complexity of man 
Shakespeare's famous lines from Hamlet express a sense of awe at the 
complexity and greatness of man: 
What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! 
infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express 
and admirable! in action how like an angel! in 
apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! 
the paragon of animals! ••••••• (Act 2, Scene 2). 
However, the complexity and uniqueness of man is vested, not only in 
his diverse capacities to think, to 
but in the "interrelated'' [author's 
functions and processes" (Ittelson 
experience, to act, and so on, 
italics] nature of all these 
et al, 1974, p.83). Experience, 
for example, arises and operates within an enormously complex system 
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of action, perception, thought, emotion, interpretation, etc. which 
1s functionally related to physiological, social, cultural and physical 
environmental circumstances. 
Thus the first assumption about man is constituted in the conception 
of man as a complex and dynamically organized system whose behavior 
and experience express the intricate interrelations among his inter-
acting functions and processes. (Ittelson et al, 1974, p.83)! 
Man's relationship to the built environment cannot be studied by ana-
lyzing specific experiences or behaviors in isolation. Reductionistic-
analysis, which seeks to understand complex human processes by establish-
ing their basic irreducible elements, e.g. the S - R unit of behaviorism, 
is limited in that man is more than a sum of his parts and should be 
viewed in a more holistic sense. The Gestalt dictum that "the whole 1s 
more than the sum of its parts'' expresses the idea that it is not merely 
the sum of a person's mental and physical characteristics, but the 
pattern of interrelationships which occur when these characteristics 
are grouped together that gives the total configuration its own uniqueness. 
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3.2.2. Man is an integral part of the total environment 
Since both man and the built environment form an integral part of the 
total environment, that is the physical and non-physical environments 
(cf. Chapter 2.2. - The Holistic Approach), the relationship between 
man and the built environment is further complicated by these con-
textual implications. 
Behavior and experience with relation to the physical environment is 
not simply a function of inner-organismic factors, such as physiologi-
cal, psychological, socio-cultural forces (that is, needs, values, 
aspirations, belief systems, etc.); neither is it simply a function 
of external socio-physical situational demands; it is also not a 
function of the summation of both internal and external factors. Be-
havior and experience is determined by the interaction of all these 
factors, each in the context of the others and in the context of their 
mutual interactions. This reasoning, that it is the pattern of rela-
tionships between intra- and extra-organismic factors in the total 
environmental context, that determines the individual's experience of 
a particular environment and his behavior in that environment, is 
integral to the proposed model of environmental cognition which is 
introduced in Chapter 7 - the Concept of Environmental Cognition. 
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3.2.3. Man lives in a dialectical relationship with the built 
environment 
Traditionally, the social and behavioral sciences have studied man 
as if he was separate from the physical environment. Barker (1968), 
Altman (1975) and others, have recognized that behavior must be 
studied within an environmental context; it is impossible to separate 
behavior from its socio-physical context, since behavior and milieu 
are dynamically and intimately connected. Barker proposes a people-
environment unit, the "behavior-setting" as the appropriate unit of 
study. 
This brings us to the third assumption about man, that is, that he 
exists in a dialectical relationship with the built environment. 
There is mutual impact between man and his environment, resulting in 
the modification and ultimate transformation of both phenomena in an 
ongoing spiral-like process (cf. Chapter 2.5 - The Dialectical Model). 
Thus, while the built environment is a material product of man's 
interaction with the total environment and reflects characteristics 
of that environment, the built environment is in turn an active in-
fluence on man's experience and behavior. In other words, man's 
behavior and experience can only be fully understood in the context 
of the total organism-in-environment situation and as a function of 
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the particular ongoing transaction between the two. (This follows 
the transactional position discussed in Chapter 3.4.) 
The influence of the built environment is not one of simple causality 
where a particular environmental configuration necessarily determines 
a particular behavioral or experiential response. Whilst the arrange-
ment of furniture and objects in a room, the layout of rooms within a 
building or buildings within a neighbourhood, as well as more quali-
tative aspects of ambience, distinctiveness, etc. clearly do influence 
man's response, this influence is of a reciprocal rather than simple 
causal nature. This reciprocal process is succinctly described by 
Sir Winston Churchill's well-known observation that "we shape our 
buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us" (quoted by Deasy, 
1974, p.5). Speaking in 1943 after German bombers had destroyed the 
House of Commons, Churchill was urging its immediate reconstruction 
despite the acknowledged inadequacy of the size of the Chambers. His 
argument was based on an astute understanding of how the shape of a 
meeting chamber influenced party discipline. Parliamentary debates 
had been conditioned by the physical character of the oblong form of 
chamber in which the face-to-face arrangement offered a pattern of con-
frontation rather than co-operation, and also imposed a restraint on 
impulsive "crossing the floor" and switching parties. To change this 
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13 The Chamber of the British House 
of Conunons, 1935. 
14 The rebui 1 t Chamber as it stands 
today. 
physical form would affect the manner of debate and possibly undermine 
the very structure of British democracy. 
3.2.4. Man is a goal-orientated organism 
Another presupposition regarding the nature of man is the conception 
that man is a goal-directed organism. This is an important assump-
tion, since it draws attention to the intentionality of man and denies 
that his behavior and experience is simply a mechanistic response to 
particular stimuli. The purposiveness of man is a major determinant 
of environmental cognition, experience and behavior. 
What ~re the fundamental human motives that initiate and direct be-
havior in ways and towards ends that will satisfy the individual? 
This question has been asked for centuries by politicians, theologians, 
philosophers; and in recent times sociologists, psychologists and 
others have attempted to uncover and define man's basic needs and wants. 
Needs are rooted in the physiological, psychological and social systems 
of man. Hunger, thirst and respiration for example are physiologi-
cally based and necessary for the existence of the individual; sex 
and maternal behavior are physiologically based, but psychologically 
and socially influenced. The frustration of the sex drive or maternal 
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"instinct" in no sense threatens the existence of the individual. 
Research in sensory deprivation (e.g. Zubek, 1969) has shown that 
the satisfaction of merely physiological survival needs, such as 
food, water, warmth, etc., does not lead to a satisfying existence. 
Piaget's concept of "equilibration" provides an insight into the 
psychological processes whereby man strives to resolve tensions 
that arise in the course of his cognitive development. Briefly, 
"equilibration" involves a dialectical process whereby mental 
structures are modified over a period of time to achieve a rela-
tively stable (but inherently dynamic) functional cognitive struc-
ture. Piaget contends that the need for balance provides an in-
trinsic motivating force underlying the individual's interaction 
with the environment. Equilibrium is attained as a result of 
interaction between the individual and the environment. (Phillips, 
1969, p.13) 
The more complex motives of the individual - his need for self-
esteem, affiliation, recognition, security, privacy, etc., so 
that he may fulfill himself as a creative, productive and autono-
mous human being - are rooted in the values of his socio~cultural 
system. It is these needs, the fulfilment of \Jiich is essential 
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for the attainment of a satisfactory quality of life, that are so 
frequently ignored by policy makers, planners and designers. 
According to Proshansky et al (1970, p.170), what has emerged 
in recent years from extensive work in the field of human needs 
and motivations seems to be a general consensus among human 
scientists that man's needs and want s are many and diverse and 
that their sum and substance are ultimately a product of socia-
lization. He suggests that the distinction · between primary 
drives (e.g. hunger and thirst) and the more complex secondary, or 
learned social motives (e.g. the need for status, affiliation, re-
cognition) is in fact fallacious: 
All human drives, both primary and secondary, are in 
the last analysis the product of the individual's ex-
periences in a series of socio-cultural systems - the 
family, neighbourhood, geographical region, and so on. 
The intensity of the person's hunger or sex drive, the 
objects that satisfy it, the means of achieving these 
objects, and even his responses to frustrations of 
these drives are as much a function of human sociali-
zation as are the secondary or more complex social 
motives. (p.170) 
The physical environment plays an important role in the satisfaction 
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Psychological and social needs 
have been ignored by policy 
makers and designers. 
~ (left) Coloured housing on the 
Cape Flats 
16 (above) High-rise housing 
Netherlands. 
in the 
of man's needs and the achievement of his goals. In terms of basic 
survival, man always stands in a relation of need to the physical 
environment - air, food, water, shelter are essential requirements 
which are provided by the environment. In terms of social and 
psychological goals, the physical environment is relevant to the 
extent that it facilitates or hinders the accomplishment of those 
goals which an individual sets out to achieve, and by which he 
defines himself. If a particular physical environment does not 
offer the potential for achieving these goals, a number of alter-
natives are open: he can (a) move to another environment (if it 
is possible), (b) re-organize it, (c) adapt to it by adjusting 
his goals and learning new behavioral responses, or (d) he can re-
main in the particular environment and suffer stress due to the 
frustration of his needs. 
3.2.5. Man is a cognitive animal 
Man has been defined as a goal-directed, mobile organism capable 
of manipulating his environment or changing his position in the 
environment. In this respect he is not different to certain 
animals: birds, for example, build nests to protect their young 
and migrate to more hospitable environs in the cold months. However, 
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what makes man distinctive are his cognitive capacities. 
The concept of cognition is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 
in the specific context of "environmental cognition". What follows 
here is a brief discussion of the general nature of cognition and 
its role in human life processes. 
Cognition refers to the psychological processes by which the indi-
vidual gives meaning to and attains knowledge of the world around 
him. Pikunas (1976) defines cognition: 
Perceptual grouping and modelling, encoding and de-
coding, underlie the process of cognition. Broad 
in its function, cognition (author's italics] refers 
primarily to conceiving and dealing with concepts, 
analyzing and synthesizing, deciding and theorizing. 
As a generic term it encompasses all processes by 
which knowledge of an object or relationship is 
attained, including sensory data and perception, 
memory and imagination, hypothesizing, and other 
logical operations. (p.90) 
Psychologists have shown that cognition is a complex process in-
valving many variables. The naive realist view that we simply 
perceive a world which is common to us all has been shaken by the 
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relativist views of contemporary theorists. The processes and re-
sulting products of cognition are influenced by a complex network 
of interrelated factors operating within the total "human action 
system'' (cf. Chapter 2.3 - Talcott Parsons). Norberg-Schulz 
(1971, p.10) confirms this with his contention that we see: 
different worlds which are a product of our motiva-
tions and past experiences. In general, perception 
[ cognitionl aims at valid assumptions about the 
nature of the environment, and these assumptions vary 
according to the situations in which we are taking 
part. 
For example, a bus driver bases his actions on different assumptions 
from those of a pedestrian in the same street. 
The alternative to this view of man, as actively selecting and pro-
cessing environmental stimuli, is what Popper refers to as the 
"bucket theory", where the mind is an empty receptacle to all en-
vironmental inputs (Popper, 1972). 
Piaget uses the concept of "schemata" t~ explain how the developing 
individual orders his world and gives meaning to it in the process 
of gaining increasingly more complex functional knowledge of his world. 
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"Schemata [author's i tali~s] are the cognitive structures by which 
individuals intellectually adapt to and organize their environment" 
(Pikunas, 1976, p.18). Piaget's theory demonstrates that any sti-
mulus from the external world is filtered through a mental struc-
ture of schemata which thus influences the resulting conception. 
Cognition, or the ways in which the individual processes information, 
is intimately related to the content and quality of his experience 
and to the manner and effectiveness of his behavior. It is thus 
the single psychological process most critical for man-environment 
interaction and forms the focus of this thesis. 
3.2.6. Man has a non-rational dimension 
It is important to recognize the non-rational aspects of man's 
nature, that is, the pait played by affect and emotion, since these 
exert an influence upon both behavior and experience. 
Leff (1978, p.83) draws a distinction between "affect" and "emotion": 
Affect [author's italics] is a psychological term for 
the inner experience of an emotion or feeling. The 
term emotion,[author's italics] by contrast, is used 
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to refer to the combination (author's italics] of 
experiential, behavioral, and physiological pro-
cesses involved in states such as anger, fear, and 
Joy. 
Feelings such as aesthetic pleasure and displeasure can thus be seen 
as affects. 
For Paiget, schemata include affective states, since emotions can-
not be separated from cognitive processes. There is a fusion, with 
a predominance of either cognition or emotion. 
Not only do people evoke affective and emotional responses; cities, 
neighbourhoods and rooms can be "friendly", "frightening", "hospi-
table", etc. and evoke affective states such as fear, joy and plea-
sure. Besides the experiential aspect of these emotions in them-
selves, they also provoke and direct particular behavioral res-
ponses, e.g. a person might avoid or move rapidly through an un-
pleasant or frightening place, or he might try to modify and improve 
that place. Ittelson et al (1974) draw attention to the recipro-
cal relationship between places and emotions: "Places may evoke 
particular feelings, and already existing feelings may colour the 
individual's perception of places" (p.88). 
55. 
.., 
tc:..; ------ \"_ .. :\ 
Places evoke different 
emotional responses. 
(Clockwise, from above left): 
17 The great foyer space of the 
Hyatt Regency Hotel, Atlanta 
(John Portman); 
18 Living space in the Burns Ho use, 
Santa Monica, California 
(Charles Moore); 
19 interior of Amiens Cathedral; 
20 Decumanus at Gerasa, 
The way a person experiences a particular environment is influenced 
by the affective state he brings to the situation, e.g. a man who has 
just had an argument with his wife and is feeling irritable and angry 
may experience a particular room as "restrictive" or "loathsome", 
whereas a man who has just won the jackpot and is feeling "on top of 
the world" might experience that same room as "cosy" and "pleasant". 
3.3. ARCHITECTURAL DETERMINISM 
For decades, geographers, planners and architects, psychologists, 
sociologists and anthropologists have debated the question of whether 
the physical environment has significant behavioral and attitudinal 
effects on people, or not. 
The deterministic model holds that the physical environment deter-
mines human behavior and social patterns. Richard Neutra's now in-
famous statement: "Let me design a house for a happily married 
couple, and I can have them divorced within six months" (quoted by 
Alexander, 1969, p.183) embodies the view of architectural deter-
minism. According to this view, with its behaviorist underpinnings, 
the architect holds a very powerful position by which he can manipu-
late the physical environment to produce specified behaviours. This 






21 "We shape our buildings and our 
buildings shape us." 
determinism, implies not only the negation of free will and a passive 
one-way moulding of man by the environment, but also that the physical 
environment is the exclusive determinant that totally shapes behavior. 
This however, is no longer widely recognized as a valid approach. 
At the opposite extreme of this model is the view that the physical 
environment plays~ role in influencing human behavior. However, 
between these two polar extremes there are more moderate views where 
some degree of influence is recognized. Conclusions drawn from nume-
rous findings (for example, Cooper, 1975; Michelson, 1970) indicate 
that design has some social and behavioral implications, but not as 
many as some designers wish to believe; that negative implications 
outweigh positive ones and that bad design can hurt more than good 
design can help. Herbert Gans, (in the Foreword to Cooper's "Easter 
Hill Village'', 1975), puts it another way: 
good user-oriented design can make life somewhat more 
pleasant and comfortable; design mistakes, including 
the mistake of ignoring user needs or wishes, can make 
people uncomfortable and even hurt them; but design 
per se cannot change people's lives significantly, for 
it cannot relieve poverty or the problems associated 
with it, or transform unhappy marriages into happy ones. 
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The notion of "possibilism" appeared (mainly in the field of geography) 
as a reaction against determinism. According to this view, the physi-
cal environment provides possibilities and constraints within which 
people make choices, based on other, mainly socio-cultural, criteria. 
Thus man is not seen as a passive recipient of environmental stimuli; 
he actively evaluates the opportunities offered by the particular en-
vironment and selects those to be pursued. (Moos, 1976, p.47). 
A more recently proposed approach, and one which is currently most 
widely accepted in man-environment studies is that of "probabilism". 
This perspective, which bridges the gap between environmental causa-
lity and free will, recognizes that the physical environment provides 
possibilities for choice, that it is not determining, but that some 
choices are more probable than others in given physical settings. 
According to Rapoport (1977, p.2): 
The most current view is that the built environment can 
be seen as a setting for human activities. Such settings 
may be inhibiting or facilitating and a particular setting 
may be facilitating to the extent of acting as a catalyst 
or releasing latent behavior but cannot, however, deter-
mine or generate [author's italics] activities. Similarly, 
inhibiting environments will generally make certain behavior 
more difficult, but will not usually block them completely, 
although it is easier to block behavior than to generate it, 
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The position which underlies all theoretical discussion regarding the 
man-environment interface in this thesis is that of "probabilism" as 
defined above, and operating within a dynamic w~ole-system context. 
The physical environment is part of a vast interacting system of 
socio-cultural, psychological and physical components, none of which 
1s a pure cause or a pure effect. The effect of the physical en-
vironment on people must be assessed in the light of their psycho-
logical and socio-cultural characteristics. 
The suburbs have been heavily criticized for being monotonous and 
repetitious environments giving rise to the emergence of the homo-
genized middle-class suburbanite. However, the conclusions of 
Peter Berger's study (1960) of working class residents in a suburb 
in San Francisco (referred to by Ittelson et al, 1974, p.349) re-
futes the notion that suburban housing by itself can change people's 
behavior and transform a non-middle-class lifestyle into a middle-
class suburban pattern of living. In this study Berger found that 
the working-class residents who moved into this suburb retained, to 
a large extent, a style of living which was very similar to that 
practised in their former environment prior to moving. The effect 
of the housing and neighbourhood was thus filtered through a screen 
of socio-cultural factors. 
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The built environment is one of the less important influences on user 
satisfaction. Forces of culture, social class and other social re-
lationships, and personality factors play a greater role in influen-
cing human behavior and general satisfaction with one's environment. 
(cf. studies of user-satisfaction by Gutman and Westergaard, 1974). 
However, despite the fact that the built environment plays a relative-
ly minor part in human affairs, it does play~ part; it is this 
role of the built environment within the total human action system 
which needs to be explored, understood and defined. 
3.4. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL COGNITION 
The investigation of environmental knowing implicitly bears upon cer-
tain general epistemological questions regarding the nature, validity 
and origins of knowledge. Two fundamental issues which underly an 
understanding of environmental cognition must be clarified: 
1) how knowledge in general is attained, and 2) how this knowledge 
relates to reality. 
Before proceeding with this task, the key terms, "reality" and "know-
ledge" will be defined. Berger and Luckmann, (1979, p.13) provide 
concise definitions. "Reality" is construed as: 
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a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize 
as having a being independent of our own volition (we 
cannot wish them away) 
and "knowledge" is construed as: 
the certainty that phenomena are real and that they 
possess specific characteristics. 
The basic epistemological position adopted in this study is the 
constructivist position, based on Nee-Kantian theories of know-
ledge (as embraced and developed by philosophers such as Dewey 
and Bentley, psychologists such as Piaget and Werner, sociolo-
gists such as Mead, as well as others). The discussion which 
follows is informed by, and based largely on the ideas advanced 
by Moore and Golledge (1976, pp. 14-16). 
The essential postulat~ is that "reality", in general, and of the 
physical environment in particular, is not given but is constructed 
by the subject through his active involvement with the environment. 
Whilst it is accepted that an empirical reality does exist, it is 
contended that there can be no direct access to this reality, but 
that reality can only be "grasped through the effort of particular 
minds" (p.14). Thus what is taken to be reality is a product of 
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the mental act of knowing, that is, reality is a construction of 
thought. Rather than assuming that knowledge can ever copy what 
is real, knowledge is treated here as, "constructed though inten-
tional acts by an active organism from the interaction of sense-
tion and reason" (p.15). 
An example from the history of science which illustrates the way 
in which "reality" is determined by thought is found in the 
Ptolemaic-Copernican dichotomy. The Ptolemaic system postulated 
an earth-centred universe which implied, inter alia, a mobile sun 
revolving around a stationary earth. Copernicus rejected this 
and posited a helio-centric universe, that is, a static sun and 
revolving earth. It can be said that Ptolemaic man inhabited a 
different reality to Copernican man by virtue of their different 
theories, or mental paradigms. 
Piaget (1954) gives empirical psychological evidence to support 
the constructivist position. He shows how the child's construe-
tion of reality proceeds by the complimentary processes of assimi-
lation and accommodation, whereby stable mental structures, which 
filter and process every input, are developed. Epistemological 
relativism permeates Piaget's thinking about the construction of 
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reality. For Piaget, reality always involves a subjective element, 
in the sense that it is always, at least in part, a projection or 
externalization of thought or action. 
Essential to Piaget's general theory of cognitive development is the 
contention that the child actively initiates environmental explora-
tion, actively assimilates information and accommodates cognitive 
structures to enable new stimuli to be assimmilated and comprehended, 
and in general, actively and spontaneously structures his experience 
and knowledge as he enters into a creative interaction with the en-
vironment. It is only by way of action (both bodily and mental), 
in an interactive process between the individual and his environment, 
that knowledge of objects and phenomena is possible (Piaget, 1954). 
To deny that there is a psychological reality without the intervention 
of the subject's activity is not to deny the separate existence of an 
external world. All that such a denial means is that all knowledge 
is mediated, rather than immediate (or copied directly). 
Piaget 0 s Interactionistic Model is taken further by Moore and Golledge 
(1976), who take a transactional-constructivist position: 
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The child enters into a creative 
interaction with the environment. 
(Clockwise, from above left): 
22,23, 24 
Knowledge, or cognitive representations, •••• are formed 
through an active construction of thought influenced by 
both the person and the environment and by the transac-
tion between the two. (p.15) 
It is assumed in this position that one does not start with a dualistic 
split between the organism and the environment (as is the case in pri-
. marily interactional theories, including Piaget's); rather: 
what is taken to be the envi!onment is not a reality de-
fined independently of the observer, but a world esta-
blished or constructed by persons in the context of on-
going transactions in environments. (p.15) 
This transactional-constructivist position implies that reality is con-
structed by the individual in the course of his transactions with the 
environment. However, it is essential to note, that this position 
does no! imply the absolute subjectivity or uniqueness of environ-
mental knowledge: the construction of reality is a function of intra-
organismic variables (i.e. what the person brings to the situation, 
including genetic and biological factors, personality factors and 
socio-tultural value and belief systems, etc.), and extraorganismic fac-
tors (i.e. external socio-physical situational demands), and their 
interrelations,operating in the context of ongoing transactions of the 
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organism-in-environment. Social and cultural forces thus play an 
extremely important role (if not the crucial role) in influencing 
the construction of reality. 
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· · The State of the Art of Environ -
mental Cognition Studies 
4 
Interest in environmental cognition has become increasingly wide-
spread in the last three decades. A review of the literature on 
the development of environmental cognition theory reveals six gene-
ral tendencies. 
1) Interest in the field has manifested itself in studies within a 
wide range of disciplines, including Economics, Geography, Anthro-
pology, Sociology, Psychology, Urban Planning and more recently, 
Architecture. During the 1960's most of the work done in these 
different disciplines was conducted independently - there is 
little evidence of shared theories and methods across the diffe-
rent disciplines. 
The fact that the common approach of explaining behavior as a 
function of subjective environmental conceptions has ~een adopted 
independently, and more or less simultaneously, in a variety of 
disciplinary fields, suggests that this approach has a consider-
able explanatory potential. 
2) Most of the research conducted has been in the context of the 
.large scale urban environment, particularly the city. There has 
been relatively little work in the field of environmental cogni-
tion in the smaller scale context of individual buildings. 
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3) Studies have generally concentrated on determining the structure 
and content of cognitive representations, schemata or images of 
the environment with very little attention or effort directed 
towards making explicit the nature of the relationship between 
the cognitive process and its products on the one hand, and, 
behavior and experience on the other. 
4) Studies of environmental cognition are increasingly being con-
sidered in terms if their practical implications in relation to 
public policy, planning and design, e.g. geographers, Pocock and 
Hudson (1978) examine the potential value of urban and regional 
image-studies in the policy-making and plannlng process. En-
vironmental psychologists such as Stringer, (1975) have similarly 
become increasingly interested in ·the relevance of their findings 
to environmental decision-making. 
5) Many research studies are conducted without a firm and explicit 
theoretical base. This pitfall has, however, been recognized by 
certain researchers and in recent years there has been a marked 
increase in the development of theori~s aimed at guiding the 
.search for an understanding of the relationship.between behavior 
and experience, and the physical environment. (Parts 1 and 2, 
Moore and Golledge, 1976). 
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6) The research area of environmental cognition is characterized 
by a fundamental confusion over terminology. All research 
fields pass through an initial classification stage in which 
phenomena are identified, grouped, labelled and described, 
before a more stable and defined position is reached. Environ-
mental cognition is still in this confused phase of its develop-
ment, with its a~biguous and ill-d~fined terms, e.g. numerous 
terms such as "mental map", "image", "cognitive map", etc. are 
used to refer to cognitive representations of the physical en-
vironment. 
4.1. THE FORTIES 
The recent emergence of interest in the individual's subjective ex-
perience and mental representations of the physical environment was 
triggered off by 3 papers written in the late 1940's. 
The first was written in 1945 by the sociologist and economist, 
Walter Firey; he contrasted the traditional role of economic and 
"social ecology" analysis in urban planning decision-making with the 
role of city "sentiment" and "symbolism". 
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In 1947 the geographer, J.K. Wright, called for the examination of 
the place of mental structures, particularly imagination, in the study 
of geography. 
The third paper was by the co~nitive learning theorist, Edward C. 
Tolman, in 1948. He coined the term "cognitive map" to describe 
the subjective representation of the physical environment housed in 
the mind of the individual and which mediates behavioral responses. 
All three authors were concerned essentially with the role of subjec-
tive experience and knowledge of the large-scale environment in deter-
mining behavior in that environment, rather than the more traditional 
"objective" approach of science to explain behavior. In short, they 
postulated that behavior is mediated by the mental representation of 
the environment. 
4.2. THE FIFTIES 
However these studies were more or less isolated works and it was 
only in the late 1950's that the necessary impetus was given for a 
sustoined and concentrated research effort which continues today in 
the field of man-environment studies. 
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The economist, Kenneth Boulding, in his seminal book, "The Image" 
(1956) postulated the theory that the image - defined as accumulated 
subjective knowledge - is the vital link between people and environ-
ment and is the key common variable in influencing all behavior. 
This work was a major stimulis responsible for the renewed interest 
in the notion of mental structures, that is, images, schemata, etc. 
of the environment. Boulding suggested the name "eikonics" as the 
name for the study of images. His thesis was that reality could 
not be directly apprehended but could only be reached via messages 
through a complex system of images. He argued that "for any indi-
vidual organism ••• , there are no such things as "facts". There are 
only messages filtered through a changeable value system" (p.14). 
He suggested that images are relatively resistant to change in their 
overall nature. It requires an accumulation of contrary evidence 
before a complete re-organisation can occur. He classified the con-
cept of "image" into 10 dimensions (pp.47-48) which fall into two 
broad classes:- 1) value images and 2) factual and knowledge 
images. · 
4.3. THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES 
Studies in the subjective experience and knowledge of the physical 
environment became increasingly widespread in the 1960's. Contri-
... ~ - ,-·- ._.. 
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butions to this field of study came from a broad spectrum of disci-
plines, particularly Urban Planning, Geography and a number of the 
social sciences. Numerous academic subfields have been spawned in 
the past two decades by "parent" disciplines: Environmental Psycho-
logy, Social and Urban Geography in particular, have been investiga-
ting the role of environmental cognition in the man-environment inter-
face. 
This section will present a brief overview of some of the work done 
in the area of environmental cognition within the numerous disciplines 
concerned with this field of study: 
Kevin Lynch's "Image of the City" (1960) has been cited as possibly 
the single most important influence on environmental cognition studies 
(Moore and Golledge, 1976, p.17). Lynch, an urban planner, explored 
environmental cognition on an urban scale, his concern being with how 
people understand the structure of cities and how they use them. He 
was particularly concerned with the notion of "imageability" of diffe-
rent cities which he defined as: 
that quality in a physical object which gives it a high 
probability of evoking a strong image in any given ob-
server. It is that shape, colour, or arrangement which 
facilitates the making of vividly identified, powerfully 
structured, highly useful mental images of the environment. 
(p.9) 71. 
He interviewed residents from three major United States cities 
(Boston, Los Angeles, Jersey City). From the sketch maps and 
verbal answers to a set of questions, Lynch synthesized the res-
ponses into composite maps of the public image of each of the 
cities. He concluded that: 
There seems to be a public image of any given city 
which is the overlap of many individual images ..• 
Such group images are necessary if an individual is 
to operate successfully within his environment and 
to co-operate with his fellows. Each individual 
picture is unique, with some content that is rarely 
or never communicated, yet it approximates the pub-
lic image, which in different environments, is more 
or less compelling, more or less embracing. (p.46) 
In spite of subjective differences in the environmental images 
of his subjects he found that there were some regularities in the 
contents of the city images. These he classified into five types 
of elements: paths, edges, districts, nodes and landmarks. 
Lynch's method stresses what people think their environment looks 
like in terms of the images that have become significant to them 
over a period of time. These images give people a sense of orien-
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Images provide the group with a common memory of the environment in 
question, and to this extent enhance its meaning. According to 
Lynch, the "character" of a city is to a large degree its memorability 
manifested in the images it impresses on people's minds. 
Lynch's work has had a great impact on large-scale planning and design 
theory and has pointed the way to the examination of what attributes 
of a given environment contribute to making it legible, understandable 
and pivotal for orientation. 
Following Lynch's pioneering study a number of similar approaches to 
urban imagery have been undertaken which have generally confirmed his 
findings. Lynch's methodology and theory have been developed and ex-
panded upon in the course of these research undertakings in various 
cities in different parts of the world. 
One of the first studies which followed Lynch's work was conducted by 
Derk de Jonge in Holland in 1962 (report reprinted in Gutman, 1971). 
Lynch's findings were confirmed and enriched by this study. Accord-
ing to de Jonge, the imageability of urban form as represented by map 
drawings was generally stronger where the street plan had a regular 
pattern and where, as in central Amsterdam, there was a simple dominant 
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path, characteristic nodes and unique landmarks. In areas where, 
according to Lynch's method of analysis, the basic form was not 
highly legible, more attention was given in the sketch maps to iso-
lated landmarks, individual paths and visual details. De Jonge 
also found that spatial orientation was easier in the more imageable 
areas and in the neighbourhoods in which the environment was not 
visually monotonous. 
John Gulick (1963) investigated the public image in Lebanon. He 
found that Lebanese subjects combined both socio-cultural associa-
tions and visual form in the construction of their urban images. 
This finding that the image depends on more than visual criteria 
has since been confirmed in various studies: Thomas Sievert's 
studies in Berlin (1967, 1969) revealed that among children the 
clarity of the image and the memory of the city depended on visible 
signs of human activity and involvement in the urban landscape; 
small details with these characteristics were often more important 
and memorable than historical monuments or major buildings. Carl 
Steinitz (1968) found in his study, conducted in Boston, that memo-
rable areas were those with congruence of form and activity. He 
also noted that the mode of travel played a role, so that motorists 
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lated into practical planning terms in Birmingham. Brian Goodey and 
his colleagues (1971) used the local newspaper as a means of recruit~ . . 
ing subjects; readers were asked to send in free-hand sketch maps 
that conveyed the major impressions they had of the city centre. By 
combining the many hundreds of responses the planners were able to 
build up a weighted mental image that seemed to emphasize a marked 
preference for elements at a human scale. Some of the tall, physi-
cally prominent buildings were not_found to be important features in 
the respondents' images. Many specific shops were mentioned because 
of street-level interest, while other areas were virtually blanks. 
This study proved very valuable to the planners who were involved in 
tha Birmingham centre project. 
Two studies by Donald Appleyard (1969, 1970) in the new town of Ciudad 
Guayana, Venezuela dealt with the question of cognition at two diffe-
rent levels: building attributes and overall city structure. In the 
first study - one of the few that deals with the environment at the 
scale of buildings - a selected sample of 320 residents were inter-
viewed as to the ways they identified and recalled individual buildings. 
Appleyard found that the importance of buildings in mental maps seems 
related to their relative prominence, form, visibility and socio-cultural 
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significance. Congruence of physical use and significance patterns 
were important in cognitive schemata, as was naming. Major diffe-
rences in schemata were found among various social groups. Indivi-
duals from the lower socio-economic bracket were found to have the 
more extensive schemata, a result of their wider movement through 
the city in seeking work. People from the upper classes had more 
limited orbits because they tended to confine themselves to their 
own areas. Appleyard concludes that: 
the urban vocabulary of architects and urban designers, 
while it may serve some purpose, is in fact substantially 
incongruent with the public's urban vocabulary. (1969, 
p.155) 
In his follow-up study of Ciudad Guayana (1970) Appleyard investigated 
the inhabitants' perception and mapping of the city as a whole The 
majority of subjects produced maps where a predominant path system led 
to distortion of·areas that were not adjacent to frequently travelled 
routes. Spatial conceptions of the city were not prominent but evi-
dence of such elements was manifested in the maps of the inhabitants' 
local areas. Individual perception of distance was distorted by 
social significance - upper class inhabitants conceptualized them-
selves as living farther from the slum areas than they actually did 
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and closer to the desirable neighbourhoods. Appleyard concluded 
from his studies that three types of urban perception appeared to be 
dominant. 
ferential. 
These he identified as operational, responsive and in-
Stephen Carr and Dale Schissler (1969) examined those aspects of city 
form which were remembered by people moving through the city on an 
elevated expressway. They considered the ways in which people 
achieve, organize and transform sequential sensory experiences into 
cognitive environmental representations. They found that there was 
considerable overlap in the images of the three groups of subjects 
drivers unfamiliar with the route, their passengers and regular 
commuters. The most significant finding of this study is the degree 
to which both perception and memory of the city, as seen from a high-
way, seem to be determined by the form of the environment itself. 
Further,this research demonstrates that perceptual and cognitive be-
haviour can be predicted rather closely by simple procedures which 
are accessible to city and highway designers untrained in psychology. 
This study complements Appleyard et al's well-known study "The View 
from the Road" (1964) which focusses on the aesthetic qualities of 
the highway trip~ 
77. 
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Anselm Strauss's "Images of the American City" (1961) consolidated 
many ideas and gave direction to subsequent work on urban cognition 
from a sociological perspective. He argued that it was not possible 
to understand urban social behaviour in cities or the processes of 
development and urbanization without at the same time understanding 
what people think of their cities. Through literary, observational 
and sociological sources he has examined different group conceptions, 
shared sentiments and -symbolism about urban and non-urban environ-
ments (1961, 1968). 
The field.of geography has contributed extensively to work on environ-
mental cognition. Interest in man's knowledge of his environment is 
treated as a subsection of behavioral and social geography. However, 
it is only in the recent past, say since David Lowenthal's important 
article in 1961 that interest in environmental images has become more 
widespread within the geographical discipline. Lowenthal's essay 
on the theory of geographical knowledge is concerned with: 
all [author's italics] geographical thought, scientific 
and other: how it is acquired, transmitted, altered and 
integrated into conceptual systems; and how the horizon 
of geography varies among individuals and groups. (p.241) 
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His study revealed the potential value of image studies in under-
standing man-environment relationships. 
The image approach has been applied, either conceptually or empiri-
cally, to a wide range of topic areas within human geography. These 
include environmental hazard evaluation (Saarinen, 1966; Kates, 
1962, 1967); retailers images of their operating environments 
(Harrison and Serre, 1975); consumer images of their retailing 
environments (Downs, 1970); city images (as discussed above); re-
gional-0nd national images (Gould and White, 1974). 
Roger Downs (1970) used the semantic differential technique (Osgood 
et al, 1957) to examine consumer cognitive evaluation of the retail 
environment in the city centre of Bristol. The author hypothesized 
nine "cognitive categories", each measured by four bipolar adjectival 
scales, as the dimensions by which shoppers evaluated the central 
area. Factor analysis confirmed six out of the nine hypothesized 
categories as distinctive dimensions of the image; these were price, 
range of goods, visual appearance, service, structure and design, 
shopping hours. Of the remaining three categories, ~ease of move-
ment and internal parking" was divided into two separate dimensions, 
but ''reputation" and "atmosphere" were distributed across many of the 
', 
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factors, such that ''it might be argued that they do not exist" (p.36). 
This study also showed that consumers did not hold generalized images 
of centres lower in the shopping hierarchy, only perc~ptions of indi-
vidual shops within the particular centres. 
R. Hudson (1974), in a follow-up study of Downs' study, investigated 
images of individual food shops in Bristol using the repertory grid 
method (Kelly, 1955) to elicit the subjective construing of these par-
ticular environments. Without going into any detail, the basic idea 
of using the repertory grid is to enable respondents to generate their 
own personally meaningful and salient bipolar constructs to use in 
making ratings (whereas in the semantic differential method the re-
searcher provides the constructs). Hudson was interested in the 
. ways in which immigrant societies adjust to their new environment. En-
listing the aid of a number of postgraduate students in their first 
term at Bristol University and of undergraduates who had just moved 
out from halls of residence into "digs", he had ninety six students 
complete a food shopping diary for a ten-week period. Interviews were 
subsequently conducted with twenty six of this group and a grid was ad-
ministered. Price levels and distance from the respondents' homes 
were found to be the most common and important dimensions of the shop 
image. 
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In a unique study of the evaluation of the retail environment from: 
the point of view of the shopkeeper, rather than consumer, Harrison 
. and Sarre (1975) used the repertory grid technique. Three distinct 
components of the environmental image were distilled from this study -
one descriptive of the physical nature of the environment, another 
relating to the running of the shop and the third an evaluative bi-
polar split between objective and subjective elements. 
Gould and White (1974) have survey~d the field of enquiry concerned 
with the mental maps that people fo~m of the large-scale regional and 
national environment. They examined collective patterns of informa-
tion, ignorance, learning and preference with regard to different 
geographical areas. They present accounts of the mental maps which 
inhabitants hold of different regions in Britain, America, Sweden, 
Southeast Asia and parts of Arica, drawing their information from 
numerous studies undertaken by themselves as well as others in this 
field. They include an analysis of the implications for the future 
of their findings. 
Roger Downs and David Stea's book, "Image and Environment" (1973a) 
represents a significant contribution to the field of environmental 
cognition. This book comprizes a selection of papers, written by 
•. 81. 
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contributors from numerous disciplines, on the topics of cognitive 
mapping and cognitive maps. In presenting a structured overview 
of cognitive mapping and maps this relatively new research area was 
introduced to a wider audience. It is essentially a state of the 
art book aimed at presenting the reader with the origins, achieve-
ments and future of cognitive mapping research. Their article 
(1973b) analyzes the processes ~f cognitive mapping and relates the 
product of these processes, that is, the cognitive map, to adaptive 
and spatial behavior. 
The developmental processes in environmental cognition have received 
considerable attention. Roger Hart and Gary Moore (1973) have pro-
vided a review and interpretation of theory and research on this 
topic. Relying mainly on the perspective provided by the work of 
Jean Piaget and Heinz Werner and his colleagues, Hart and Moore 
derived several conclusions concerning the development of spatial 
cognition in children. In addition to reviewing the literature, 
they have suggested a direction, consistent with the major theories 
of cognitive development, in which furthe~ investigations may proceed. 
David Stea, together with James Blaut, has investigated the develop-
ment of cognitive mapping abilities in children (1973). Their paper 
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attempts to provide the underpinnings for a general theory of cog-
nitive mapping, drawing upon their own research findings and those 
of a number of other researchers. In earlier studies (reported in 
this article) they discovered that children as young as three to 
five years of age, can interpret features (and at least some areas) 
on black and white aerial photographs without any prior exposure to 
such photographs or any special training. Stea ·and Blaut inter-
preted these findings in terms of a developmental theory of spatial 
learning. This theory postulates that play with toys or miniature 
models, such as houses, animals, vehicles, gives children practice 
in the three essentials of mapping: 1) the use of a vertical per-
spective, 2) reduction in scale and 3) the use of symbols. They 
conclude their article with some implications of their findings for 
the design of environments for children and adults. 
The prolific output of the architect-townplanner-anthropologist, Amos 
Rapoport (1967, 1973a, 1973b, 1976, 1977) has made a significant im-
pact on the field of man-environment studies in general, and of the 
specific area of environmental cognition in particular. In his 
. "Human Aspects of Urban Form" (1977) he takes a phenomenological per-
spective, dealing with the individual's and group's experience of the 
physical and socio~cultural environment •. 
with: 
Rapoport is concerned here 
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how people experience cities, give meaning to what they 
perceive, how they understand the city and organize it 
conceptually, how they give identity to environmental 
elements and how they behave as a result of this, how 
designed environments reflect ideal images and how they 
affect behavior, how choices are made and on what basis. 
(p.6.) 
He postulates a "filter model" for linking "real world choices" and 
final subjective choices made and given expression in the built en-
vironment. His diagram suggests that filters (cultural, personal 
and other possible filters) arid the resulting different perceived 
environments within which people act - the different perceived pos-
sibilities, criteria and choices - are intimately linked to images. 
Rapoport uses many cross-cultural references to support his argu-
ments. 
Studies concerned with national and regional images and urban images 
have been discussed above. This review now turns its attention to 
the work which has been done in the field of environmental imagery 
in the smaller scale environment - the neighbourhood, building and 
room. 
The systematic study of the definition of neighbourhood began with 
the British environmental psychologist, Terence Lee (1968) and has 
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proved to be very influential~ Adopting an inductive empirical 
approach, he found that respondents defined their neighbourhood in 
both physical and social teims. Lee used the concept of the'socio 
spatial schema" to repre~ent the neighbourhood image. 
While the content of schema varied individually in size and ~hape, 
based on personal experience, Lee found that they could be general-
ized for various groups. He found that the size and make-up of 
the subjective neighbourhood is a function of numerous factors: 
the physical environment, name, symbolic elements, and group be-
havior and characteristics (Lee, 1971). Among important social vari-
ables were friendship networks within the locality and local club 
membership; the use of local shops was positively, but not signi-
ficantly, related to neighbourhood definition due to the wide use 
of such shops generally, in the English context. Among important 
physical variables were the number of houses, shops and amenity 
buildings encompassed by the area (Lee, 1968, 1971). 
Robert Hershberger has conducted considerable research in the area 
of architectural meaning. His initial research in this area 
focussed on whether or not there is a correspondence between archi-
tects' comprehension of architectural environments and that of laymen, 
..... ___ ..,. --·-. -....... 
85. 
and if not, to discover to what this difference could be attributed 
(1970a). In this study semantic differential scales and single 
colour slide representations of familiar buildings were emp!Qyed to 
elicit judgements from architects, pre-architects and non-architects. 
Pronounced differences were found between the architects and non-
architects. Hershberger suggests that it is the architects' pro-
fessional education that plays an important role in influencing the 
cognition of the architectural environment. The most important 
aspect of this study is Hershberge~'s introduction of a tool by which 
affective responses to architectural environments may be systemati-
cally identified and so aid the architect to understand his clients' 
preference~. 
His later research has continued to be directed toward the end of 
improving the architect's ability to make pre-construction predic-
tions and to develop research instruments which can be used to attack 
the prediction issue directly. Hershberger has conducted numerous 
studies in this field: 1) he has made further comparisons of the 
environmental comprehension of different groups of people (1970b), 
2) he has considered problems relating to the adequacy of various 
media to represent the architectural environment in experimental 































































Exp~·rirnent 1 Media Profile. The mean responses on each of thirty semantic 
:ales are plotted for judgements made during real visits and with respect to each 
:"_five representational media for twelve prototypical housing examples. 0 Real 
IU!its, D super 8 mm color film, 6 super 8 mm black and white film O 35 mm 
'1ngle color slides, 0 35 mm multiple color slides, ¢ video tape. 
{_· ·· .. ;,;,> ,, Sample building p·rediction profile. · This is an example of a hypothett· 
prediction problem in which the architect has personally evaluated a given build~ 
( D) and has predicted how a group of client/users would assess the building ( 6) 
The hypothetical mean judgement of the client/users is indicated by 0, and the • 
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develop a comprehensive set of semantic scales applicable to designed 
environments,(1972). 
Henry Sanoff (1974) has recognized the need for knowledge of environ-
mental perceptual phenomena. In this article he describes an experi-
ment he conducted which focusses on the ordering of visual attributes 
of the architectural environment through the use of bipolar semantic 
differential scales. Two groups - experts in design and research 
and graduate students of planning - were asked to describe an ideal 
environment and to rate visual displays on these scales. The results 
reveal that there is ambiguity inherent in our language and strong 
value associations with the connotative meaning of words. 
Kelly's Personal Contruct Theory and his repertory grid technique (1955) 
were first introduced to architectural psychologists by Peter Stringer 
(1970) at the Dalandhui Conference., His.exhortation was not restric-
ted to the value of Kelly's theory and methodology for research; he 
stressed the advantages for both psychologists and architects of adopt-
ing in practice the flexible "constructive alternativism" advocated by 
Kelly. This attempt to "reconstrue" the world in ever new ways would 
help in mutual understanding and it would also deliver them from the 
mere attempt to reproduce the environment of the past. 
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Group 1 (Architects) 
Simplicity ,------;::-?""~,,.-----, 
Stimulating I ~ ~ I' 
Harmony I ) > • I 
Roughness 1-----+-<~-~ 
Ambiguity t--------'.....,. 
Formal I ;# ':ll._ !Informal 
Symmetry! 4 
Boldness I 7 4 2 4-.. I Unobtrusiveness 
Interest I <. <.: _...: Boredom 
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Individual] ( I, "> I Universal 
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Austere I 4 i.....: ) > -I Sensuous. 
Novel I ,-'F ~ I Common 
Satisfaction I (\ ~ I Frustration 
Paradoxicality \ )'> ,C: \ Comprehensibility 
Exhilarated I (/ , I Depressed 
High! ~ llow 
Peaceful Disruptive 
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Arithmetic mean distribution for environmental displays a/b/c/d 
37 Results from Sanoff's study 
which uses semantic differential 
scales to measure attributes of 
the visual environment. 
Instead of merely designing so as to preserve the particu-
larities of men he has observed, [the architect] can design 
so that [men] reconstrue the world, change and become new 
men. (p.9) 
Interest in Personal Construct Theory (PCT) and more particularly in 
the repertory grid method of measurement, has grown rapidly in the 
field of environmental cognition. Certain applications of this 
research method have already been mentioned earlier in this chapter 
in connection with urban imagery. Basil Honikman (1973, 1976a, 
1976b) has written extensively on the use of Personal Construct Theory 
as an approach to architectural and environmental design. One of his 
first empirical projects, using the repertory grid, was the Kingston 
living room study (1976b) where his objectives were to explain the 
meaning thdt seventeen different livings rooms (represented by colour 
photos) had for a person in terms of their physical characteristics. 
In other words, if someone felt that a particular environment was 
comfortable and liveable but unfriendly, Honikman's study aimed to 
discover which aspects of the design, its materials and arrangements, 
contributed to this feeling. The methods and techniques of the 
living room study were used in two studies of housing carried out by 
the human environment program at the University of Kansas. 
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eralized linear link diagram, demonstrating the linking of elements through principal 
ponents to constructs. 
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FIGURE 2 
Construct-space diagrams for elements in the construct space: 
left, informant 6; right, informant 29. The heavy axis lines 
represent the principal components and are divided into 
scales of eight units. The vertical heavy line in both diagrams 
is the first principal component; the horizontal heavy line is 
the second component. For reasons of clarity, the third and 
-8 
!J 
least important component is excluded (the originial construct-
space working diagrams were much larger). The liig'ht lines are. 
the construct lines representing dimensions runn,u,ng between 
the opposite poles of each construct; thus +9 is the location 
in the construct space of element 9. 
M Diagrams from Honikroan's Living 
39 Room Study which uses the 
repertory grid method. 
Probably the most prolific British writer and editor today in the 
general field of man-environment studies is David Canter (1969a, · 
1969b, 1970a, 1970b, 1973, 1977; Canter and Lee, 1974) Canter and 
Springer, 1975). He has also written specifically on environmental 
cognition and conducted numerous empirical research projects in this 
area. His book "The Psychology of Place" (1977) is concerned with 
the psychological processes that enable people to understand places, 
to use them and to create them. Canter contends that our concep~ 
tualization of a situation may be thought of as producing, or at 
least influencing, our behavior. The essence of his argument. -
which has its origins in the work of Mead (1934), Kelly (1955) and 
more recently, Harre and Secord (1972) - is that any act is made in 
relation to the context within which the individual thinks himself 
to be. In studying the cognitive systems pertinent to the environ-
ment, Canter attempts to develop a theory which explains and des-
cribes the structure of these conceptual systems. This is an inter-
disciplinary exercise where he draws upon the theoretical formula-
tions of theorists from numerous disciplines - Boulding, the economist, 
Bartlett, the physiologist and Lynch, the urban planner. The second 
major theme of this work is Canter's examination of the methodological 
procedures available for examining th~ cognitive processes involved 
in the comprehension of place. 
/ 
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In the United States, the work of Harold Proshansky and William 
Ittelson and their colleagues (1970, 1974) has made a very signi-
ficant impact on the general field of man-environmeni relations. 
Whilst their work does not focus on environmental cogition speci-
fically, it does recognize the vital role of cognition in man-
environment interaction. In their comprehensive work, "An· 
Introduction to Environmental Psychology'' (Ittelson et cl, 1974) 
they devote a chapter to a discussion of how people perceive the 
environments within which they live. This chapter is based 
largely on the earlier work of Ittelson (1973) where he specifi-
cally investigates the relationship between environment and cog-
ni tion. In this work Ittelson takes a holistic approach to man 
and his environment, defining their inter-relationship as "trans-
actional": 
All parts of the situation enter into it as active 
participants; and •••• these parts owe their very 
existence as encountered in a situation to such 
active participation - they do not appear as already 
existing entities which merely interact with each 
other without affecting their own identity. (Ittel-
son, 1973, p.19) 
Ittelson, Franck and O'Hanlon (1976) have produced a paper which 
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investigates the nature of environmental experience. They describe 
a methodology for the study of environmental experience that is based 
on the fundamental premise that environmental experience and environ-
mental action cannot be separated and that environmental experience 
is that continuing product of an active endeavour by an individual 
to create for himself a situation within which he can optimally 
function and achieve his own particular pattern of satisfaction. 
Three empirical studies which they conducted are reported in this 
paper. The results of these studies indicate a number of character-
istics of environmental experience and specific modes of experiencing 
the environment. 
The significance of the human body in the experience of architecture 
is examined by Kent Bloomer and Charles Moore (1977) who contend that 
the body is the source of a personal world which generates many of 
the meanings by which we experience the physical environment. In 
-arguing that body experience and memory are closely linked, they 
stress the importance of memory as part of our existence in the en-
vironment. Various models of perception that have been influential 
in the twentieth century are reviewed, with particular attention being 
given to the implications of body-image theory and the recognition and 
development of the haptic sense. Numerous architectural examples are 
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6nalyzed in an attempt to substantiate their theoretical formulation. 
They develop their main thesis that all achitecture at its beginnings 
derived from a body-centred sense of space and place, and that it is 
only in relatively recent times, with the increased emphasis on the 
rational and cerebral approach to design, that the relevance of the 
human body is no longer central to architectural thought. 
The question of meaning in architecture has been approached by Charles 
Jencks (1969) who argues for the application of "semiology" - the 
theory of signs - to architecture and urbanism. His argument is based 
on the "semiological triangle" which links language (or symbol), thought 
(or concept) and reality. He applies this linguistic model to describe 
the communicative dimension of architecture. Jencks postulates the 
notion of mental schemata, or concepts, which determine environmental 
perception. 
Christian Norberg-Schulz' (1971) treatise on the problem of architec-
tural space is cognitively orientated. Basing his argument on a theory 
of existential space, he proposes the idea that architectural space can 
be understood as a concretization of the environmental schemata, or 
JJTiages that form a necessa!y part of man's general orientation in the 
world. He draws on the theory and research of Piaget to support his 
92. 




41 Jencks 1 "semiological triangle". 
contention that the individual acquires various schemata which 
mediate a three-dimensional world, and which together make up 
man's "image" of his environment. Existential space is de-
fined as a relatively stable system of perceptual schemata, or 
"image" of the physical environment. Norberg-Schulz' work re-
presents one of the few contemporary attempts to develop a com-
prehensive theory of architecture. His basic motivating inten-
tion is to establish "a simple and useful key to the architectural 
totality" (p.7). 
The above review has drawn on work in environmental cognition from 
a wide spectrum of disciplines. Studies which are both relevant 
in themselves and which have contributed to the development of the 
research field, have been included here. Whilst giving a broad 
overview of the state of the art of environmental cognition studies 
and a background context within which the following chapters are 
couched, this review by no means represents a definitive descrip-
tion of the field. 
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Cognition and the .. Man .. 
Envi-ronment Interface 
5 
5.1. THE COGNITIVE APPROACH 
5.1.1. A working hypothesis for conceptual analysis 
Any concern with built environment and how people influence and 
are influenced by it has at its roots the question of how this 
environment is cognized, or known as an environment. A working 
hypothesis for conceptual analysis is postulated; this serves 
as the point of departure for building up a framework by which 
to study man-architecture relations. This hypothesls proposes 
that the single psychological process most critical for man-
environment interaction, and one that underlies all human res-
ponse to the built environment, is that of cognition. 
A number of assumptions underly this hypothesis: 
1) A fundamental presupposition is that the process and products 
of the cognitive mechanism of a person influences his behavior-
al response and experiential reaction to the physical environ-
ment. The corollary to this is: the influence of the envi-
ronment on a person is determined by his cognitive structures 
Following the constructivist position on epistemology outlined 
in Chapter 3.4., knowledge of the environment is acquired through 
an active and creative interaction of the subject with the 
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environment, whereby the object, in this case, the built en-
vironm~nt, is construed by the subject in his own way. In 
this sense, the environment is what we think it is and we thus 
respond to it as we conceive it to be. 
Steven Carr (1967) supports this view of the role of human 
construals or conceptions of the environment in structuring 
reality: 
the city is what peopl~ think it is. 
that we know personally - the city of 
largely determines the world in which 
life experiences and through which we 
gain many of our daily satisfactions. 
The city 
the mind -
we have our 
strive to 
(p.199) 
2) It is assumed that a more profound understanding can be reached 
of people's actions, needs, attitudes and desires with regard 
to built environment if the way that they conceive of that en-
vironment is made explicit. This assumption concurs with 
Stacey's (1976) contention that: 
If people believe in, and act upon their infor-
mation, notions and stereotypes as obviously they 
often do, then it is necessary to have knowledge 
of their subjective reality and to relate it to 
what is known of the bbjective reality. (p.120) 
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We need to find out what images, symbols, and meanings are 
attached to elements of the built environment, such as diffe-
rent housing types and styles, use of open space and planting, 
demarcation of private property, etc. The findings thus gene-
rated will contribute to the general level of understanding of 
the relationship between people and their envir~nment. This 
knowledge can then be used to inform the design process, there-
by increasing the potential for designers to create environ-
ments for people which are congruent with what the potential 
users would take to be an improved quality of life. 
3) Whilst it is ciccepted that peoples' cognitions of the environ-
ment are influenced to a large extent by what there is to be. 
cognized, that is, the "objective reality", the position is 
held that cognition (as a process of the subject), mediates 
between subject and object and determines to a large degree 
human,behavioral response and experiential reaction. The sti-
mulus, that is, the environment, is a trigger, and the response 
is a function of the individual's cognitive structure. 
The "anti-architectural determinism" position has been dealt 
with in Chapter 3.3. where the concept of "probabilism" 
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(Rapoport, 1977, p.2) was introduced. This suggests that the 
environment, viewed as a setting for human activities, provides 
possibilities for choice but that some choices, in a given physi-
cal setting, are more probable than others. The influence of 
the environment is mediated by the cognitive "filter". Thus it 
is not the actual physical elements of architecture that deter-
mine particular responses, but rather the way that they are 
structured by the human mind in the process of cognition that 
determines the response. 
5.1.2. Subjective orientation 
The cognitive approach emphasizes the internal processes of the indi-
vidual in his intercourse with the socio-physical environment. It 
is concerned with the subjective manner of construing the built en-
vironment, rather than with the objective reality of that environ-
ment. It deals with the relevance of such mental representations· 
to individual and social experience and behavior. It investigates 
the social and psychological, rather than the neurological and 
physical aspects of getting to know the environment. 
Interest in the subjective experience of the environment has in 
recent years increased. (e.g. Bloomer and Moore, 1977; Norberg-
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Schulz, 1971, 1980; Jencks, 1969; Tuan, 1974, 1977 and others.) 
This humanist approach seems to be a direct response against the 
so called "objective" or "factual" approach taken by science which 
still operates largely in the Positivistic paradigm. 
Although the subjective-objective dichotomy has been debated by 
philosophers through the ages, this recent upsurge of interest in 
a subjective or person-oriented approach, which is concerned with 
understanding meaning structures, images, attitudes, beliefs and 
values regarding man's physical surroundings, can be traced back 
on a relatively recent time-scale to Husserl's far reaching and 
influential Phenomenology. This philosophical standpoint was 
developed by Husserl in response to his argument that the modern 
world, particularly positivist science, had reduced man to an ob-
ject in an objectified world (Husserl, 1965). 
This so called "objective" view of the wor~d demanded by science 
is reflected in numerous disciplines: the behaviorist model used 
in psychology; the logistical models used in sociology; the 
economic model used in geography; and in a sense, the Modern 
Functionalist Movement in architecture which attempted to reduce 
architecture to "a set of minimum dimensions" (Norberg-Schulz, 
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1969, p.226) supported by scientific data. 
This study, which attempts to investigate and understand the physical 
environment as it is subjectively cognized and experienced by the 
individual within his socio-cultural context rather than the physical 
world "as it really is", is thus in a broad sense phenomenological in 
orientation. However, the phenomenological method itself is not 
followed. 
5.1.3. The distinction between object- and environmental cognition 
_Most of the research carried out in the field of cognition and percep-
tion has been in the context of object perception. However, objects 
are not environments and environments are not collections of objects: 
"Environments ••••• provide much more information than that necessary 
for the perception of objects and their spatial relationships." 
(Ittelson et al, 1974, p.103). The Gestalt reaction against atomis-
tic psychology recognized the importance of context and emphasized the 
behavioral environment. In this sense the Gestaltists come close to 
studying environmental cognition (or perception). However, Gestalt 
pe~ceptual theory did not focus on the environment but was primarily 
developed through the study of form and object perception. 
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In dealing with the cognition of objects, a set of circumstances 
prevails which is inherently different and opposed to those of en-
vironmental cognition. The subject-object dichotomy of object 
cognition does not apply in environmental cognition; one is not 
a subject of an environment, but rather a participant in it. The 
cognizer does not stand apart and separate from the environment, 
but rather he forms an active and integral part of the surround-
ing environment. Ittelson. et al (1974) confirm this point: 
There is only the total environment of which man 
is one kind of component in relation to other 
kinds of components. The very distinction be-
tween person and non-person breaks down. The en-
vironment surrounds, enfolds, and no thing and no 
person can be isolated and identified as standing 
outside of and apart from it. (p.104) 
5.1.4. The distinction between cognition and perception 
The terms "perception" and "cognition" have been applied in a 
confusing variety of contexts by different psychologists and 
other behavioral and social scientists. It is thus necessary 
to define the usage of these terms in this study. 
Traditionally, psychology has viewed perception and cognition as 
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two separate and isolated systems with certain fixed and uni-
directional contacts betwe~~ them. However, the current view 
in psychology, although there is some disagreement, is that it is 
difficult to separate perceptual and cognitive proce~ses (e.g. 
Gibson, 1968, Chapters 12 and 13; Ittelson, 1973, p.10; Moore 
and Golledge, 1976, p.6). The view that perception is the 
passive reception of information and stimuli from the environ-
ment which is subsequently structured by the mind in the cogni-
tive phase, is no longer accepted. Rather than passively accep-
ting the bombardment by sensory data, people actively search the 
environment for meaningful information. (This is discussed in 
more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.) Perception and cognition are 
thus seen as forming one "perceptiocognitive" system whose funda-
mental function is the processing of information. 
Although the distinction between perception and cognition falls 
short of forming a clear dichotomy, but rather fades into diffe-
rences of degree and focus, certain relative distinctions can be 
made. Perception has a more direct sensory referent than cog-
nition. It is stimulus dependent and involves an immediate be~ 
havioral response, whether overt or covert, to energistic sensory 
impingements (Moore and Golledge, 1976, p.6). However, as Moore 
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and Golledge point out, most perceptual tasks require an interval 
between stimulus presentation and response, if for no more than 
the comparison of the task and the standard in the most simple of 
perceptual situations; "it thus may be questioned if anything like 
pure perception ever occurs without cognition". (p.7). 
Cognition is the more general term and refers to all the modes of 
knowing that mediate between the external world and human response. 
It includes the processes of thinking, remembering, judging, imagin-
ing, reasoning - and perceiving. Perception is one of the means by 
which information from the environment is processed and made known 
to the individual; at the same time perceptual activity is influenced 
by memory, judgmental processes and other cognitive structures and pro-
cesses. Perception can thus be treated as a sub-system and as a func-
tion of cognition. This approach to perception is widely held amongst 
contemporary theorists, such as Piaget (1969); Wapner and Werner (1957); 
and Downs and Stea (1973b). Moore and Golledge (1976, p.7) cite nume-
rous examples of experiments which support the notion of the subordina-
tion of perception to cognition. 
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5_. 2. OVERVIEW OF A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL COGNITION 
A theoretical model is a mental construction which describes complex 
systems or events in simple terms so that they can be more easily 
understood. Since models are human constructions, they contain only 
those aspects, dimensions or concepts which their authors choose to 
put into them. Different models based on different fundamental 
assumptions can be built to describe similar phenomena; their valid-
ity lies in their usefulness to explain, order and predict. 
A particular conceptual model of environmental cognition is proposed 
here which attempts to explain the complex transactional nature of 
man's relationship to the built environment. It is based on, and 
represents an expanded and adapted version of the model of environ-
mental perception advanced by Pocock (1973). It deviates from 
Pocock's model in several ways, the most significant differences 
being the projection of a transactional rather than a simple inter-
actional relationship between man and the built environment; the 
use of the term "cognition" rather than "perception" (cf. Chapter 
5.1.4.); and the emphasis of the social dimension in the human compo-
nent. The component parts of environmental cognition and thei~ in-
terrelationships are summarized in a schematic diagram representing 
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DIAGRAM OF A CONCEPT-
UAL MODEL OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL COGNITION 
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and further elaborated upon in Chapters 6 (The Built Environment and 
Cognition), 7 (The Concept of Environmental Cognition), and 8 (The 
Environmental Image). 
For the purpose of analysis it is necessary to separate the phenomenon 
of environmental cognition into its component parts - the environment, 
man and the mental representation, or image. However, this distinc-
tion is one that is made for pragmatic reasons only and not because 
it represents the components as independent and separate entities. 
Man and his environment are inseparable and both can be defined only 
in terms of the ongoing transactions in which they are mutually engaged. 
Man is an integral part of the physical environment and is defined in 
part in terms of the man-in-environment transaction in which he is en-
gaged. The individual cannot be separated from the environment. He 
is part of the system he is perceiving, and the strategies he chooses 
become part of the environment he in turn experiences as being exter-
nal to himself. All human behavior and experience necessarily take 
place in environments, the quality and nature of this behavior and 
experience is in part influenced by the environment within which it 
occurs. The physical environment is not something outside of and 
separate from human activity, it is integral to the activity. The 
environment is defined in terms of the mental constructions created by· 
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The individual forms an integral 
part of the physical environment. 
"Interior II " , 
metal relief on 
oil, collage, 
panel, by 
Richard Hamilton (1964), 
man in his active transactional participation with that environment. 
Ittelson (1973) sums it up: 
Man is never <Dncretely encountered independent of the 
situation through which he acts, nor is the environ-
ment ever encountered independent of the encountering 
individual. It is meaningless to speak of either as 
existing apart from the situation in which it is en-
countered. (p.18) 
Most of the central concepts which.underly t·he model presented 
here have already been touched upon in various sections of this 
document. The model presented here is intended to integrate and 
give structure to these numerous concepts as well as to the theo-
retical conceptions and postulates which are yet to be introduced. 
The model should be considered only as a general framework and not 
as a fully-fledged theory. 
As a prelude to the detailed presentation of the model, the prin-
ciple views espoused by this model will be discussed, providing a 
broad overview of how man comes to know and experience the built 
environment. Although several of the following points are re-
lated to each other, they will be dealt with independently for 
the sake of clarity. 
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Firstly, all the components indicated on the diagram - the environ-
ment, the cognizer and the image, and their subcomponents - are seen 
as interrelated and interdependent elements of one total system. The 
person as one component in that system continually influences all 
the other components, and he, in turn is influenced by that pattern 
of other components described and experienced by him as "his environ-
ment". Rudolph Arnheim (1977) describes man and architecture as one 
integrated system: 
To Le Corbusier, man and the world he builds are an 
indivisible unity. Just as man is an outgrowth of 
nature, so the building, the furniture, the machine, 
the painting or statue, are outgrowths of man. The 
builder and his work are interdependent like the 
snail and its shell. Man enlarges his scope by his 
works, and the works receive their meaning from man's 
use of them. It follows from this Romantic view 
that man and his creation must be conceived as one 
integrated organism. (p.133) 
Secondly, environmental cognition is depicted as a dialectical process, 
in which the components are in a state of perpetual change occurring 
over time. The dialectical process reflects the dynamic nature of 
the relations between man, as a cognizing being, and the built en-
vironment. (cf. Chapter 3.2.3.) 
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Thirdly, cognition of the physical environment rests on the twin notion 
of action and transaction. Man is not a passive recipient of infor-
mation from the "real" environment. Piaget has shown how the indi-
vidual, through active mental operations as well as active bodily con-
tact with the physical environment· spontaneously structures his ex-
perience and knowledge. Information about the environment always in-
volves action. The environment is not passively observed; it is 
always defined by and experienced through activity. 
In the sense that the environment defines the probabilities of occur-
rence of potential actions, offers differing opportunities for the 
control and manipulation of the environment itself, and provides 
symbolic meanings and cues for behavior, it can be seen as an active 
participant in man-environment relations. The environment provides 
both the "source of information on .which action is based", and "the 
arena within which the actions do, in fact, take place" (Ittelson 
et al, 1974, p.107). Insofar as all parts of the man-in-environment 
situation ente~ into it as active participants, and that these com-
ponents owe their very existence as encountered in a situation to 
such a~tive participation, that is, their identity is affected by 
their interaction, the man-in-environment situation is a transactional 
process. 
108. 
A fourth notion postulated by the model is that the environment 1s 
considered as a source of information. This is quite distinct from 
the traditional position in psychology where the environment, seen 
as the "stimulus", is taken as a source of stimulation which impinges 
on the senses of the person, resulting in a response which is predic-
table and totally determined by the stimulus. 
Lastly, the model postulates a multi-dimensional response to the pro-
cess of.cognition. Cognitive representation, or images, incorporate 
informational, evaluative, affective~ predictive and inferential 
aspects. 
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The Built Environment and Cognition 
6 
In being concerned with how people come to know and experience the 
built environment, certain fundamental questions must be answered 
regarding the nature of the environment, and those characteristics 
of environments which are important for environmental cognition. 
These questions presuppose an artificial division of the situation 
into the environment on the one side and the cognizer on the other. 
However, as it has been argued (Chapter 5.2), man and the physical 
environment together form part of one system. The environment is 
not something "out there" to be perceived or known. The environ-
ment and people are inextricably linked by a dynamic, transactional 
and systematic relationship. At any given time it is man-in-environ-
ment, rather than man and environment. However, for pragmatic rea-
sons it is necessary to make the distinction between man and the en-
vironment; this chapter focusses attention on the environmental com-
ponent, whilst the following chapter emphasizes the human component. 
Both components are examined against the background of the total man-
environment system. 
Whilst it is accepted than an empirical reality does exist indepen-
dent of mind, it is contended that knowledge of this reality, in 
general and the environment in particular, can only be apprehended 
through a mental act of knowing, that is, through an active construe-
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tion of thought (cf. Chapter 3.4.). This thesis is not concerned 
with the objective reality of the built environment but rather with 
man's cognitive response to that environment, with the subjectively 
constr0ed environments of the mind. The first step in the analysis 
of these mental representations is to understand the mechanisms by 
which the objective reality is linked to subjective realities. What 
properties of the built environment per se are important in the crea-
tion of these mental images? 
6.1. DEFINITION OF THE "BUILT ENVIRONMENT" 
The term "_environment" is defined in numerous different ways: the 
biologist uses the term "environment" to include a wide range of 
scales from the extra-nucleic matter of a given cell to the geogra-
phical or climati~al conditions in which an entire species exists; 
to the geographer, "environment" refers to large scale physical con-
ditions such as climate, vegetation and topography; the psycholo-
gist, anthropologist and sociologist include the political, economic, 
social and cultural milieu in their use of the term "environment". 
All these usages have one thing in common: they all refer to condi-
tions which surround the object of interest. 
Since the term "environment" can be used in so many different ways, 
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to avoid confusion it is necessary to define its specific use in 
the conceptual model presented in this ~tudy. As has already been 
discussed (Chapter 3.2), the human environment consists of inter-
dependent and multilevelled dimensions. It can be differentiated' 
into two broad categories: 1) the physical environment, which 
.. 
includes the man-made environment as well as the natural environment 
and 2) the non-physical environment which includes the socio-cultural, 
political and psychological dimensions of man's life. The two compo-
nents comprise the "total life environment". This study emphasizes 
the man-made physical environment and its relationship to human ex-
perience in the context of the non-physical environment. 
The man-made physical environment occurs at scales ranging from the 
single room to the city, and includes formally designed and "non-
designed" spontaneous structures. The term "architecture" cannot be 
applied indiscriminantly to any man-made spatial structure; one can 
distinguish between architecture and mere shelter. To qualify as· 
"architecture" a building should also contribute toward the satis-
faction of human expectations, goals and self-fulfilment. Peter 
Cook (1967) puts it another way: 
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The distinction between architecture and mere shelter 
lies in the former's infinite ability to interpret 
basic (or less than basic) needs in some special way 
which accentuates them or conditions them so that they 
take on a greater relevance. At best, architecture 
gives experience a further dimension. (p.10) 
However, for the purpose of this study, which deals conceptually with 
man's cognition and experience of man-made environments, the actual 
status of the building - as architecture or mere building - is not of 
particular relevance. The broader, more embracing term, "built en-
vironment" is used here to refer to the environment at the scale of 
buildings. 
This term "built environment" is used here in a way which implies 
two things: 1) that there is a particular configuration of matter 
in space, thatis,g ~hysical system, everi 1f-there cannot be direct 
access to it other than through a cognitive process of construction, 
and 2) that this physical system is experienced. The physical sys-
tern and the experience system interact in such a way so to form one 
dynamic system in which both are transformed over time. Man expe--
riences the built environment, detects deficiencies and potentials 
and then modifies that environment. This modified environment then 
becomes the stimulus for a new experience and so the cycle is repeated. 
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The physical environment and man's experience of it is thus trans-
formed in a continuing dialectical process over time. The physical 
system-experience system interaction which leads by modification to 
transformation is a basic process of built environment. 
6.2. THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION 
The pivotal point for this discussion is the notion of the built 
environment as a source of information. The emphasis is thus not 
on the specific features of the built environment - the dimensions, 
proportions, materials, textures, forms and elements - but rather 
on the general informational properties of the built environment. 
Information theory was developed by communication engineers to deal 
with the performance of communication equipment but has since become 
a major theoretical construct in modern science. Psychologists and 
environmental psychologists have also adopted this theory in cogni-
tion studies. The contemporary psychologists who first advanced an 
approach to perception consistent with the "stimulus as a source of 
information" view were Egon Brunswik (1956) and his contemporary, 
Adelbert Ames, Jr. (Ittelson, 1960). James J. Gibson (1968) an im-
portant and influential perceptual psychologist also based much of 
his research 6n the view that environmental perception is an infor-
mation-processing system. These theories differ in their attitudes 
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and ideas about numerous issues of environmental cognition. However, 
they all agree that environmental cognition is based on an information-
processing system in which the individual actively explores his surround-
ings and extracts and uses information in his interaction with the en-
vironment. 
This approach negates the conventional view of the physical environment 
as a source of stimulation which impinges on a passive individual's 
senses. The environment does not. simply stimulate the senses, but· 
rather it offers information which is actively selected and synthe-
sized by the cognizing individual as he acts within his total contex-
tual situation. The environment provides messages which communicate 
information to a "tuned" receiver who defines these messages. Informa-
tion is thus not the result of the stimulus alone, but is phenomenolo-
gically defined. The senses are regarded as aggresive, seeking mecha-
nisms and not merely as passive receivers of sensory stimulation. Gibson 
(1968) disputes the classical notion of sensing as primarily receiving 
(with sensory receptors). He characterizes sensory activity as selec-
tive and purposive in nature: 
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The observer who is awake and alert does not wait passively 
for stimuli to impinge on his receptors; he seeks them. He 
explores !he available field of light, sound, colours, and 
contact, selecting what is relevant and extracting the in-
formation. (p.32) 
Also, the stimulus considered as a source of stimulation, can be under-
stood only in terms of the immediate context of physiological and phy-
sical reactions, ~hereas the stimulus considered ai a source of infor-
mation refers to a much wider context and includes information about, 
and from, the environment within which the individual lives and func-
tions (Ittelson, 1973, p.9). 
Several characteristics of the built environment, considered as source 
of information, which are relevant to environmental cognition are 
identified and discussed in the following sections. 
6.2.1. The environment provides information through all the senses 
The process of environmental knowing depends on all the senses by ( 
which the individual relates to his environment (Ittelson et al, 1974, 
p.106). These senses provide the means by which information is ex-
tracted from the environment; by looking, listening, sniffing, tast-
ing and touching, the individual is able to pick up information from 
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43 Information is extracted from 
the environment through all 
the sensory systems: visual, 
auditory, taste-smell, haptic 
and orienting systems. 
the environment. The eyes, ears, nose, mouth and skin can orient, 
explore and investigate. When thus active they are neither passive 
senses nor channels of sensory quality, but ways of paying attention 
to the stimulus information provided by the environment. In ex-
ploratory looking, smelling and touching the sense impressions are 
incidentar symptoms of the exploration, and what gets isolated is 
information about the environment looked at, sniffed at or touched. 
Gibson (1968) defined the senses as "active rather than passive, as 
systems rather than channels and as interrelated rather than mutually 
exclusive" (p.47). Since the senses function to pick up informa-
tion, not simply to arouse sensations, this function should be de-
noted by a different term. Gibson uses the term "perceptual sys-
tems'' to refer to the five basic senses. Rather than listing the 
senses according to the physiological details of the sense organs, 
such as Aristotle's five basic senses - sight, sound, smell, touch 
and taste - which are each linked to a particular physiological 
sense receptor, Gibson regrouped the senses around the types of in-
formation that individuals receive in their transactions with the 
environment. He thus focussed on the types of environmental infor-
mation which the body deals with rather than on the variety of sen-
sory receptors and responses of the body. In this he has provided 
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a useful framework by which we might understand some of the pro-
cesses that generate environmental experience. By characterizing 
the senses as active detecting systems constantly seeking out in-
formation from the e~vironment, he was able to produce a new inven-
tory of the senses. Th~se Gibson listed as 1) the visual system, 
2) the auditory system, 3) the taste-smell system, 4) the hap-
tic system and 5) the orienting system which is basic to all the 
others. 
The traditionally acknowledged senses of looking, listening, smell-
ing and tasting require little elaboration and explanation here. 
However, the basic orienting and haptic systems, which play a vital 
role in man's understanding of environmental three-dimensionality, 
require definition. The basic orienting system refers to the gene-
ral orientation by which bodily equilibrium is attained. This sys-
tem co-operates with all the other perceptual systems, since it pro-
vides a frame of reference for them by generating an awareness of 
what is stable and permanent in the world. The basic orienting 
system does not have a specific mode of attention, but according to 
I 
Gibson (1968) "it mi~ht be said to have a general one - being awake, 




Basic orienting refers to our postural sense of up and down which, 
because of its dependence on gravity, establishes our knowledge of 
the ground plane. A consequence of this postural orientation is 
the development of the sense of verticality and horizontality. We 
bring to our experience of buildings specific expectations of hori-
zontal floors and vertical walls. Any gross distortion of these 
planes leads to feelings of unease and "loss of equilibrium". How-
ever, certain attempts have been made in architecture to deliberate-
ly deviate from the vertical and horizontal planes. Le Corbusier's 
chapel at Ronchamp is an example of deliberate distortion to achieve 
particular sensory effect; certain walls slope internally, the roof 
sweeps over the worshippers in a dramatic curve and the floor is 
slightly dished. 
The haptic sense is the sense of touching and doing simultaneously. 
It involves the whole body, rather than merely the instruments of 
touch, such as the hands. To sense an environment haptically is to 
be in physical contact with that environment - to climb a flight of 
stairs, rather than to simply look at it. The haptic system, then, 
is an apparatus by which the individual gets information about both 
the environment and his body. "He feels an object relative to the 





(far left and above) Deliberate 
distortion of the vertical and 
horizontal planes: 
Chapel at Ronchamp (Le Corbusier). 
(left) Distinct delineation of 
the vertical and horizontal 
planes: 
Chicago Civic Centre 
(C.F. Murphey). 
system by which •.. men are literally [author's italics] in touch 
with the environment" (Gibson, 1968, p.97). The haptic system 
includes the sensations of warmth, cold, pressure and pain. It 
also includes the property of kinesthesia, which is the sense of 
the position and movement of one's muscles and joints and is vital 
to one's perception of three-dimensionality. 
Certain contemporary architects have considered the haptic sense 
in their designs, such as the Swi~ Club at the Sea Ranch . in Cali-
fornia, designed by Moore, Lyndon, Turnbull and Whitaker. Here, 
for example, the skylit shower in the men's locker room is a few 
steps below the dressing bench, and the sauna and plunge pool be-
low ·that, to "take advantage of one's special sense of self without 
clothes, and the pleasure of moving on stairs in the light" (Moore 
and Bloomer, 1977, p.86). However, designing with the haptic 
sense in mind is not a new innovation of modern times, the zig-
gurats of ancient Sumeria seem to have been built around the expe-
rience of climbing. Bernini's forecourt for St. Peter's in Rome 
is a very sophisticated example of haptic cues being deliberately 
counteracted by visual cues resulting in a powerfully unsettling 
experience. One's sense of walking distance is confused by the 
receding side colonnades and by the statues which are larger near 
120. 
Design for the haptic sense: 
47 (far left) Steps in the locker 
room of the Sea Ranch Swim 
48 
Club, California (Moore, Lyndon, 
Turnbull and Whitaker). 
(above) Ziggurat, Ur c.2100 B.C. 
49 (left) The forecourt of St. Peter's 
in Rome (Bernini). 
the cathedral facade than near the main elliptical space. 
Not only are all the sensory systems involved in the experience of 
the built environment, but for most of one's waking hours the diver-
sity of environmental information is received through all the senses 
simultaneously. These five sensory systems overlap one another, 
they are not mutually exclusive. "In this respect", environments 
are multimodal [author's italics]; , the senses function so to speak, 
in concert" (Ittelson et al, 1974, p.106). The environment is thus 
experienced as a unitary field. Although the environment presents 
itself to the individual as a series of separate stimuli - visual, 
auditory, touch and so on - it is the total complexity of stimulus 
information that constitutes the physical setting to which he res-
ponds and which influences his behavior and experience. 
The visual system is, however, the dominant sensory mode and contri-
butor to the environmental image. This is especially true of Wes-
tern civilized man where the emphasis on vision is manifested in the 
visually oriented media of television, movies, billboards, magazines, 
newspapers, books and so on. The dominance of the eye may be rea-
dily indicated by simply closing one's eyes in any environmental 
situation, for example, in a restaurant, supermarket or one's own 
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the environmental image. 




living room. A wealth of sensory information - sounds, temperature, 
smells, etc. - previously screened by the vision-dominated scene is 
revealed. However, at a given moment, or in specific circumstances, 
any other modality might dominate one's perception. The incessant 
whine of an electric drill may preclude one from seeing the visual 
variety of a particular room. A blind person experiences the built 
environment by processing a range of environmental information diffe-
rent from that of a sighted person, the dominant sensory modes of the 
former being touch and hearing • . Not only are all the senses involved 
in environmental experience, but the only information that one receives 
directly from the built environment comes to one via these sensory 
systems. 
The garden at Stourhead in Wiltshire, England, designed by Henry Hoare 
and others in the mid eighteenth century, is an example of a carefully 
planned, multimodal man-made environment offering a wide range of sen-
sory experiences. This garden was consciously designed for sensory 
delight; the layout and landscaping is visually very appealing; varied 
planting offers pleasant smells; the controlled play of water, both 
externally and in the Grotto, offers continuous sound; Flitcroft's 
Pantheon containing one of the first central heating plants to be built 
since Roman times provides a contrasting air temperature to that outside • . 
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Even the sense of equilibrium was planned for - the timber bridge 
which spans one arm of the lake was deliberately designed to "give" 
slightly as one walked across it, (Woodbridge, 1970). 
Most contemporary architects design for the visual sense and to a 
lesser degree, for the skin senses (heat and cold~ texture) and for 
the control of sound. Few, however, take into consideration, and 
design for smell, for orientation or for the haptic sense. It is 
thus not surprizing that so much of contemporary architecture is 
lacking in experiential richness. 
6.2.2. The environment provides more information that can be processed 
A second characteristic of the built environment is that it provides 
more information than can be processed by the individual (Ittelson 
et al, 1974, p.107). The individual is thus forced to select from 
the wealth of potential sensory information, his choice being de-
pendent on his particular goals and intentions as well as the socio-
cultural context within which he lives. The cognitive filter is 
necessary to ensure a healthy and comfortable existence; without 
this filter the condition of information overload would result in 
confusion, problems of orientation and insecurity, and mental stress. 
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Much information provided by the environment is peripheral to the 
central focus of interest. It is peripheral in the sense that one 
is not consciously aware of it since it is not directly relevant to 
the focus of attention. However, this peripheral information does 
play_ a part in environmental transactions: 
Although much peripheral information may never enter 
awareness, its 1ong-range effects may be measurable 
and important. The area behind us is no less a part 
of the environment than that- in front. We assume it 
to be there, and we make predictions and act on them 
based on that assumption, even though we do not direct-
ly receive sensory input from it at any moment. (Ittel-
son et al, 1974, p.107) 
At the opposite pole to sensory overload is the condition of sensory 
deprivation. This condition is, however, very rarely encountered 
in the built environment. · Research in sensory deprivation (for 
example, Zubek, 1969) using highly contrived laboratory settings 
has clearly shown that people find very low levels of sensory stimu-
lation to be extremely unpleasant after even a few hours. 
Somewhere between the opposing poles of sensory overload and sensory 
deprivation is an· optimum condition of sensory complexity. Psycho-
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52 Experiments on sensory deprivation 
dramatize the importance of 
external stimulation. 
logical research has shown that people prefer ambiguous, complex 
patterns in their sensory fields and that this seems to be a funda-
mental perceptual preference, applying even to infants and labora-
tory animals. (Rapoport and Kantor, 1967). 
Piaget (1950) has suggested that people prefer complex visual en-
vironments over simple ones. The empirical work of Munsinger and 
Kessen (1964), (as cited by Rapoport and Kantor, 1967), proved their 
hypothesis that adults consistently prefer variability and uncertain-
ty in their visual and auditory stimulation (although this preference 
ceases if pushed so far that the stimulus information becomes chaotic). 
The gestalt psychologist, Arnheim, who has studied the perception of 
art and architectural form, speaks of the ''indispensable need for a 
minimum of complexity" (1965, p.49). 
Findings in this area of research suggest that there is an optimal 
range of perceptual input preferred generally by subjects. This 
range lies between the extremes of austerity and simplicity, and 
chaotic complextity. Rapoport and Kantor (1967) have examined the 
question of complexity and ambiguity in environmental design. They 
have argued that, 
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53 (above) Complex, visually rich 
environment: 
row of buildings in Windsor, 
England. 
54 (left) Simple, austere environment: 
shops and offices in Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands, 
Since healthy behavior is exploratory, varying, venture-
some in nature, it requires an environment which allows, 
indeed encourages, the development and_exercise of such 
behavior ••• Yet this preference for the complex and 
ambiguous is not limitless. Stimuli which are too 
simple lead to quick boredom; those which are too com-
plex lead to confusion and avoidance. This suggests 
the idea that for each person there is an optimal per-
ceptual rate. (p.214) 
There has been much less awareness of the~e needs among designers 
themselves. Robert Venturi and Aldo van Eyck have, however, made 
a significant impact in this area of theoretical formulation. Ven-
turi's personal credo "Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture" 
(1966) rejects the orthodox Modern Movement's doctrine of simplicity: 
I like complexity and contradition in architecture. I 
do not like the incoherence or arbitrariness of incom- · 
petent architecture nor the precious intricacies of 
picturesqueness or expressionism. Instead, I speak of 
a complex and contradictory architecture based on the 
richness and ambiguity of modern experience, including 
that experience which is inherent in art ••• Blatant 
simplification means bland architecture. Less is a 
bore. (pp.22,25) 
Aldo van Eyck's work and writings express his concern with ambiguity 
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and complexity in architecture. Van Eyck (1962) speaks of "multi-
phenomena" and more specifically of "twinphenomena" rather than dual 
phenomena, giving examples such as: inside-outside, alone-together, 
many-few, open-closed. He speaks of architecture including all 
rather than some, and in his buildings achieved a multivalence of 
meaning. 
states: 
Regarding his Children's Home (1958) in Amsterdam, he 
[Architecture should] break away from the contemporary 
concept (call it sickness) of spatial continuity and 
the tendency to erase every articulation between 
spaces, i.e. between outside and inside, between one 
space and another •••• Instead the transition must 
be articulated by means of defined in-between places 
which induce simultaneous awareness of what is signi-
ficant on either side. An in-between place in this 
sense provides the common ground where conflicting 
polarities can again become twinphenomena. (1962, 
p.602) 
6.2.3 The environment is a form of non-verbal communication 
The built environment has communicative properties. The trans-
mission of meaning through the architectural medium is essential 
to both the use and enjoyment of architecture. Numerous elements 
of the built environment serve as communication symbols; the most 
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Aldo van Eyck: Childrens' 
Horne, Amsterdam, 
55 (above left) Entrance 
56 (left) Semi-public space half-
way in the Horne 
57 (above) Roofscape and plan. 
obvious are the ubiquitous signs that direct our movements and vie 
for our attention but they are not the only ones. Building form 
and elements such as entrances, stairways, ramps and escalators, 
building materials, decorative elements and so on also communicate 
messages. Banks, for example, are often designed to convey to 
customers and potential customers how safe, reliable and friendly 
they are; likewise, shops announce their exclusivity or cheapness 
by their shopfronts. 
The built environment provides information regarding behavioral 
expectations; it thus communicates cues for behavior. Particular 
settings suggest appropriate behavior which is socially defined. 
People act according to their interpretation of the environmental 
cues. For example, people behave differently in a church to the 
way . they behave in a supermarket since each of these settings con-
vey messages about appropriate behavior, and thus define to a large 
extent the type of activities that are likely to occur in it. Simi-
larly, the stone curb or low wire railing alongside park paths 
communicates an unwritten "keep off the grass" (Cullen, 1971, p.123). 
The linguistic analogy has been used in the study of how architecture 
communicates meaning. Although this analogy between architecture 
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58,59 Shops announce their 
exclusivity or cheapness by 
their facades. 
and language can be traced back through the last two centuries 
(Guillerme, 1977), it is only in relatively recent years (about 
two decades), with the development of the formal discipline of 
linguistics, that it has been systematically applied to the ques-
tion of architectural meaning and signification. Saussure's 
(1960) theory of semiology has formed the backbone of this area 
of enquiry. 
Semiology, defined as the theory of signs, has been postulated as 
the "fundamental science of human· communication" (Jencks, 1969, 
p.7). It is essentially a theory of how signs relate to meaning 
and can be applied to any system of signs, such as Morse code, 
street signs, architectural form and, of course, verbal language. 
The usefulness of applying semiology to architecture is that, in 
bringing up to the conscious level an understanding of how archi-
tectural meaning functions in a technical sense, it increases the 
area of responsible choice. 
Semiology is a comprehensive theoretical scheme with its own 
glossary of terms and specific concerns; the details of semiology 
will, however, not be dealt with in this thesis. 
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Using the techniques of Osgood's Semantic Differential, Robert Hersh-
berger conducted a research experiment to determine the nature of 
architectural meaning (Hershberger, 1970a). He concluded that the 
physical attributes of buildings should ,i •••• be considered to 
constitute a 'code' capable of use to communicate an architect's 'intentions• 
to the users of his buildings (laymen and other architects)" (p.96). 
The design of buildings can thus be seen as a process of encoding 
· information; the users, in experiencing and giving meaning to the 
environment, decode the information. 
According to Saussure, language is a social contract, an agreement 
implicit between people as a whole, that each word (or sign) should 
have a particular meaning, and also that words (or signs) should be 
used in certain ways. The initial choice of sign is arbitrary but 
once it has been agreed on by social contract, that is, once the re-
lationship between signifier and signified has been established in 
the language, it cannot be changed at will. It becomes part of that 
contract which is essential to the definition of all language. When 
we speak of "meaning" in architecture, we are concerned with "language" 
in Saussure's sense, as the social contract to which, at a particular 
point in history, a significant number of people subscribe. 
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If the designer's intentions are to be communicated to the users, 
through the architectural medium, then the ''language'' he uses, 
that is, forms, spaces, colours, etc. must be shared. It is when 
the designer's meanings and sign systems are not congruent with 
those of the users of his buildings that meaningful communication 
breaks down and the building is interpreted by these people as ugly, 
inhuman, inconvenient, alien, etc. Rapoport's critique (1967) of 
Saarinen's CBS Building in New York draws attention to this all too 
prevalent situation which arises with regard to contemporary archi-
tecture. This building was widely acclaimed by the architectural 
profession in contrast to the dissatisfaction expressed by the 
people who actually work in and use the building. Rapoport des-
cribes the building as "having the designers' meaning, the archi-
tects' meaning, the meaning of that subculture but not the inhabi-
tants' meaning" (p.44). 
The architect's problem is similar to that of the linguist who 
attempts to understand a language that has never before been analyzed. 
Design elements serve as a conrnunication medium just as verbal !an-
guage exists as a communication medium. The linguist must not inter-
pret the language in terms of other languages he already knows; he 
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it, not what it means to him. The architect, likewise, must find 
out what the particular forms, colours, materials, etc. that he 
chooses co1T1Tiunicates to those people who are expected to use his 
building. Thus regardless of the architect's talent or inten-
tions, unless he speaks the same language as that of his audience, 
there can be no communication. Rather, there is confusion, mis-
interpretation and general dissatisfaction. 
The imagery of contemporary architecture, having been developed 
within the profession,is relevant only to an educated minority; by 
and large the general public do not "understand" or relate to these 
new buildings. Venturi and his colleagues, Charles Moore and others 
have recognized the problems in this situation, where particular 
meanings have been developed and styles reinforced within the pro-
fession to the detriment of the public. Venturi and associates' 
Guild House Apartments (1960) and Moore, Lyndon, Turnbull and Whit-
taker's Sea Ranch Housing (1963) are a deliberate attempt at low-key 
"vernacular" type of design. A conscious effort has been made in 
these buildings (as well as numerous others) to synthesize meanings 
drawn from architectural history with those found in popular culture. 
However, in spite of these relatively new but isolated tendencies, 
the profession ai a whole remains ignorant of the way in which archi-
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62 Guild House, Friends' Housing 
for the Elderly, Philadelphia 
(Venturi and Rauch, Cope and 
Lippincott, Associates). 
63 Sea Ranch Housing, California 
(Moore, Lyndon, Turnbull and 
Wh itaker), 
-
~ (left) Modern housing in Shanghai 
combines the Chinese domestic 
tradition in a simplified form, 
~ (above) Traditional one-court 
house. Model made of pottery 
of a farmstead (1st century, A.D.) 
excavated in 1951 at Cheng -
Chah, Honan. 
tectural forms are invested with meaning by different groups of people~ 
Hershberger (1970a) has analyzed the options that are available for 
improving architectural communication: One option would be to re-
orient architectural education such that it does not alter the lay per-
ceptions that the new student brings with him. A second course would 
be to re-orient the training of the architect such that he is taught 
how forms, spaces and so on are interpreted by laymen, as well as by 
architects so that he can consciously manipulate these architectural 
elements to communicate with both groups. This implies a bilingaul-
ism where the architect has one vocabulary for addressing the public 
and another for communicating with his peers. (This is in keeping 
with Jencks' (1978) notion of "dual coding" in Post-Modern buildings.) 
A third possibilitiy is to educate the public to see and appreciate 
architecture in the same way as architects. The first alternative 
is neither desirable nor possible without abandoning architectural 
education almost in its entirety. It seems that an approach combi-
ning the second and third alternatives might lead to improved communi-
cation between architect and building user, and hence to greater user 
satisfaction. 
Christopher Alexander (1964), Bernard Rudofsky (1964) and others have 
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recognized and drawn attention to the lesson of vernacular archi-
tecture, namely: the integration and synthesis of images of the 
popular culture in architectural forms. "Unselfconscious" archi-
tecture evolves in response to direct feedback from the users and 
becomes an integral part of the culture. They have noted that 
the system of meanings inherent in the enduring forms of anonymous 
vernacular architecture is an integral part of the popular culture; 
the formal elements of vernacular architecture are a spontaneous 
expression of the common man acting under a community of experience. 
The beauty of this architecture has long been dismissed 
as accidental, but today we should be able to recognize 
it as the result of rare good sense in the handling of 
practical problems. The shapes of houses, sometimes 
transmitted through a hundred generations seem eternally 
valid ••• Above all, it is the humaneness tcuthor's 
italics] of this architecture that ought to bring forth 
some response in us. (Rudofsky, 1964, p.4) 
There have been attempts to find those universals and absolutes in 
man which determine meaning (Le Corbusier's Purism is an example of 
this quest). Certain patterns of meaning intrinsic to man have 
been postulated (Osgood and Sebeok, 1965). However, it is con-
tended here that the way man cognizes any object or environment is 
,.. 
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66 Vernacular architecture 
embodies an integration 
and synthesis of images 
of the popular culture. 
::01debele woman in court-
yard, Eastern Transvaal. 
not an intrinsic part of the nervous system, but rather a function 
of the concepts, or schemata which he has. These in turn are the 
function of his total life environment. 
Forms are by themselves relatively empty of meaning, unless we attri-
bute to them some system of conventional meanings not inherent in the 
forms themselves. Gombrich (1963, pp.45-69) rejects the view of 
Modern Expressionist theory that shapes (such as those found in a 
Kandinsky painting) have physiognomic or expressive content which 
communicates itself to us directly. Attributed meanings are a func-
tion of the total environment, in particular the socio-cultural milieu, 
and is thus not an "absolute" or universal meaning but one that is re-
lative to its particular context. A person from another culture, for 
example, an aboriginal tribesman from the South Sea Islands might have 
the same difficulty understanding the architecture of Western civili-
zation as he has with our language and customs. A South Sea Islander 
might not "recognize" a wood panel approximately lm wide by 2,lm high, 
with a knob on one side and hinges on the other as a door which one 
can open and pass through. Similarly he would probably not be able 
to distinguish a church from a post office. Rapoport (1977) has 
pointed out that knowledge of the environment, that is, how one en-
codes the messages of buildings, is largely a function of socio-
cultural factors: 
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Everyone will see a building as being in a given place 
but will not understand it as a pub unless pubs are 
known. Similarly everyone will see a linear space 
(which we call street) or non-linear space (which we 
call plaza) but knowing for what they are used, how 
one behaves in them and so on are more variable. 
(pp.30,31) 
Architectural symbolism comes into play when a building includes 
elements and shapes that carry a conventional meaning that is 
shared by a body of people. For example, Christian churches have 
traditionally reflected the conventional symbolism of Christianity. 
The three doors in the facade and the three-sided space which are 
so often used in the design of churches, invoke the Trinity, twelve 
columns recall the twelve Apostles and so on. The architects of 
these buildings encode a series of institutionalized and pre-
established meanings into their designs so that most parts of the 
building have precise referents which are interpreted accordingly 
by those who are initiated into the particular code of Christian 
symbolism. The mediaeval mind, in particular, was inclined to see 
such a message in every shape. Nikolaus Pevsner (1963) makes this 
point in discussing the Gothic Cathedral: 
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67 The church reflects the symbolism 
of Christianity. 
Chartres Cathedral, West front. 
The cruciform church represented the Cross, and the 
weathercock on the spire the preacher who rouses the 
sleeping from the night of sin. The mortar, ••• 
consists of lime, i.e. love, sand, i.e. earthly toil 
which love has taken upon itself, and water, uniting 
heavenly love and our earthly world. (p.116) 
The language of architectural form is a dynamic and continuously 
developing language. Its vocabulary includes elements and forms 
which have historical associations as well as allusions to every-
day experience. Gouldie (1969) defines these experiences as the 
awareness of space, the awareness of the flow of force (especially 
of gravitational force) and the awareness of rhythm (p.11). Alan 
Colquhoun (1971) has written of architecture as part of a "system 
of communications within society" (p.396) and describes the anthro-
pological and archifectural basis for the use of a typology of forms 
in design suggesting that not only are we: 
•••• not free from the forms of the past, and from 
the availability of these forms as typological models, 
but that, if we assume we are free, we have lost con-
trol over a very active sector of our imagination and 
of our power to communicate with others. (p.403) 
In his treatise on the communicative function of architecture (1977) 
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Venturi draws a distinction between the building as symbol - or 
"symbolic duck" architecture - and the building with applied sym-
bols and signs - or "decorated shed" architecture. · The "symbolic 
duck" communicates its meaning by a symbolism implicit in the un-
decorated physiognomy of the building. It is a building in the 
shape of its function (such as the bird-shaped building selling 
duck decoys) or a Modern building where the construction, structure 
and volume become the decoration. This is the form of contempo-
rary establishment architecture w~ich rejects ornament and instead 
promotes expressionism, concentrating on the expression of archi-
tectural elements themselves, that is, on the expression of struc-
ture and function. Venturi attacks Modern architectures' rejec-
tion of explicit symbolism: 
By limiting itself to strident articulations of the 
pure architectural elements of space, structure, and 
program, Modern architecture's expression has become 
a dry expressionism, empty and boring - and in the 
end irresponsible. Ironically, the Modern architec-
ture of today, while rejecting explicit symbolism and 
frivolous applique ornament, has distorted the whole 
building into one big ornament. In substituting 
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69 (left above) Petrol station 
70 (left) "Long Island Duckling". 
The "decorated shed" is a simple enclosure which conveys meaning 
by an explicit symbolism in the form of applied ornament (such as 
a pediment symbolising entry) or by means of signs attached to it 
like a billboard. Venturi argues in favour of the decorated shed, 
basing his polemic on the assumption that explicit sym~olism is 
essential in architecture and that the prototype from a previous 
era or from the existing city is part of the source material. This 
point is well taken. However, Venturi's total rejection of duck 
architecture in favour of the decorated shed is an extremist and 
over-simplified position; in eliminating the whole species of duck 
buildings he is, in fact, reducing the modes of communication at 
our disposal. There is a place in contemporary architectur• for 
both the decorated shed and the symbolic duck. 
6.2.4. The probabilistic nature of environmental information 
The messages that individuals receive from the environment are 
probabilistic rather than absolutistic, that is, the position is 
taken here that environmental information does not give the indivi-
dual an exact and accurate picture of the environment as it really 
is, but rather it conveys messages about the probable nature of 
the environment. This view draws on the Brunswik-Ames approach 
to perception. 
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Brunswik (1956) postulated a probabilistic theory of perception 
to explain the relationship between the information available from 
-the environment and the way the individual perceives that environ-
ment. It is based on the concepts of "functional and ecological 
cue validity". Environmental information is, in Brunswik's view, 
probabilistic rather than absolutistic. The individual samples the 
environment perceptually, then tests the accuracy of his perception 
through action in that environment; the perceiver thus builds up 
probabilities about the environment. Ames (1951) ~eferred to by 
Ittelson (1960)) also emphasized the probabilistic nature of environ-
mental information. He, however, elaborated on this theory by deve-
loping the notion of the role of action in building up probabilities 
and by his emphasis on the role of the individual in creating his-
own probability statement. 
Whilst Brunswik and Ames differ in numerous details of their theories, 
they both agree on the fundamental premise of the probabilistic nature 
of environmental information. Gibson (1968) on the other hand, 
whilst also viewing environmental cognition as an information-process-
ing system, describes environmental information as absolutistic rather 
th~n probabilist~c':'- by actively exploring the environment and extract-
ing information from it, the individual gradually builds up a more 
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accurate image of the real environment. Since we have no way of 
gaining access to the real environment except through thi cognitive 
processing of information received from that environment, we can 
never positively assess the accuracy of the information. It is 
thus reasonable to posit a probable relationship between environ-
mental information and the environment as it really is. 
6.3. THE PRESENT PHYSICAL CONTEXT 
The present physical context refers, in the conceptual model of en-
vironmental cognition postulated in this study, to two aspects of 
the physical setting of a given building environment: 1) the plat-
form from which the environment is experienced, that is, the spatial 
and temporal context of the perceiving person, and 2) the immediate 
physical surroundings of the particular environment, that is, the 
physical context of the perceived environment. 
Two basic dimensions of the first aspect are the degree of the per-
son's physical contact with the environment and the speed and mode 
of his movement. Pedestrians and motorists differ greatly in the 
way they perceive the city (Rapoport, 1977, p.240). Speed in-
fluences the rate and content of information processing. From 
within a moving vehicle environmental information is limited to 
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Perception of the city is 
influenced by the mode of 
movement: 
71 (above) Motorist's view of Main 
Street, Port Elizabeth 
72 (below) Pedestrian view of the 
same street. 
mainly the visual range, so that a motorist is cut off from a wealth 
of information and consequently his involvement with the environment 
is restricted. In comparison, a pedestrian is less insulated from 
multisensory information and the active nature of walking increases 
the dimensionality of information. At pedestrian speeds the per-
son is free to explore the environment and can easily alter his pace 
and rhythm to suit the particular environment. The gradient and tex-
ture of the ground, the sounds and smells of the environment all con-
tribute to the richer environmental experiences of the pedestrian. 
The order and sequence in which the environment is experienced in-
fluences the formation of the environmental image. Cullen (1971) 
speaks of "serial vision" (p.9) in the experiencing of the city. This 
is the sequence of views which gradually reveals itself to the pedes-
trian and motorist in the course of travel. 
The immediate physical surroundings of a particular environment have 
a significant influence on the image formed (Arnheim, 1965, p.67). 
Contrast between juxtaposed environments heightens the impact of the 
particular neighbourhood, building or room perceived. For example, 
the impact of a bright open space will be enhanced if access to it 
is through a narrow and dark entry passage. Similarly, the level of 
142. 
WESTMINSTER 
- ~---- - ------~ 1 
•L rn:.::me1n•11"'" ·~ -~l • ••. ' . 2 
.lml1e'1u~ , 
4 
Plan of Westminster, showing 
viewpoints 
73 Serial vision: the shifting 
interplay of towers, spires 
and volumes as one moves through 
Westminster, London. 
·- - - -
_ .:...i: ... ~· 
Sharp contrasts between adjacent 
buildings influences the image 
formed. 




(middle) Old and new in Venice, 
Italy 
(below) Old and new at Yale 
University Art Gallery 
(addition in 1953 by Louis Kahn). 
illumination and the temperature and climatic conditions which pre-
vail in a given environment have a profound influence on the communi-
cation of environmental information. 
This chapter has presented certain notions regarding the informational 
nature of the built environment. Several characteristics of environ-
ments which are relevant to environmental cognition have been identi-
fied and discussed and serve as a point of departure for the analysis 
of environmental cognition which is presented in the following chapter. 
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The Concept of. Environmental Cognition 
7 
The question of how people know or conceive of the built environ-
ment, how they give meaning to it, and how they structure the en-
vironment in their minds is answered by defining th~ concept "en-
vironmental cognition". This implies the definition of, firstly, 
the nature of the mental processes involved in acquiring knowledge 
of the environment and, secondly, the nature of the resulting cog-
nitions formed. This chapter focusses on the former, that is, the 
cognitive process, whilst the product of this process, that is, the 
environmental image, forms the fo~us of the following chapter. It 
is important to note, however, that these two aspects of cognition -
process and product - are in fact interdependent and the separation 
into two distinct chapters is made only for purposes of analysis and 
not because it represents independent and separate entities. Acer-
tain degree of overlap in the two chapters is therefore inevitable. 
This chapter presents some basic notions concerning the function and 
mechanism of environmental cognition and those factors which play an 
important role in determining the product of the cognitive processes. 
The essence of the view espoused by the model presented in this thesis 
is that environmental cognition is an information-processing system 
involving the active selection of environmental information and the 
mental processing of that information which leads to the construction 
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of the environmental image. The actual choice of information end 
the nature of the resultant image ore a function of a dynamic inter-
action between whet the individual brings to the situation (that is, 
inner organismic factors, including physiological, psychological, 
social and cultural systems) end the demands mode on him by the 
situation (that is, external sociophysicol environmental factors), 
cs well cs the feedback from previous cognitive experience. 
7.1. DEFINITION 
The word "cognition" hos its roots in the Latin "cognitionis" (f); 
according to Cossell's Compact Latin Dictionary, this is translated 
cs "getting to know, knowledge, ocquointance," and in the plural, 
"ideas, conceptions". The Latin thus refers to both the process 
of knowing and the product of knowing. 
The cognitive approach to understanding men-environment relations 
views cognition as the structure underlying the active interdepen-
dence between men and the environment. Scheerer (1954) states 
that general cognitive theory deals with: 
the problem of how men gains information end under-
standing of the world about him, and how he acts in 
and upon his environment on the basis of such cogni-
tions. (p.91) 145. 
A cognition can be identified as a "centrally mediated process of 
representing external and internal events" (p.137). In less tech-
nical terms, cognitions are beliefs, thoughts or items of informa-
tlon which an individual possesses concerning his own internal con-
dition and the nature of the social and physical environment in 
which he exists. An approach which focuses on cognitive activity 
thus stresses the role which these types of conceptual organizations 
play as mediators between environmental stimuli and human response 
in the course of man's transactions with the environment. Cogni-
tions are viewed as mediating variables in that, though they may 
not be directly observed, their f0nctioning is presumed to inter-
vene between stimulus, and response, and to be involved in an im-
portant way in determining the meaning which the stimulus has for 
the individual; it is in terms of this meaning that a response is 
initiated. 
Moore and Golledge (1976) broadly define environmental cognition as: 
the awareness, images, information, impressions, and 
beliefs that individuals and groups have about the ele-
mental, structural, functional and symbolic aspects of 
real and imagined physical, social, cultural, economic 
and political environments. (p.5) 
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The above definitions deal with cognition in general and its func-
tion in the total environment (physical and non-physical environ-
ments); however this thesis focusses on a subsection of cognition, 
that is,with cognition of the physical environment, and of the 
built environment in particular. 
In the previous chapter the physical environment was defined as a 
source of information. This view of environment almost demands 
that one treat environmental cognition as an information-process-
ing system. This approach.is in contrast to the more conventional 
sensation-based theories of cognition where the stimulus is defined 
as a source of stimulation, rather than as a source of information. 
Environmental stimuli are said to arouse the senses, and the sensa-
tions so aroused are integrated in some way into a perception. Sen-
sation-based theories attempt to deal with the supposed units of per-
ception - sense data - and to explain how these are put together in 
C 
the brain. Efforts were made to identify and categorize the funda-
mental sensations and the various sensory apparatus throughout the 
body, and to discover the laws by which these body organs and sensa-
tions were related. However, it appears that by the 1930's the 
method of ·investigating the senses by categorizing the many sensa-
tions and their r·eceptor elements had become frustrating, excessively 
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complex, and more useful to physiologists than psychologists. The 
way was set for new strategies for systematizing the senses psycho-
logically. · 
Information-based theory of cognition focusses, not on describing 
how sensations are organized to comprehend the environment but on 
the discovery of how we process phenomenal information. The exis-
tence of sensory experience is not denied but is viewed within a 
different framework (cf. Chapter ~.2.1.). The defining qualities 
of particular sensations do not provide the basis of cognition, but 
rath~r, as in the case of visual perception, the optic array, or 
ambient light, provides potential information for the observer. It 
only becomes effective if the observer attends to it. 
Cognition refers to the psychological processes whereby people select, 
organize, store and use information. Cognitive processes are thus 
involved in perceiving, remembering, day-dreaming, contemplating, 
problem solving, deciding, evaluating, planning, imagining, as well 
as numerous other mental activities (Leff, 1978, p.81). The details 
of exactly what processes operate and how they interrelate are still 
partially conjectural and will not be dealt with in this study. 
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7.2. FUNCTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL COGNITION 
Environmental cognition has a fundamental function in man-environment 
relations. It is the source of all environmental experience. Our 
awareness of the phenomenal world is given through cognition. 
7.2.1. Mediating role 
The transactional-constructivist theory of knowledge has been intro-
duced in Chapter 3.4. The basic position is advanced that knowledge 
of the world is constructed by man in the context of a series of on-
going transactions between man and the environment. Knowledge is 
not given ''a priori" before experience, nor is it acquired through 
pure reason independent of experience; it is also not gained directly 
through sensory experience. Knowledge is the product of an active 
and intentional mental construction. In adopting a constructivist 
position, it is held that there is no way to apprehend the nature of 
what we take to be "the environment", except through the minds of 
people, that is, through man's cognitive processes. Environmental 
knowledge is thus mediated by cognition. 
that: 
Neisser (1967) has noted 
we have no direct, immediate [author's italics] access 
to the world, not to any of its properties ••• Whatever 
we know about reality has been mediated [author's 
italics]. (p.3) . . 149. 
The cognized environment, or environmental image, does not constitute 
a direct copy or exact representation of the objective properties of 
the real environment; rather, the known environment is a personal 
and socially influenced construction of the mind. It is thus a pro-
duct, not a cause of cognition. 
Whilst it is recognized that sensory experience does influence to a 
considerable degree the acquiring of environmental knowledge, it is 
contended that environmental knowledge does not arise directly out of 
raw experience. Sensory experience is mediated by cognitive struc-
tures and operations. A central assertion regarding environmental 
cognition is that seeing, hearing, etc., are all acts of construc-
tion using, to a greater or lesser extent (depending on circumstances), 
the stimulus information from the environment as the raw material. 
The way in which environmental information is mediated by the indi-
vidual's cognitive processes is of great importance since the result-
ing cognitions, or images determine to a great extent the way in which 
he will respond to that environment, that is, his emotional, intellec-
tual and behavioral response. Cognition is in this sense intimately 
related to experience. In the words of Leff (1978): 
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The ways in which we process information are central 
considerations in the content and the emotional tone 
of our experience, the style and effectiveness of our 
adaptation to the environment, and the potential en-
hancement of each of these domains. (p.81) 
7.2.2. Ordering of environmental information 
The functional relevance of environmental cognition centres around 
the ordering capacity of this information-processing system. In 
selecting, categorizing and organizing information, environmental 
cognition orients the individuai to his surroundings, giving co--
herence to his world. Ittelson et al (1974) describe the order-
ing role of environmental cognition: 
It provides us 1 with information about the systematic 
relationships among the components of our world, and 
it is the means whereby we can relate our own goal 
strivings to the environment within which'~e live. 
[Environmental cognition] thus orders our world, with 
ourselves as part of the ordering process. (p.123) 
The physical environment provides an inexhaustible reservoir of in-
formation. Unless information is selected, sorted and organized 
by the individual, the environment would be a formidable phenomenon 
to contend with. The ordering of the environment is essentially 
151 .• 
a ta><?nomic process, whereby the environment is made meaningful by 
classifying, naming and_discriminating according to some culturally 
and socially recognized conceptual system. Different social and 
cultural groups classify the world differently by the use of diffe-
rent t"Cxonomies. The cognitive process is a mode of reducing, 
organizing and ordering the enormous load of information provided 
by an intrinsically chaotic environment. It imposes a structure 
on the environment, thereby transforming the world psychologically 
into a predictable and man~geable environment within which to live. 
Ittelson et al (1974) maintain th~t 
It is this cognitive structuring_of the environment 
that enables us to organize our world in a recognizable 
and manageable way. Unless we were able to schematize 
the environment in terms of mental images, we could 
hardly hope to live in it with any degree of predicta-
bility, although it is quite obvious that we are con-
tinually having to correct our distortions against 
reality. (p.14) 
People have a basic need for order and meaning in their lives. 
Without some measure of perceived environmental order and stability, 
the individual~ finding himself in a chaotic and totally unpredict-
able.world, would. experience considerable confusion and mental stress, 
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and would be unable to carry out his daily activities and to pursue 
his particular goals and purposes. Environmental cognition thus 
contributes towards the satisfaction of a basic human need; in this 
sense it is essential not only for the comfort and pleasure of every-
day life but is also necessary for m·ari 's very survival. 
The individual's only known world is that which he has mentally con-
strued in the process of cognition. The isomorphic relationship be-
tween the individual's cognitive representation and the real world 
is something which can never be accurately assessed. The effective-· 
ness of his cognitionsis measured, not by comparing them with an exis-
tentially independent and "objective" environment, but rather by their 
usefulness in aiding him to achieve those goals for which he is striving. 
The need to experience the environment as a pattern of meaningful re-
lationships is something primary and spontaneous, not something ac-
quired by training. "Man's search for meaning is a primary force in 
his life" (Frankl, 1964, p.99). Meaning, however, does not have an 
independent existence; rather, meaning resides in the minds of people. 
These mentally construed conceptions are then projected onto the world. 
This inherent tendency to endow forms with meaning is exemplified in 
numerous ways; to the child's mind, the "Man in the Moon", or the moon 
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People have a tendency to 
endow forms with meaning: 
77 (far left) The "Man in the 
Moon" 
78 (far left above) Inkblots 
resembling those used by 
Rorschach 
79 (left) Faces, animals, etc. 
seen in cloud formations. 
as a large round of cheese gives a more tangible meaning to the pure 
form of the moon; in psychology, the Rorschach test is used to ana-
lyze the particular meanings given by a ~ubject to an ink blot, and 
hence to uncover those realms of the mind with which the subject is 
concerned; Leonardo da Vinci, in his notebooks, refers to the mean-
ings placed on the arbitrary formations of clouds; the simplistic 
cylindrical forms of the University of Cape Town's newest residences 
are referred to as the "Tampax Towers", and so on. 
However, whilst this "effort after meaning" is seen as a primary and 
common force acting in every individual, the content of the meaning 
is variable and depends on numerou~ contextual conditions, such as 
social, cultural and personality factors. Those factors which in-
fluence the processes whereby environmental information is made 
meaningful are discus~ed in Chapter 7.4. 
7.2.3. Predictive Role 
Environmental cognition is not simply a static process whereby the 
present environmental reality is made known. An important and far-
reaching function of cognition is the predictive role which it plays 
in man's relationship to the physical environment. Environmental 
cognition is a forward-looking process which enables the individual 
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to predict the consequences of his actions in the environment. 
The processes of environmental cognition include selection, rela-
ting and the development_of mental representations of the environ-
1 
ment built up from a hypothesis-forming and testing attitude to the 
environrrent (Ittelson et al, 1974). Cognition aims at valid assump-
tions about the nature of the environment. In order to operate 
effectively in the world and to attain one's particular goals, the 
individual interacts with his surroundings, making suppositions 
about the nature of the environment and predicting the consequences 
of his actions in that environment~ Predictions, however, are not 
always accurate. They are tested by the individual's actions in 
the environment and are modified where necessary so as to become 
more accurate and effective. In this way a pattern of predictable 
relationships is gradually built up through the interplay of cogni-
tion and action in different environmental situations. 
The individual learns to recognize the relevant relationsh~ps in the 
environment that correspond to similar relationships encountered in 
other environments. Experience with previous situations of a similar 
nature gives him a clue as to what will probably occur in the present 
situation. He c·an thus infer that, for example,_ an escalator will 
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transport him from one level to another; an object thrown in his 
direction will strike him if he does not move out of its way; he 
is likely to slip and fall if he runs carelessly on a slippery 
floor surface, and so on. However it is not always as straight-
forward as these examples might suggest; perceptual distortions 
and illusions, such as in the assessment of distance, height, etc. 
lead to predictions and expectations not being realized. As Ittel-
son et al (1974, p.123) have pointed out" 'appearances are de-
ceiving' and perception is seldom. if ever absolutely accurate. In 
the face of this we are continually striving to reduce the proba-
bility of distortion to acceptable limits." 
Environmental cognition enables the individual to reconcile the en-
vironment he experiences anew each day with the environments he has 
already experienced and come to know. "By referring what we per-
ceive to what we assume on the basis of past perception, we are able 
to create and maintain a stable environment" (Ittelson et al, 1974, 
p.124). 
Having examined the more important functions of environmental cogni-
tion, the discourse now turns to the identification and discussion 
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U· designed (as the diagram shows) 
to produce distortions of size 
perception . 
83 
What the eye can see and what 
the mind will believe can be 
2 different things. 
"Belvedere", lithograph by M.C. 
Escher. 
presents some basic notions concerning the processes by which en-
vironmental information is cognized. 
7.3. THE MECHANISM OF ENVIRONMENTAL COGNITION 
As has been noted in the previous section of this chapter (7.2.2.), 
people are engaged in a search for a valid and usef~l understanding 
of the world in which they exist. The task for the infant is to 
create for himself a reasonably ordered and stable world out of the 
kaleidoscopic and chaotic morass of environmental information. This 
task continues into adulthood and its realization is a necessary con-
dition for a sane and fulfilling human existence. Cognition is a 
process of imposing an order on the environment, so that the conse-
quences of behavior in a particular environmental situation can be 
predicted with some measure of accuracy. This ordering involves 
the process of abstracting and creating concepts and schemata out 
of which environmental images arise. Knowledge is neither innate, 
nor is it a direct copy of reality, but rather to grasp reality it 
is necessary for the individual to create the structures which enable 
him to assimilate reality. 
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7.3.1. Schemata 
In broad outline, the basic position held here regarding the deve-
lopment of environmental knowledge is that people as they grow up deve-
lop a system of relatively abstract and generalizable conceptual 
structures which reflect certain perceived regularities in the re-
lationships among environmental phenomena. In order to organize 
the influx of environmental information the individual develops 
generalized concepts, or classes of environments, objects and events, 
so that new information can be fitted into an existing scheme of ex-
perience. These mental structures, or "schemata", then determine 
the way the environment is perceived. For example, in processing 
visual material, schemata are used for identifying regularities, 
grouping similar or contiguous events, or emphasizing separation, 
continuity, closure or symmetry, and so on. They provide the 
basic framework whereby environmental information is selected, cate-
gorized and stored so that it can be easily _retrieved as the situa-
tion arises. New information is related to the stored information 
of past experience through the way it fits into the individual's 
schemata. 
This is in accordance with Piaget's developmental theory (1950) 
which provides an insight into the processes by which the individual 
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forms his picture of the world; Piaget shows how the individual's 
consciousness of his surrounding environment develops and how he 
gives meaning and order to the environment through the acquisition 
of "schemata". These schemata - which have·been defined as the 
cognitive structures by which individuals intellectually adapt to 
and organize their environment (cf. Chapter 3.2.5), and which may 
be viewed as "categories of knowledge into which information is 
classified" (Pikunas, 1976, p.18) - are fo~med during mental deve-
lopment through a complex transaction between the individual and 
his environment and by this process a man's actions, or "operations" -
are grouped into coherent wholes. According to Piaget, the indi-
vidual, rather than submitting passively to the environment, modi-
fies it by imposing on it a certain structure of his own. 
Piaget (1954) has shown many examples of how cognitive structures, 
or schemata influence the development of environmental knowing. 
He has shown how the child's current cognitive structure dictates 
what information can be assimilated and what will be ignored. There 
seems to be ample evidence that in the process of coming to know an' 
environment, the person accumulates new information, tries to struc-
ture it and changes his current schemata in the light of this new 
in format ion. Piaget refers to this as the "assimilation" of new 
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"aliment" or new "food for thought" to some pre-existing structure, 
and the "accommodation" of this rudimentary structure to further 
experience and information. Assimilation is the modification of 
input information, by the activity of a pre-existent structure; 
accommodation is the active modification of the structure, or _ 
schemata, itself, so as to adapt to the input. In the same way 
that assimilation and accommodation are complementary and insepar-
able processes, so the gathering of information and the structuring 
of it are simultaneous and cannot be separated. 
What is known about the environment is not just a function of what 
information is available but also a matter of the inherent ways in 
which the mind of the particular individual structures the avail-
able information. Piaget's theory is thus rooted in the construc-
tivist hypothesis: reality is construed by the individual in the 
course of his environmental transactions. The way he construes 
the "reality"of the external world, in particular the built en-
vironment, is determined by the schemata which he holds. An ex-
ample of how mental constructs influence perception is f0und in 
Tom Stoppard's play, "Jumpers" (1972): 
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Meeting a friend in a corridor, Wittgenstein said: "Tell 
me, why do people always say it was natural for men to 
assume that the sun went round the earth, rather than that 
the earth was rotating?" His friend said, "Well, obvious-
ly, because it just looks as if the sun is going round the 
earth." To which the philosopher replied, "Well, what 
would it have looked like if it had looked as if the earth 
was rotating?" (p.75) 
Schemata can thus be viewed as the intervening variable between environ-
mental information ard the individual's cognitive response, that is, the 
resultant environmental image which is construed. The processes of 
knowing and giving meaning to the physical environment are far more com-
plex than simply learning an appropriate response to particular stimuli. 
Piaget's theory demonstrates that any stimulus from the external world 
is filtered through a mental structure of schemata, which influences 
the way the environment is conceptualized by the individual. 
Charles Jencks (1969) in his analysis of meaning in architecture postu-
!ates an "extrinsic theory of meaning" (p.17). His basic contention 
is that the concepts or schemata that we have determine perception and 
that instead of these schemata being an intrinsic part of the nervous 
system, "they are slowly created through language and other cultural 
sign systems •.• We form schemata by constant bombardment from outside 
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stimuli, but also by relatively pure thought (logic ••• ) and language" 
(p.18). Schemata are thus not seen as ar:i "a priori" and intrinsic part 
of the human mind, rather, the propensity for the·human mind to ac-
quire these schemata may be seen as inborn and intrinsic. (Jenck's 
analysis of the forces which contribute to the development of schemata 
is extended in this study to include social norms and values, psycho-
logical characteristics and physiological capacities). 
Schemata evolve gradually through the individual's transactions with 
his environment. According to Piaget and Inhelder (1956): 
it is quite obvious that the perception of space involves 
a gradual construction and certainly does not exist ready-
made at the outset of mental development. (p.6) 
It thus appears that information-processing is a learned ability. New 
information is matched against existing schemata, which are themselves 
gradually being modified through the dual functions of assimilation 
and accommodation; learning occurs in the development of both cogni-
tive structures and processes. All environmental learning tasks are 
not solved in early childhood, but a framework is established for the 
future learning of physical environments. Piaget's developmental 
theory is thus diametrically opposed to those theories of learning 
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where the acquisition of knowledge is seen as the quantitive accretion 
of information and facts; Piaget is concerned with the qualitative 
changes which take place as the child develops cognitive structures, 
thereby creating in increasingly complex framework for processing and 
understanding environmental information. 
The term "schema" was probably first used by the British neurologist, 
Sir Henry Head (1920, p. 605) in his work dealing with the "phantom 
limb" phenomenon where a limb seems to be present to its owner long af-
ter it has been amputated. He used the term to describe the neural 
patterns that must be progressively built in the cortex to tell the 
person where his limbs are. Sir Frederic Bartlett (1932) broadened 
and elaborated the concept of the schema, particularly to explain 
the phenomenon of memory. Numerous other psychologists, including 
Allport (1947), Hebb (1966) and of course Piaget (1950, 1954) have 
employed the notion of schemata in one context or another. However 
this concept is by no means limited to psychology; it provides a 
useful framework by which numerous man-environment phenomena can be 
explained, and has found application in numerous disciplines, although 
the actual term "schemata" might not always be used. The common 
thread linking the variety of usages is reference to some sort of in-
ternal integrative process which plays an important part in the deter-
mination of cognitive response. 
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Edward Hall (1959), ihe a~thropologist, has noted that 
there is a growing accumulation of evidence to 
indicate that man has no direct contact with 
experience per se but that there is an invervening 
set of patterns which channel his senses and thoughts, 
causing him to react one way when someone else "'ith 
different underlying patterns will react as his 
experience dictates~ (p. 145) 
The art historian, Gombrich (1962), outlines in his book, ''Art and 
Illusion", how cognition is influenced by the schemata which the 
individual has. He uses the. duck-rabbit figure (p. 4) to exemplify 
this phenomenon: depending on the schemata of the viewer, the figure 
is seen as either a duck or a rabbit, or both but at separate moments 
in time. It is in fact, very difficult to see this figure as both 
rabbit and duck simultaneously or as an abstract form which is nether 
duck nor rabbit, as the mental constructs of the individual tend to im-
pose order and to imbue the form with meaning. 
Various investigations have revealed that the formation of cognitive 
schemata has a neurophysical basis (Stea, 1974, p. 163). There is 
evidence to suggest that the 2 hemispheres of the brain have different 
cognitive functions - the left handling fragmented, non-dimensional, ver-
bal, rational, analytical thought, while the right sides copes with 
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84 Is it a duck, or is it a rabbit? 
dimensional spatial thought. This issue will, however, not be further 
dealt with in this work. 
Much of the literature dealing with cognitive processes and the notion 
of schemata fails to distinguish between "schema" and "image". The two 
concepts are often confused and used interc_hangeably whereas they_ in 
fact represent two distinct, although interdependent entities. In 
essence, ·the term "schema" is used in this thesis to refer to the ab-
stract mental structure by which e~vironmental information is processed 
in the course of cognition; image, on the other hand, is used to refer 
to the product of environmental cognition, that is, to the construed 
mental representation of the environment (cf. Chapter 8.2 for a more 
detailed definition of."the image".) 
7.3.2. The role of action in cognition 
Essential to Piaget's theory is the notion of the active organism 
(Piaget, 1963). His findings strongly contradict the assumption 
of behavioristic "learning" theories that the child is a passive 
recipient of stimuli from a "real" environment. On the contrary, 
his findings indicate that, in adapting to his environment, the indivi-
dual actively initiates contacts and structures his experience. Thus 
according to Piaget's model, at the core of human development is the 
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concept of the individual in an active relationship with the environ-
ment; the action of the individual in the environment, as he moves about 
in it, produces increasingly complex functional knowledge by creating 
new schei:nata. It is through his active participation in the environ-
ment that he comes to know and experience that environment. 
Cognition may be viewed as a reaching out to the world. Man does not 
passively receive. environmental stimuli but actively explores and searches 
- for relevant environmental information in an attempt to satisfy his basic 
need for order and meaning in the external world, as well as his need 
to achieve particular goals ard purposes. "This search for information 
is a characteristic feature of our relation to[ the] external world" (Ittel-
son et al, 1974, p. 123). 
J: Gibson· (1968) and other perceptual theorists have shown that man 
is very active in obtaining information from the environment. Body, head 
and eye movements, for example, all play key roles in the exploration 
and selection of environmental information. Sense organs, when not active-
ly used, are minimally operative. To detect differences in the texture 
or hardness of surfaces, it is not sufficient to simply place a finger on 
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them; the finger must be moved acro$s the surfaces. ''It is possible 
u 
to have eyes and not see, ears and not hear (Tuan, 1974, p. 12). The 
fundamental tenet is that environmental experience, is a continuing 
product of an active endeavour by an individual to create for himself 
a situation withi~ which he can optimally function and achieve his 
own particular pattern of satisfaction. 
thus purposive and goal-directed. 
Environmental cognition is 
The individual's cognition of and action in~ particular 
built environment are inextricably related processes·-. "How we 
behave in a setting is a function of how we perceive it, but these 
perceptions in turn are dependent on the information we derive from 
our actions in this setting" (Ittelson et al, 1974, p. 113). The 
individual thus engages in an active dialectic with his physical en-
vironment. 
Man has a dual function in the physical environment; man the res-
ponder to the environment on the one hand, and man the actor on the en-
vironment on the other hand. Man as responder to the environment has 
traditionally been considered the subject matter of the social sciences, 
who have shown very little interest in man as the manioulator and builder 
of environments. However, as Ittelson et al (1976) point out, 
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7.4 
The way man responds to his environment affects 
the way he acts on it, the way he acts on it 
affects the way he responds. Out of this contin-
uing process emerges a picture of man as the 
active creator, psychologically and physically, 
of the environment within which he functions. 
(p. 191) 
Environmental cognition involves ari active ~recess of transformation. 
Cognition is an intellectual function which enables the individual to 
transform the chaotic outer world apprehended by his senses into a cohe-
rent inner world that he can manage. In getting to know an environment 
certain aspects of one's experience, beliefs and attitudes are attributed 
to that environment. In this sense the environment is transformed in the 
act of getting to know it. This notion of transformation is one of the 
key concepts in Piaget's theories. He contends that it is only by way 
of active transformation that knowledge is possible: 
In order to know objects, .the subject must 
act upon them, and therefore transform them •••• 
From the most elementary sensorimotor actions ••.••• 
to the most sophisticated intellectual operations, 
which are interiorized actions, carried out mentally ••• 
knowledge is constantly linked with actions or 
operations, that is with transformations 
[authors italics]. (Piaget, 1970, p.704). 
ENVIRONMENTAL COGNITION AND THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM. 
Man is an active and integral part of the total environmental 
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system, the physical and non-physical components of which are 
mutually interdependent. (cf. Chapter 3.2.2). The person as one 
component in the total systems acts on the other components, and is in 
tu;n influenced by them. Environmental cognition never occurs in 
isolation; it always occurs within a particular contextual situation. 
Ittelson et al (1974) articulate this holistic approach to environ-
mental cognition: 
[environmental cogni tion]never takes -place"by itself". 
It can be studied only as part of the situation in which 
it occurs, and the components into which that situation 
can be analyzed are determined by the situation in which 
they are encountered. (p. 104) 
The selection of, and response to environmental stimulus information is 
conceptualized in the proposed model as a function of the individual's 
total life environment; that is, the way in which the individual gets 
to know the physical environment and imbues it with meaning is deter-
mined by his physiological characteristics, his psychological make-up, 
his previous cognitive experience, Jhe socio-cultural system within which 
he operates, his current state, as well as the nature of that physical 
environment, and the inter-relations between all these variables. The 
model thus embraces the Parson~n systems approach (cf. Chapter 2.3) 
with its interdependent human activity systems combining to make up the 
total environment which is: 
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7. 4. 1. 
the ever-present context fo! undertaking 
those tasks concerned with securing m~terial 
and social welfare for ourselves and our 
families, as well as pursuing our search for 
and celebration of meaning in our lives. (J. 
Burnett-Prinsloo and Prinsloo, 1978, p. 13) 
That the world means different things to different people, is the point 
of departure for a brief review of the variables which operate in en-
vironmental cognition. Although these forces are in fact interdependent 
and mutually related, for the purpose of analysis they will be considered 
separately. The role of the environment, defined as a source of infor-
mation, has been dealt with in Chapter 7. The influence of the biologi-
cal characteristics of individuals is the least variable factor in en-
vironmental cognition since most people have a similar physiological make-
up and only a very small minority suffer from an inherent physical 
disability or reduced physical competence. The biological factor is thus 
not dealt with. Attention .is directed here to the psychological, social 
and cultural dimensions of cognition. 
The psychological system. 
The physical world is idiosyncratic for each individual. Personal 
environmental conceptions diverge from one another even within the limits 
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set by human physiology and group standards. Private milieus differ 
markedly among people in different cultures, among individuals within 
the same social group, and for the same individual as child and as 
adult, at various times and places, and in various situations and 
moods. As Lowenthal (1966) has observed: 
A man's feelings about space and traffic, smog 
and flood will differ in rain or shine, peace 
or war, and according to whether his stomach is 
empty, or full, or maybe overfull. (p. 129) 
Each private milieu is unique, partly because no two persons can occu-
py the same point in space at the same time,and the physical environ-
ment is never precisely the same on successive occasions (unless, of 
course, it has been set up articificially in laboratory conditions), 
and partly because each individual chooses from and reacts to the en-
vironment in his own peculiar way. His particular "cognitive style" 
is a function of a wide spectrum of psychological variables. 
The relation of cognition to other psychological processes is a general 
problem area in both the theoretical and empirical study of cognition 
(Ittelson et al, 1974, , p. 121). Cognition is inseparably linked 
to certain other aspects of psychological functioning. Cognitions are 
loaded with feelings and values and involve the use of information re-
corded and stored in one's memory system. Likewise cognition is 
... 
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intimately related to personality factors, to the particular developmen-
tal stage and to the specific needs and goals of the individual. 
The purpose and circumstances of cognition materially alter what is 
seen. The potential house-buyer sees a different house to that 
of a potential burglar. "Intent modifies the character of the 
world" (Lowenthal, 1961, p. 256). An open tract of natural land-
scape with a river running through it might be viewed by an indus-
trialist as real estate with good investment potential for a water-
intensive industrial undertaking, such as a paper- mill. On the other 
hand, a nature conservationist might view the same area of land as a 
beautiful and unique ecological zone, whilst a canoeist navig~ting 
the river might be aware only of the gradient and general conditions 
of the river. Circumstances apart, each person is distinctively him-
self. Lowenthal quotes Vernon's (1952) observation that 
The individual.carries with him into every perceptual 
situation .••... his characteristic sensory abilities, 
intelligence, interests, and temperamental qualities ••• 
[and his] responses will be coloured and to some extent 
determined by these inherent individual qualities.(p.255) 
Craik (1970) has investigated the role of personality in environmental 
cognition. He has suggested the existence of "environmental traits": 
,, 
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Individuals not only exhibit characteristic 
styles of relating to other persons, such as 
'dominant', 'assertive', 'deferent', and so on, 
they also display enduring orientation toward the 
physical environment; an inventory of environ-
ment traits would permit the declaration: 'I am the 
sort of person who reacts in these ways to the molar 
physical environment! (p. 86) 
Another reason why the images which each person construes from a given 
environment are distinctive and unique is that all environmental 1n-
formation is inspired, filtered and distorted by feeling. The dere-
lict house looks warm and hospitable to the homeless; Bruner and Klein 
(1960) found that coins appeared larger to the children of the poor • 
. This study does not attempt to comprehensively analyze the nature of 
these psychological variables and their interrelationships. It simply 
acknowledges that cognition is intimately related to the individual's 
psychological system which thus has a significant influence on his 
conception of the built environment. 
7.4.2 The socio-cultural system 
It has been stated (Chapter 3.4) that, although the position is taken 
that environmental knowledge is constructed by-the individual in the 173. 
course of his environmental transactions, this position does not imply 
the absolute subjectivity of environmental knowledge. The way the 
individual conceptualizes and evaluates the built environment has 
both a personal and a collective dimension. Neither the built en-
vironment, nor cognition can be fully understood until they are seen 
in their socio-cultural context. 
Lowenthal (1961, p. 260) has commented that "the surface of the earth 
is shaped for each person by-refraction through cultural and personal 
lenses of custom and fancy." 
Cognition comprizes individual mental processes; however, the con-
cepts, or images which arise are largely a product of social and cul-
tural forces. Cognition is a search for meaning and a process of 
imposing order on the world; by having a meaningful structure im-
posed on it, "the world is humanized and made habitable" (Rapoport, 
1976, p. 222). The type of order imposed varies with the differing 
"cognitive styles" of different socio-,cul tural groups. Piaget has 
shown how the child from birth has an innate structuring ability which 
enables him to interact with and orientate himself in the built environ-
ment, thus establishing some kind of order. Piaget stressed the social 
basis of this cognitive structure; the social environment 
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in part determines the interactions from which the schemata stem: 
Without interchange of thought and co-operation with 
others, the individual would never come to group his 
operations into a coherent whole: in this sense, 
therefore, operational grouping presupposes social life. 
( 1950, p. 163) 
Values, beliefs, attitudes which are held by the group play an impor-
tant part in determining the schemata and concepts which individuals 
use to structure the physical environment. For example, the belief 
held by certain civilizations that the earth is flat resulted in the 
individuals of that group perceiving the horizon as the "edge of the 
world", beyond which lay an infinite drop into space. This concept of 
the earth as a flat disc-like form played a significant role in de-
termining subsequent cognitive categories and orientational systems. 
The relationship betwe~ people and the built environment is thus 
largely a social one. Husserl (1965, p. 189) argued that the in-
dividual's experience arises out of a common experience and that the 
constant foundation of man's thinking and experience is the "environ-
ing world of life", or "lebenswelt". Individual perspectives of the 
built environment can thus be seen as intersubjective rather than 
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subjective. This viewpoint is obviously phenomenological in character 
and avoids the s~mplisticapproaches of objectivism and subjectivism. 
The socio-cultural base of cognition is a necessary condition for 
the co-existence of members of particular social or cultural groups. 
Without basic concurrence as to the nature of the world and the way 
it is ordered, there could be no communication between people. Nor-
berg-Schulz (1971), in his discourse on "existential space", notes that 
"our different individual worlds must have common basic structural pro-
perties to enable us to become part of society" (p. 38). People need 
to share certain cognitive str0ctures and concepts if they are to com-
municate with each other. Adequate schemata, as well as the manipu-
lation of symbol systems (such as language), are learned as a means of 
communication. An untenable situation would arise should every in-
dividual experience the built environment in a totally subjective or 
arbitrary way. 
Environmental knowledge is a function of the roles that people play 
in society. For example, studies by numerous environmental psychologists 
(Canter, 1969b; Hershberger, 1970 a, 1974) have indicated that archi-
tects conceptualize the built environment in ways quite different from 
that of the general public. "Learning from Las Vegas" by Venturi et 
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al (1977) further highlights the necessity of distinguishing between 
expert and user viewpoints. Hershberger's initial research in this 
area focussed on whether architects do, in fact, comprehend the archi-
tectural environment differently from laymen, for either the represen-
tational or responsive levels of meaning and, if so, to discover to 
what this difference should be attributed. He concluded that there 
were pronounced differences between the architects and non-architects 
in their comprehension of architectural environments. It was evident 
that the professional education of_the architects had a great deal to 
do with their way of comprehending the built environment. In fact, 
the results were so conclusive that Hershberger made the rather alar-
ming comment that "the architect might be one of the_worst !9uthor's ita-
lics] persons to predict how laymen, the users of his buildings, would 
represent and respond to what he designs" (1974, p. 154). 
Another example of how different roles affect environmental cognition 
is the familiar situation where the tourist, or visitor views a par-
ticular environment in a very different light from that of the inha-
bitants. The element of novelty is an important aspect of the tourists' 
environmental experience; what is familiar and ~undane to the residents 
is "interesting" and "fascinating" to the visitors. Another.factor 
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contributing to the discrepancies of tourist/resident cognition is the 
difference in the socio-cultural background, and henie world view, 
of these two groups of people. The average middle class Western 
tourist who visits Israel, for example, views the area of Jerusa-
lem, known as Nachlaot as a miserable and uncomfortable slum. 
However, despite the delapidated condition of the buildings and the 
general overcrowding, the residents of Nachlaot, many of whom come 
from North African and Middle Eastern countries, find the environment 
very congenial to their style of living and do not wish to move to new 
accommodation in modern suburban apartment blocks. 
The influence of language on cognition has been much debated. The Whor-
fian Hypothesis (Whorf 1956) suggests that language determines thought 
and our knowledge of reality; that is, language acts as a frame of 
reference through which we view the world. 
We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native 
languages ••..... the world is presented in a kaleidos-
.copic flux of impressions which has to be organized in 
our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic sys-
tems of our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into 
concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely be-
cause we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this 





Miserable slum or congenial 
living environment? 
~ Nachlaot in Jerusalem, Israel. 
-------------· - ------·-- ------------------
and is codified in the patterns of our language. 
(Whorf, 1956, p. 213) 
However, whether language affects cognition at all, and if it does, 
the extent of its influence is still an open question. It does however, 
seem plausible that language plays a significant role in determining 
what environmental information is selected and how this information is 
classified. Eskimos, for example, have many different words for 
different types of snow and are able to distinguish a wide range of 
snow conditions. We, on the other hand, simply spe_ak of "snow" and 
. where the eskimo will notice fine distinctions, we tend to see a 
uniform type of snow (although we can be taught to recognise the dif-
ferent snow types). The main problem with Whorf's theory is that it 
is circular - different cultural groups see the world differently be-
cause they speak different languages, and conversely, we speak dif-
ferent languages because we see the world differently. Which comes 
first - language, cognition or reality? 
In summary then, cognition as a process is far from being solely a 
mechanical response. The cognitive representations which are formed 
by individuals are a product of the interrelations between physio-
logical, psychological, socio-cultural and physical environmental fac-
tors. 
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a product - a person's organized representation 
of ~ome part of the spatial environment. Exam-
ples include a sketch map showing the route to 
your house; a list of the places downtown that you 
avoid because they are dangerous; a child's painting 
of his house and neighbourhood; the picture that comes 
to mind every time you try to-cross town on the subway 
system, and the travel brochure that describes places 
that are worth visiting. Most importantly a cogni-
tive map is a cross section representing the world 
at one instant in time. It reflects the world as 
some person believes it to be; it need not be cor-
rect. (p. 6) ••.••• 
The cognitive map is, above all, a mental image in 
a person's brain. (p. 7) 
However, "cognitive map" is a misleading and restrictive label. Firstly, 
the term implies map-like representations of the physical environment. 
It has been argued (Hart and Moore, 1973) that it begs the question to 
suggest that spatial relations are necessarily represented in a carto-
graphic form and that the cognitive map is only one form of cognitive 
representation. 
Rapoport (1977) concurs with this latter point, describing mental maps 
as "those specific spatial [author's italics]images which people have 
of the physical environment and. which primarily affect spatial behavior" 
(p. 119). Secondly, the term leads to confusion regarding the 
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distinction between internal representations of the environment, that 
is, cognitive representations, and external representations such as 
drawings, maps, verbal reports. External representations enable us 
to infer internal representations and ,have been used in numerous ex-
perimental studie~. Downs and Stea in their definition of the cog-
nitive map fail to draw this distinction, resulting in a definition 
which is confusing and ambiguous. The examples of cognitive maps which 
they offer include both observable external representations - sketch 
map, list, painting, travel brochure - and internal cognitive repre-
sentations - "the picture that comes to mind" - which cannot be di-
rectly observed. 
Piaget (1951, pp. 67 - 72) has acknowledged the dual use of the term 
"representation". He has distinguished between representation in 
the sense of knowledge, which he has termed "cognitive representa-
tion" and representation in the sense of the re-presentation of ab-
sent realities, which he has termed "symbolic representation", or sim-
ply "symbolization". Cognitive representations are not directly ob-
servable and he thus further defines them as "internal" representations. 
On the other hand, symbolic representations are directly observable 
and "external", for example a portrait painting represents a par-

















 -· "'I 0 :J 3 (I) :J ,... Q) - - 3 n, (C CD 
In the previous chapter the processes of cognition were analyzed and 
certain theoretical conceptions were suggested regarding the way peo-
ple acquire knowledge of the built environment. The concept of the 
image was introduced and broadly defined as the product of the cognitive 
system. In this chapter the nature and function of the image will be 
examined in more depth, giving a broad overview of how it relates to 
the physical environment and to human experience. 
Since the processes and products of environmental cognition are inti-
mately related and, in· fact, form part of one overall system, it fol-
lows that a certain degree of overlap and repetition from the previous 
chapter is inevitable. 
The diagram of the conceptual model of environmental cognition shows 
how the environmental image is formed through the cognitive processing 
and input selection - which is a function of the individual's "human 
action system" (Chapter 2.3) - of environmental stimulus information. 
The diagram graphically indicates feedback from the environmental image 
to the cognizing individual and to the environment, in what is a con-
tinuing system. It is thus suggested that the image is dialectically 
related to both the cognizer and the built environment~ 
·' 
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8. 1 THE IMPORTANCE OF IMAGE STUDIES 
Since the environmental image is the.mental representation that the per-
son holds of the built environment, that is, the subjective knowledge 
of the environment, it follows that the image is a crucial factor in 
determining man's use·and evaluation of the built environment. Pylshyn 
(1977) in his critique of mental imagery refers to the image as a fun-
damental aspect of human experience: "We cannot speak of consciousness 
without, at the same time, implicating the existence of images'' (p.3). 
Cognition as a process has been defined in the previous-~hapter as an 
intervening filtering between man and the environment; the product of 
this process - defined here as the image- thus refers to the resultant 
intervening construct which is related to, although not a copy of, the 
objective environment. If the present architectural environment does 
reflect largely untested assumptions made by the professional planners 
and designers about human preferences and behavior, then it follows 
that the systematic study of images is necessary if the gap is to be 
closed between planners, architects and policy makers, and the public. 
This study does not attempt to reveal the precise content of environ-
mental images held by particular people, but rather it aims to present 
a theoretical overview of the nature and function of the environmental 
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image in a more general sense. This can be seen as a prelude to possi-
ble future empirical research. A central theme is the importance of 
the image as a link between people and the built environment. 
8.2 TERMINOLOGY 
Before the discussion continues, it is essential that the sense in 
which the term "image" is used in this study be defined. 
The field of environmental cognition is characterized by a fundamental 
confusion over terminology, particularly with regard to the concept of 
mental representation. Numerous different terms are used in.the lite-
rature - "cognitive map", "mental map, "schema", "cognition", "mental 
representation", "image" - in a conceptually related sense, and are 
often used interchangeably. All are used to refer, in one way or 
another, to a cognitive representation of the physical environment. 
The terms "cognitive map" and "mental map" were originally introduced 
by Tolman in 1948. In more recent times they have been used parti-
cularly by Downs and Stea in a comprehensive body of research (1973 
a & b, 1977) which has made a significant impact in the field of en-
vironmental cognition. Downs and Stea (1977) define the cognitive 
map as 
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a product - a person's organized representation 
of Borne part of the spatial environment. Exam-
ples include a sketch map showing the route to 
your house; a list of the places downtown that you 
avoid because they are dangerous; a child's painting 
of his house and neighbourhood; the picture that comes 
to mind every time you try to·cross town on the subway 
system, and the travel brochure that describes places 
that are worth visiting. Most importantly a cogni-
tive map is a cross section representing the world 
at one instant in tim~. It reflects the world as 
some person believes it to be; it need not be cor-
rect. (p. 6) •.•••• 
The cognitive map is, above all, a mental image in 
a person's brain. (p. 7) 
However, "cognitive map" is a misleading and restrictive label. Firstly, 
the term implies map-like representations of the physical environment. 
It has been argued (Hart and Moore, 1973) that it begs the question to 
suggest that spatial relations are necessarily represented in a carto-
graphic form and that the cognitive map is only one form of cognitive 
representation. 
Rapoport (1977) concurs with this latter point, describing mental maps 
· as "those speci fie spatial [author's italics J images which people have 
of the physical environment and. which primarily affect spatial behavior" 
(p. 119). Secondly, the term leads to confusion regarding the 
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distinction between internal representations of the environment, that 
is, cognitive representations, and external representations such as 
drawings, maps, verbal reports. External representations enable us 
to infer internal representations and ;have been used in numerous ex-
perimental studies. Downs and Stea in their definition of the cog-
nitive map fail to draw this distinction, resulting in a definition 
which is confusing and ambiguous. The examples of cognitive maps which 
they offer include both observable external representations - sketch 
map, list, painting, travel brochure - and internal cognitive repre-
sentations - "the pi_cture that comes to mind" - which cannot be di-
rectly observed. 
Piaget (1951, pp. 67 - 72) has acknowledged the dual use of the term 
"representation". He has distinguished between representation in 
the sense of knowledge, which he has termed "cognitive representa-
tion" and representation in the sense of the re-presentation of ab-
sent realities, which he has termed "symbolic representation", or sim-
ply "symbolization". Cognitive representations are not directly ob-
servable and he thus further defines them as "internal" representations. 
On the other hand, symbolic representations ate directly observable 
and "external", for example a portrait painting represents a par-
ticular person, a word represents a particular meaning, and so on. 
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The term "schema" has been used in environmental cognition studies 
to describe a cognitive re~resentation of the environment. The terms 
"schema" and "image" are often used interchangeably. Rapoport (1977) 
has noted that "images" seem to be structures or schemata" (p.42). 
He thus implies that the two terms are synonymous. 
Lee (1976) applied the notion of "schema" to his study of the neigh-
bourhood concept. The findings from his empirical study carried out 
in Cambridge led to his formulation of the "neighbourhood in the mind" 
and later, to the use of the concept of "socio-spatial schema" to repre-
sent this. Lee defines socio-spatial schema as "an inner represen-
tation of both physical and social objects in an integrated form" (1976, 
p.37). However, the term "schema" has also been used in another sense 
in the literature; it has been used to refer to the more abstract cog-
nitive representation (Jencks, 1969; Piaget, 1951). It is in this 
latter sense that the term "schema", or "schemata", has been used in 
this study. (cf. Chapter 7). 
The term "image" has been used in a number of conceptually distinct 
ways and therefore some clarification is needed. The concept of 
imagery has been linked historically to both memory and thought. The 
linking of imagery to memory apparently originated in Western culture 
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as a mnemonic technique that was invented by Simonides about 2500 years 
ago. The connection between imagery and thought also goes back to anti-
quity. Aristotle wrote that it was impossible to think without mental 
pictures, and used the images of mnemonics to illustrate his statements· 
about imagination and thought. (Paivio, 1977). 
It seems that many contemporary psychologists who write on the subject 
use the term "image" to refer to a subjective mental representation, or 
sensation, which occurs in the absence of a stimulus. Academics have 
suggested that images are related to "indirect reactivations of former 
sensory or perceptual activity" (Bugelski, 1970, p. 1002); or that they 
are "a faint subjective representation of a sensation or perception 
without an adequate sensory input" (Holt, 1964, p.255); or "the occur-
rence of perceptual processes in the absence of stimulation which nor-
mally gives rise to perception" (Hebb, 1966, p.41); or imagery is 
defined as "the ability of a subject to generate or synthesize a sen-
sor~like datum in the absence of physical stimulation" (Weber and Bach, 
1969, p • 199) • 
However, it is not in this sense that the term "imagery" is used 1.n 
this work. It is used in a broader, more comprehensive sense to refer 
to the picture, or internal model that people build up of the world 
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about them through the process of cognition; the stimulus information 
from the environment may or may not be present. In perceiving and ex-
periencing a particular building the person forms an image, or cognitive 
representation, of that building, that is, in the presence of the sti~u-
lus information. Similarly, one retains in one's memory, to a greater 
or lesser extent, the image of particular buildings experienced in the 
past and this image may be consciously or unconsciously recalled in the 
absence of the original stimulus information. 
The term "image" is used in this thesis to refer to subjective knowledge 
of the physical environment, to an individual's ''mental representation 
of the parts of external reality known to him via any kind of experience" 
(Harrison and Sarre, 1971, p.352)and is synonymous with the terms, "cog-
nition" (noun), "mental representation" and "cognitive representation". 
It is used here in a way closely related to Lynch's concept of the image. 
He describes the environmental image as "the generalized mental picture 
of the exterior physical world that is held by an individual" (1960, p.4). 
Lynch, however, concentrates on the visual aspect of the image and neg-
lects in his study to investigate the other dimensions of the image. 
This point will be dealt with later in this chapter. Norberg-Schulz 
(1971) in his analysis of architecture, bases his argument on a theory 
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of existential space. He demonstrates that "man's existence is de7 
pendent upon the establishement of a meaningful and coherent environ-
mental image or 'existential space'." (p. 114). His use of the con-
cept of existential space to describe man's image of his environment 
thus corresponds with the concept of the environmental image postu-
lated by this thesis. 
The image is treated here, following Moore and Golledge (1976), as a 
hypothetical construct, that is, as 
a proposition about hypothetical entities, processes 
- or events which are not directly observable •••• [but J 
that there is reason to believe do [author's 
italics] exist, which are in principle [author's 
italics] observable (i.e., cognitive representations 
have correlates in other behavioral domains, e.g., 
physiological processes which could be measured 
under some ideal circumstances), but which can only 
be hypothesized at the present time". (p.8) 
Thus, although images are covert processes and organizations of ele-
ments of knowledge which are not directly observable, they have an 
"allegedly real status" (p.8). 
8.3. THE FUNCTION OF THE IMAGE. 
In order to operate effectively in the environment one needs to have 
some mental conception of that environment. Images are the basis ~f 
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one's interactions with one's surroundings and, as Lynch ( 1960) has_ noted, 
the image ••• is used to interpret information and to guide 
action. The need to recognize and pattern our surroundings 
is so crucial, and has such long.roots in the past, that 
this image has wide practical and emotional importance to 
the individual (p. 4) ••• Our environmental image is still 
a fundamental part of our equipment for living. (p. 124) 
The diagram of the model indicates feedback from the image to the cog-
nizing individual, and from the image to the built environment. It has 
been suggested earlier in this chapter that the image is a fundamental 
aspect of human experience. Since the environmental image is defined 
as subjective knowledge of the environment and constitutes one's envi-
ronmental reality, it follows that it must play a very important role 
in determining human consciousness. The way an individual or group 
conceptualizes a particular physical environment is influenced by, and 
ultimately exerts a reciprocal influence on, the "human action system" 
of thai individual or group. It is in this sense that the image is 
seen as playing a dynamic role in man-environment relations. 
8.3. 1 Mediator of Cognition 
The environmental image functions in the mediation of environmental 
knowledge. Images enable the individual to code, structure and store 
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environmental information and thus influence subsequent environment~! 
conceptions. Lynch (1960), in his pioneering work on urban imagery, 
stresses man's need to find order in the built environment and his con-
stant effort to reduce physical "chaos" to a meaningful pattern. He 
describes the reciprocal process by which environmental images, once 
established, influence the select~on of environmental information and 
at the same time are themselves tested against the environmental input: 
Environmental images are the result of a two-way pro-
cess between the observer and his environment. The 
environment sugge~ts distinctions and relations, and 
the observer- with-great adaptability and in the light 
of his own purposes - selects, organizes, and endows 
with meaning what he sees. The image so developed now 
limits and emphasizes what is seen, while the image 
itself is being tested against the filtered perceptual 
input in a constant interacting process. (p.6) 
This description, with its emphasis on the dynamic nature of the image, 
corresponds with the conceptual model of environmental cognition pro-
pounded in this thesis. The image is viewed as a product of cognitive 
processes and as a function of environmental and human factors. At the 
same time, the image once formed, influences the selection of environ-
mental information and the processing of that information; it therefore 
plays a significant role in determining the development of subsequent 
images. 
190. 
8.3.2 Mediator of Behavior. 
The environmental image, as a partial and simplified representation of 
of the physical environment, forms an indispensable part of an indivi-
dual's survival kit. Not only does it mediate cognition, but it is also 
assumed to be a crucial intervening variable between the built environ-
ment and man's behavior in that environment. Architects have in the 
last two decades been concerned with the behavioral phenomena referred 
to as "personal space" (Sommer, 1969), "home range" (Anderson and Tindal, 
1972), "behavior settings" (Barker, 1968) and so on. Most of the re-
search, however, deals with the.ways -in which behavior, related to per-
sonal space, home range, etc. are manifested; the literature reveals 
that there has been relatively little concern with the origin of the 
particular behavior. It is suggested in this section that there is 
a meaningful link between images and behavior. Reference is made to 
certain studies which do recognize this link. However it is difficult 
to discover the exact nature of this link, how action results from the 
images held. In effect, the image model is still incomplete because 
of this gap between image and behavior (Rapoport, 1977, p.45). 
Boulding's book, "The Image" (1956) propounded the then somewhat here-
tical notion that all behavior was a function of knowledge, that is, 
the cognitive structure that he termed the "image". He refers to.the 
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image as being subjective knowledge which "largely governs my behav.ior" 
(pp.5-6). This view has since become more acceptable in academic circles 
and has formed the foundation of a small, but growing, body of research 
in the field of environmental cognition. Charles Burnette (1974), for 
example, describes the role of the image in influencing human behavior: 
The mental image •••••• of the environment which we 
0 anticipate' for our actions is a necessary part of 
the ability to plan behavior •••• to function at a place 
in a room, in a building, in a city, in the country, 
and in the world we depend on mental images of these 
environments. (p. 170) 
Downs and Stea (1973b) take a similar position stating that "human spa-
tial behavior is dependent on the individual's cognitive map of the 
spatial environment" (p.9). Behavior does not occur in a vacuum; all 
overt behavior necessarily takes place in a physical (as well as non-
physical) environment. The way one "sees", or knows, a particular en-
vironment, that is, the physical, evaluative and inferential aspects 
of one's mental model will determine largely how one behaves in that 
environment. The relationship between environmental cognition and 
behavior can be viewed in the framework of the dialectical model. Not 
only do images arise out of the individual's transactions with the en-
vironment (Chapter 7), but subsequent transactions, including overt 
behavior, are presumed to be mediated by previously constructed concep-
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Behaviour does not occur in a 
vacuum: 
all behaviour necessarily takes 
place in a physical environment. 
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tions. In G.T. Moore's words, ''behavioral transactions with the en-
vironment are mediated in part by the individual's knowledge, or cog-
nitive representations, of the total environment-behavior situation" 
(1976, p.144). 
The fundamental premise which underlies much of this thought is the 
notion that the environment is what the person thinks it is, and he 
responds to is, behaviorally, emotionally and intellectually, as he 
conceives it to be. The environmental image which a person holds 
constitutes hi-s_only reality regarding that environment; it repre-
sents the environment as it is known to him. The cognitive environment 
is "no less functional than the geographical environment, since mental 
images predispose the manner in which we interact with the actual 
physical setting" (Ittelson et al, 1974 p.14). 
In linking behavior with the image, the diagram of the model of en-
vironmental cognition may be extended to include a further- flow from 
the image to categories of overt response. However, whilst this link-
age is recognized and briefly discussed here, this thesis is more 
concerned with the nature of the known environment per se. 
8.3.3. Role in the design process. 
The feedback from the image to the environment can be explained by 
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viewing the built environment as a physical expression of the images 
held by the designers of that environment, that is, the designer's con-
ceptual environment is manifested, or made visible, in the construction 
of the built environment. This notion can be traced back to the six-
teenth century when (according to Wittkower, 1971, pp. 67-68) Barbaro, 
a noted teacher and scholar,wrote: 
The artist first works in the intellect and conceives 
in the mind and symbolizes the exterior matter after 
the interior, image, particularly in architecture. 
Barbaro believed that the architect's images were based on an ideal, 
universal form of truth. Although this Platonic principle is rejected 
here, the notion of images - defined as the personal knowledge of a 
particular architect or non-professional 'designer in a specific situa-
tion - as the basis for design decisions remains relevant. 
In more recent times, Rapoport (1976, 1977), Norberg-Schulz (1971) and 
Colquhoun (1971) have supported the contention that the built environ-
ment is designed and built to meet some conceptual image of environment. 
Norberg-Schulz has argued that man's spatial images are created through 
interaction with existing architectural space5, 9nd when these do not 
satisfy him, that is, when his image becomes confused or too unstable, 
he modifies the environment. Norberg-Schulz therefore defines archi-
tectural space ''as a concretization of man°s existential space'' (p.12). 
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Rapoport takes a similar stance, noting that "designers always seem to 
match solutions against images whether it is an aboriginal making a 
spear, an artist trying to represent ci landscape, city or building or 
an urban designer choosing among alternatives" -( 1977, p. 40) • According 
to Rapoport, design is the making concrete of some ideal environment. 
(In this he is following the theoretical propositions of Langer, 1953 
and Eliade, 1961). He views design "as giving physical expression to 
an ideal environment embodied in images" (1977, p.42). 
Alan Colquhoun (1971), in his convincing argument for a typological 
approach to design, contends that the design of artefacts (including 
buildings and objects) necessarily depends on the existence of an image, 
or cognitive model, of the form which the artefact should ideally take. 
He states that architecture pre-supposes "the existence of a given 
system of representation" (p.404). These cognitive representations, 
or images, he terms "typologies". Building typologies are thus type 
solutions to particular environmental problems. They have been culiur-
ally transmitted through time within socio-cultural groups and are 
housed in the minds of all people,including architects and the lay pub-
lic. They have to a large extent determined the form and structure of 
man's built environment. 
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The Modern Movement in architecture attempted to break down the repre-
sentational systems inherited from the past under the pretext that the 
type solutions, or models, of the pre-industrial era were no longer 
compatible within the context of a rapidly changing technology. How-
ever, Colquhoun argues that the creation of artefacts, including archi-
tecture, can never be based only on scientific determinism (that is, 
the application of sociological, biological and engineering sciences 
etc. to design), nor solely on intuition, neither can design be based 
on a fusion of both. He maintains that the reliance on typologies as 
a source of design solutions is inevitable. These typologies, which 
are consciously and unconsciously used in the shaping of the environment, 
are rooted in the socio-cultural system and form "part of a system of 
communications within society" (p. 396). The image held by the designer 
is communicated through the physical form which he creates and which 
corresponds as closely as possible to his mental image of that artefact. 
The notion of the built environment as a physical expression of images 
can be used to explain the disparity between the apparent adequacy of 
the vernacular architecture of simple preliterate s~cieties, and the 
widely criticized inadequacy of the contemporary architecture of West-
ern civilization. The ABC triangle of Architect, Builder and Consumer 
with which modern industrial society is familiar, is generally absent 
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from tribal societies. The three functions are compressed, if not to 
an individual owner-builder, then to a community grouping based on kin-
ship ties or gender rather than occupational specialization. For example, 
in the Xhosa tribe the women's domestic duties include the task of the 
construction and decoration of dwellings. Deviation from tradition is 
not likely amongst a group that has a clear and shared image of what 
buildings should be like. Certain patterns of building have persisted 
for centuries in certain pre-industrialized societies e.g. the thatch-
roofed circular mud hut still.used.today in Southern Africa. The particu-
lar w·ay of building is embedded deep into the -group (or tribe) conscious-
ness through the medium of legends, songs, and so on, so that each mem-
ber of the group has a stable mental image of the form that a dwelling 
should take, The matching of the physical building with these commonly 
held images is relatively easy to achieve. 
Ideally there should be this isomorphic relation between the environ-
mental image and architecture. However, in our complex modern society 
with its division into highly specialized functions, this is not often 
achieved. Architecture reflects the cognitive environment of the arch-
tect who created it. This mental model may be at odds with those held 













·- .. ~ .,.l .Jr _ ...,, ~ 
· w .~ ..;.. 4f;::!.,, /8':utl/ll. ~,~} Jy -
f-:""·""'-
,,.. _ _;,.,,\..~ .. ,: .. i; :.;;.-~-
.7:·~~~·;\i{:~~·~:·;i\·~~~; .;'f ·':'-":.~ :'"\ .. ~ .'~ ,•, v 
~-.... .... -· ~ \, ~.,,..,, ::- . ~ 
• 
Patterns of building have 
persisted for centuries. 
87 Xhosa huts, Ciskei . 
Architectural space is given 'ready made' to the indi-
vidual, that is, it is the creation of others and re-
flects their [author's italics] existential spaces •..• 
and when we try to create architectural spaces which 
concretize our existential space, the result may not 
be liked by others. (p. 37) 
It is not only the specialization of the building task in modern society 
that leads to alienated and unsatisfactory buildings; our society is 
characterized by a lack of cohesion amongst its people. Numerous socio-
cultural groups, defined by occupational, educational, financial, racial, 
religious factors etc., result in a multiplicity of relatively idiosyn-
cratic images. Also, a sophisticated technological society offers many 
more alternative choices. In this situation the matching process is 
much more difficult and incongruency, or mismatches, are frequent; that 
is buildings are frequently designed which do not relate to the mental 
conceptions held by the people who are to use the buildings, resulting 
in widespread user dissatisfaction. The increasing separation between 
designers and users which characterizes the position of the professional 
in our society today can be understood in these terms. It is thus im-
portant that architects search for the means to recognize, understand 
and reinforce or transform the mental images which people hold of archi-
tecture. 
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8.4. COMPONENTS OF THE IMAGE. 
Environmental images have been defined in this study as stable mental 
conceptions, or models of environments. They can be thought of as 
"summarizing individuals' environmental knowledge, evaluations and pre-
ferences and as having implications for behavior" (Pocock and Hudson, 
1978, p.3). However, images do not have implications only for behavior, 
but as has been discussed in the previous section, they also play an 
important role in influencing subsequent environmental cognition and 
in the design process. Thus the image may be considered to possess 
designative, appraisive and prescriptive components. These interrelated 
components of the image are shown in the diagram of the conceptual mo-
del cf environmental cognition. This definition of the image is based 
on that advanced by Pocock (1973). He presents the above 3 categories 
in his model of environmental perception; however the ideas embodied 
in these categories are not developed. His subsequent work with Hudson 
(1978) applies this framework but fails to extend or develop the basic 
concept. The following section takes Pocock's categories as a useful 
starting point for an analysis of the multi-dimensional nature of the 
image. 
8.4. 1. The designative component. 
The designative component refers to the informational content of the 
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image. It is that aspect of the image which describes and classifies 
environmental information, that is, the basic "whatness" and "whereness" 
of the image content. The designative component of the image relates 
to those physical attributes of the environment, such as s.ize, shape, 
texture, colour, location, and so on. 
8.4. 1. 1. Structural elements. 
Norberg-Schulz (1971, pp. 17-27), in his existential interpretation 
of architecture, classified the basic constitutent elements of the en-
vironmental image as places, paths and domains. This distinction is 
based on concepts established by Heidegger, Frey, R. Schwarz and Lynch 
and is related to Piaget's concept of topological schemata (Piaget and 
Inhelder 1956). Although Norberg-Schulz postulates this classification 
as the definitive description of the environmental image, his elements 
focus only on a part of the image, that is, they constitute only the 
designative component of th~ image. It is proposed here that the image 
is composed not only of designative, but of appraisive and prescriptive 
components as well. A discussion of the two latter components will 
follow after this section. 
Norberg-Schulz demonstrates how his classification is applicable on 
several levels within a hierarchy of which the most comprehensive.is 
the geographical level, while at the opposite end of the hierarchy is 
an order of furniture and still smaller objects. 
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Places, paths and domains. 
88 (above) Piazza : 11 Campo, Siena 
89 (far left) Street : S.Gimignano, 
Toscano 
90 (left) District 
Basilicata. 
Pisticci, 
The definition of place is based on factors of centrality, closure.ond 
proximity. Places are defined as centres, or foci where the meaningful 
events of existence are experienced. Places are also points of departure 
"from which we orient ourselves and take possession of the environm~nt 11 · 
(p. 19). In other words, places are points in space to which we direct 
ourselves; in which we linger and live; and from which we depart. 
To be recognized as a place, a space needs a "pronounced limit or bor-
der" (p. 20). The place itself is experienced as "inside" in contrast 
to the surrounding "outside". Regc:irding proximity, Norberg-Schulz notes 
that "a place is characterized by a certain 'size''' (p.19). He quotes 
Rudolph Schwarz (1949): 
A [place] can only become a home if it is small •••••• 
The settlements must remain within an imaginable scale 
if they are to become a home. 
Whereas a place is determined by its having a "centre" and by the proxi-
• 
mity of its enclosing elements, the path is imagined as a linear succes-
sion: 
Primarily il is a direction to be followed towards a goal, 
but during the journey events happen and the path is also 
experienced as having a character of its own. 
(Norberg-Schulz, 1971, p. 22) 
Paths provide the organizing axes in space and are characterized by their 
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continuity. 
Paths divide man's environment into areas which are known and areas 
which are relatively unknown. These qualitatively defined areas are 
termed "domains" by Norberg-Schulz. Domains are delimited 1n numerous 
ways distinctive natural elements such as hills and rivers form bor-
ders between areas; land use, such as agriculture, industry or housing 
creates a particular "texture" and gives the area a consistent character; 
domains may also be defined by social conditions as is seen in the sec-
tioning off of most cities into residential zones for different socio-
economic groups. The domain is a "relatively unstructured 'ground', 
on which places and paths appear as more pronounced 'figures 0 " (p. 23). 
They serve a unifying function in environmental cognition, giving the 
perceived environment a spatial context. In a sense, domains are "places" 
because they are physically defined by closure and because they have 
certain uniformity of constituent characteristics. However, domains do 
not function as foci or goals; rather they surround places but remain 
outside of these places. 
The designative component of the environmental image is therefore com-
posed of a few basic elements which interact in characteristic ways. 
Although these element types have been isolated for.the purpose of dis-
cussion, they are not experienced as independent, isolated entities. 
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For example, domains are structured with places, and defined and pene-
trated by paths; places occur within domains and are linked by paths; 
paths are given identity and tempo not only by their own form or by the 
places with they link, but also by the domains through which they pass. 
These elements - place, path and domain - are simply the raw material 
of the environmental image and must be patterned together to form a 
comprehensive image. 
Images of houses may be seen as comprizing the three basic elements 
discussed above. However, at_ this-scale of environment, the place 
element dominates. Our house is the place where we "take root day 
after day," for it is our "corner of the world ••. it is our first uni-
verse, a real cosmos in every sense of the word" (Bachelard, 1964, p. 4). 
It is the place where the child first learns to understand his being in 
the ~orld. It is the centre from which we depart and to which we return. 
Not only is the house itself conceptualized as a place but its internal 
structure is comprized of a series of subordinate places connected by 
paths. Objects and furniture may also serve as foci, or points of .re-
ference, within the house. For instance, the fireplace has since 
ancient times been the central focus of the dwelling and the dining 
table has traditionally been the place where the family congregates to 
eat. 
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An overlap between path and place is evident when the house is imaged 
as a sequence of s~atial entities. In this sen~e the house is an archi-
tecturally structured "path", while at the same time, in relation to its 
surrounding space, or domain, it is a "place". The house and its site 
are physically separated from the street and from neighbouring buildings 
by various means (fences, walls, edge of lawn, etc.). That area which 
is outside the enclosure, and which has certain characteristic properties, 
forms the "domain" element of the total house image. 
8. 4, 1. 2. "The spirit of place is a ·great reality". (D.H. Lawrence, 1933, 
p. 12) 
A place is defined by its being bounded and therefore distinguished from 
space such that there is a recognizable "inside" and "outside". However, 
a "sense of place", that·is, the recognition of an environment as being 
distinctive, derives from more than physical structure and form; space 
is internalized as "place" when socio-psychological dimensions intervene. 
"A sense of place, however, comes from the further attribution of meaning 
to such physical form ••• There is, therefore, a social or psychological 
interaction, a reciprocal relationship between place and person" (Pocock 
and Hudson. 1978, p. 81). There is an interaction between people and 
place - on the one hand, individual personality is reflected in one's 
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home and possessions and in the same way, the collective personality' 
and values of a group of people is reflected in public places; and on 
the other hand, people are affected by place. People adopt different 
attitudes and behave differentiy in different places such as church, 
sports stadium, bus stop or supermarket. 
8.4.1.3. The multimodal nature of the image. 
The visual aspect of the image has been emphasized in much of the work 
done in the field of environmental imagery. For example, Venturi et al 
(1977) in their treatise on symbolism in architecture have stressed the 
visual impact of "big sign - little building" or "building as sign"; 
Lynch's (1960) definition of the image emphasizes the "seeing" aspect 
of imagery and imageability (pp. 6, 9). This has led many researchers 
to equate imagery with the cognitive equivalent of vision and has resul-
ted in confusion between environmental perception and environmental 
cognition (Downs and Stea, 1973b). However the image depends on more 
than visual input - blind people also construct mental images of ~heir 
physical environment. All the sense modalities combine to give an 
intergrated representation of any physical environment; the image is 
thus a multimodal representation. For example, the image of a particu-
lar restaurant is a composite of the characteristic cooking smells, the 
sounds of people talking, the clatter of cutlery and crockery, the air 
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temperature, the feel of the chairs as well as the lighting, use of 
colour and other visual effects. 
However, although environmental experience is a totality contributed 
to by all the sensory systems, the dominance of the eye in Western 
society results in our images having a comparatively large visual con-
tent. Controlled experiments have been undertaken to investigate the 
role of the various sense modalities in the cognition of the physical 
environment. For instance, Southworth (1969), in an experiment using 
-subjects in Boston, filtered out the auditory input from the city. He 
found that the removal of the sonic environment produced a cityscape 
"surrealistic in its peacefulness" (p. 61) but which at the same time 
was lacking in contrasts, sad and almost two-dimensional. 
8.4.2. The appraisive component. 
Images include both concrete and abstract stimulus information. The 
component of the image which relates to concrete physical attributes 
has been discussed above. 
Leff (1978, p. 197) has noted that the attention of many theorists and 
researchers se~ms to have been riveted primarily on th~ purely structural 
aspects of environmental conceptualization. Questions about people's 
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knowledge of location and environmental structure have predominated~ 
while questions about the role of affective response and social meaning 
have been relatively neglected. 
Lynch (1960, p. 8) has ·analyzed the environmental image into three com-
ponents : identity, structure and meaning. He defines identity as the 
distinction of an object from other things, "its recognition as a 
separable entity" (p. 8). Structure is the "spatial or pattern re-
lation of the object to the observer and to other objects" (p. 8), 
which Lynch maintains forms an integral part of the image~ Thus iden-
tity and structure together form part of the designative component; 
Lynch's meaning component forms a part of the appraisive aspect which 
is discussed in this section. Although Lynch recognized that the image 
was a compound of physical attributes and meaning, he chose to focus 
on the role of physical form, developing the hypothesis that an indi-
vidual's knowledge of the city is a function of its "imageability". 
This concept he defines as 
that quality in a physical object which gives it a 
high probability of evoking a strong image in any 
given obse~ver. It is that shape, colour or arrange-
ment which facilitates the making of vividly identi-
fied, powerfully structured, highly useful mental 
images of the environment. (p. 9) 
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His work thus deliberately concentrated on the relation of physical 
features to the ways in which people's environmental images seemed to 
identify and structure urban surroundings. The meaning of these physi-
cal features was largely ignored. The results of his empirical work, 
showing how the images of the central areas of Boston, Jersey City and 
Los Angeles were structured by the citizens, verified his hypothesis. 
His research design has subsequently been replicated in a variety of 
cultural settings, including Cuidad Guyana in Venezuela (Appleyard, 
1970), Milan and Rome in Italy (Francescato and Mebane, 1973) and 
Birmingham in England (Goodey et al, 1971) ~mongst others (cf. Chap-
ter 4.3). These studies have however demonstrated something of the 
paucity of Lynch's image, with its emphasis on spatial and relational 
components and neglect of the evaluative and emotional elements of the 
image. 
The development of environmental knowledge and a clear environmental 
image depends to some extent on the distinctiveness of the building form 
and its prominence in the environment. However, whilst it is obvious 
that physical attributes play an important part in determining environ-
mental knowledge, the concept of imageability cannot be defined in 
specifically physical terms ''Physical stimuli per se [authors' italics] 
do not exert an influence on the image directly proportional to their 
208. 
objective prominence'' (Pocock and Hudson, 1978, p. 33). In a study of 
central Birmingham, for instance, the two tallest buildings in the area, 
one rising to almost 153 metres, figured weakly in the public image 
(Goodey et al, 1971, p. 44). The cognitive representation d~pends upon 
more than visual input of concrete stimulus information. 
''It is the attribute of significance which gives meaning to neutral en-
vironmental happening'' (Ittelson, 1960, p. 34). That is, environmental 
images include evaluative and affective dimensions. 
This appraisive component of the image, comprized of evaluative and 
affective elements, plays a very important role in man's experience of 
the built environment. Findings from numerous studies, (Gulick, 1963; 
Sieverts, 1967; Harrison and Howard, 1972; as well as the studies by 
Appleyard, 1970; Francescato and Mebane, 1973 and Goodey et al 1971, 
mentioned above), reveal that not only visual form, but affective and 
evaluative criteria are instrumental in the construction of environmen-
tal images. Images do not reflect simply the objective physical attri-
butes of the built environment. The attitudes, values, beliefs and 
feelings which people have also contribute to the meanings which are 
attached to ·physical forms and thu·s to the connotative, symbolic and 
emotional content of the image. 
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8.4.2. 1. The affective dimension, 
The 6ffective dimension of the image is concerned with man's emotional 
relationship to the environment. Feelings and emotions are brought in-
to play in the cognition of the environment. The cognitive environment 
may be exciting, pleasing, annoying, boring, and so on. Affect and 
evaluation are interrelated factors. Evaluation of a particular build-
ing depends to a large extent on one's feelings about that building. 
As Rapoport puts it "environmental evaluation- is more a matter of overall 
affective response than of a detached analysis of specific aspects'' 
(Rapoport, 1977, p. 60). Similarly, one's preferences and evaluation 
of a building exerts a considerable influence on one's affective res-
ponse to that building. 
8.4.2.2. Social meaning. 
Buildings and places become associated with particular social activity, 
so that in time, although the physical building as such is seen, the 
meaning that it acquires in the minds of people is not structural or 
physical, but social. Thus the cbnceptualization of that building is 
more concerned with symbolism, that is, with what the building repre-
sents, rather than with the actual physical structure. 
Lee's (1976) research in the neighbourhoods of Cambridge revealed that 
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people's images of their_ neighbourhood environment ''comprized a synthesis 
of the multiplicity of both social and physical [author's italics] inter-
actions between the person and the environment" (lee, 1976, p. 129). 
When asked whether they possessed a neighbourhood or not and -if they did, 
what it was like, the majority of respondents neither could, nor wished 
to distinguish the physical from the social aspects of their rneighbour-
hood. Lee thus used the term, "socio-spatial schema" to represent this 
inner representation of the environment that the normally mobile person 
possesses. 
8.4.2.3. The evaluative dimension. 
Inherent in the cognitive representation is an assessment factor which 
includes the subjective evaluation and preference ranking of the built 
environment. Values, purposes, norms and attitudes which people possess 
are brought into action in the process of cognition and the particular 
building is conceived of as pleasant, unpleasant, beautiful, ugly, better, 
worse, novel or common and so on. 
Designative and appraisive components are interrelated and interdepen-
dent in the sense that the cognitive selection of information regarding 
the physical characteristics of a building is determined to a considerable 
extent by the meaning which is attached to that building. For example a 
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"midgle class" architect may look at-a "deteriorating slum" and see di-
lapidated, paint-peeled old buildings and dirty streets, while the resi-
dents of the area see their neighbours' homes in all of their particu-
lars and streets active with children at play. A tourist, in the light 
of his own purpose, beliefs and values, will judge buildings on criteria 
quite different from those of a native. Similarly, the details of a 
building will appear quite differently to a maintenance man than to an 
art historian. 
Research is being undertaken in the field of environmental cognition to 
identify the elements of environmental assessment. The Semantic Dif-
ferential (Osgood et al, 1957) and Repertory Grid (Kelly, 1955) are two 
techniques originally developed in psychology, which have recently been 
adopted by geographers, planners, architects, environmental psychologists 
and others involved in the study of environmental cognition, to measure 
the subjective meaning which man attributes to the physical environment. 
Hershberger (1974) has attempted to develop a definitive set of semantic 
differential scales applicable to designed environments and which fully 
cover the presentational (or designative), affective and evaluational 
areas of architectural representation. By reviewing research work 
utilizing semantic scales he extracted and analyzed the scales which pre-
dominated, reducing the almost infinite number of possible scales to a 
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comparatively small, yet comprehensive group. 
Using the Semantic Differential technique, Sanoff (1974) conducted an 
experiment to assess the relation between satisfaction, and complexity, 
ambiguity and novelty. He focussed on the cognition of the visual 
properties of the environment, isolating all other stimulus inputs, 
such as auditory or olfactory. He concluded that the attributes of 
preferred environments appear to be "complexity", "stimulating", sen-
suous", dynamic", and so on. Less-preferred environments are defined 
in terms of such descriptors as "simplicity", universal", "symmetry", 
"unobstrusiveness". Sanoff also found that the attributes "interest" 
and "satisfaction" were positively associated with affective judgements 
of the envir6nments described as novel, dynamic, stimulating, bold, 
sensuous and individual. As Sanoff points out (p. 254), environmental 
descriptions are amenable to scientific investigation. However, 
additional techniques need to be explored, partially to test the 
efficacy of the Semantic Differential and partially to generate 
further insights into response patterns to visual fields. 
The measurement of meaning, with a minimum of interviewer influence, 
by the use of the Repertory Grid method is well illustrated in a study 
of the image of Bath (Harrison and Sarre, 1975). It was hypothesized 
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that the evaluative and affective components would account for the greater 
part of the image content. However, it was found that the bulk of the 
constructs elicited were of a descriptive and relational nature. Despite 
the relative disproportionality, the importance of the evaluative and 
affective constructs is not undermined, they still constitute a substan-
tial and significant part of the image. 
0 
These techniques (that is, Repertory Grid and Semantic Differential) 
which elecit information about subjective images have contributed to 
some extent to this area of enquiry. However, inherent in these tech-
niques which depend on verbal responses are certain methodological pro-
blems. These will be discussed later in this Chapter. 
8.4.3. The prescriptive component. 
The third component of the image relates to predictions and inferences 
of both a designative and appraisive nature. This component gives to 
the image continuity and meaning so that the image does not simply 
represent one's immediate impressions of a particular environment in 
isolation. The image is slotted into the pattern of the individual's 
experience, enabling him to project back into the past and forward in-
to the future. By extrapolating from the immediate environmental in-
formation as well as from a body of stored images, the gestalt is 
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closed to create a composite and coherent picture of reality. Cognition 
of the physical environment is a composite of perception, memory, logic 
and faith. Lowenthal (1961, p. 251) quotes the example from Descartes, 
where, looking down from a window, we say that we see men and women, 
when in fact we perceive no more that parts of hats and coats. That 
is, it is inferred from the inforrmtion immediately available - bits 
gf hats and coats moving in the street - that people are walking there. 
The predictive and inferential nature of cognition has been discussed 
in Chapter 7 where it was shown that environmental cognition can be 
viewed as the creation of certainty out of uncertainty or probability. 
The individual makes hypotheses regarding the nature of the physical 
environment and predicts the consequences of his actions in that envi-
ronment. These predictions are then tested. The overall function of 
environmental cognition is not, ac~ording to Ittelson et al (1974, 
p. 124), "to reveal present reality nor to recall past reality: rather 
it is to predict the future". Cognitive representations can thus be 
seen as prognostic directives for behavior. 
In drawing from our recorded images of past environment~, in projecting 
into the future with predictions and in making inferences from the 
available stimulus information against the backdrop of one's emotional 
and evaluative response, cognition, and the resultant cognitive 215·. 
representation, can be seen to furnish directives for action. Thus 
the prescriptive component of the image forms a fundamental and inte-
gral part of the content of the environmental image. 
8.5. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE IMAGE TO REALITY. 
The function of the cognitive process is to reduce the information 
that is available from the environment and to make a basically cha-
otic environment orderly, predictable and manageable. Through im-
posing a structure on the environment, the cognitive mechanism se-
lects information and processes it (cf. Chapter 7) ; the resulting 
images are thus partial and simplified representations of the environ-
ment and are not necessarily isomorphic to the objective environment. 
However, they may not be very "accurate", but.they are nonetheless real 
to the persons who have them and, as Stea (1974, p. 157) puts it, "the 
idea or image of a building is as important as the building itself." 
Kates (1970) has summed up the relationship_of the image to reality: 
There is an· environment in the minds of men ••••••••• 
[which for] the human concerned, is no less real than 
the external ambience despite its existence solely in 
the form of perceptions, cognitions, attitudes, beliefs 
and behavior. (p. 648) 
Questions regarding the relationship of knowledge to reality, and the 
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nature of reality are the classical concerns of ~pistemology. These 
problems form the point of departure for Piaget's theory of the de-
velopment of the child's conception of space (1963). As has been dis-
cussed in earlier chapters, Piaget has empirically validated the Kan-· 
tian contention that what constitutes the environment for a particular 
organism is an intellectual construction by that organism. That is, 
what is taken to be real is a product of an act of knowing. Although 
it is accepted that an empirical reality does not exist independent of 
mind, it is argued that this reality can only be apprehended through 
the cognitive process~s of man. Kant argued that there can be no com-
-
plete u~derstanding of truth in either sense or reason; thus it is 
postulated that instead of the image ever representing exactly what is 
real, what we take to be real is a construction of thought. Since each 
individual views and reconstructs the environment within his total 
environmental context, that is, according to his own assumptions, beliefs, 
values and life experience, the images developed of a particular physical 
environment vary greatly across different individuals and groups •. Each 
of these images however, constitutes a reality and, in an experiential 
sense, are equally valid and true. Moore and Golledge (1976) have noted 
that 
No one·person's or group's image of the environment 
is more "accurate" or true than another's. (p. 4) 
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We can however assume that there is considerable corres~ondence between 
the environment as people conceive it to be and as it actually is. The 
fact that the human species has survived supports this assumption. As 
Lowenthal (1961) expresses it, 
If the picture of ~he world~ our heads were not 
fairly consistent with the world outside, we should 
be unable to survive in any environment other than 
a mental hospital. (p. 250) 
8.6. THE PUBLIC DIMENSION OF THE IMAGE. 
Whilst environmental images are by their very nature idiosyncratic, each 
in~ividual having developed his own inner representation of the built 
environment, the images of members of the same group have at the same 
time certain shared properties. It has been argued in this study that 
the construction of environmental images is a function of the total 
environment within which the individual operates. Cognition is influ-
enced by the society and place to ~hich the individual belongs; shared 
needs, ideals and values induce common or group images. 
Images show regularities and systematic inter-relationships so that 
groups of people are organized groups because they share images. 
Communication between people is possible only to the extent that meaning 
and imagerycre shared. This general concensus of agreement, or group 
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image is one of the foundations of community. This theme runs through 
Boulding's book, "The Image" (1956) where the term "public image" was 
used and defined as the "basic bond of any society, culture, sub-culture 
or organization" (p. 64). The same premise underlies the work of Lynch 
(1960), who working in the specific area of urban imagery, investigated 
the 
common mental pictures carried by large numbers of a 
city's inhabitants: areas of agreement which might 
be expected to appear in the interaction of a simple 
physical reality, a common culture, and a basic 
physiological nature. (p. 7) · 
Images influence the way the group manipulates its environment and thus 
has a great effect on the form and style of the group 0 s architecture 
(cf. Chapter 8.3.3.). At _the same time, the social organization and 
the existing built environment help to transmit and develop particular 
images in the group. The socio-physical environment and the image are 
thus dialectically related. 
8.7. MEASURING THE IMAGE. 
Inherent in the study of images there is a fundamental methodological 
problem. The essence of the problem is that, by definition, environ-
mental images ~xist as psychological entities "inside our heads." In 
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this sense, they lack a physical existence and cannot be measured in 
the way that one would measure the attributes of a physical object. 
Since images are covert and nonobserv~ble, their existence and charac-
teristic properties can only be inferred from overt responses. Another 
problem inherent in the measurement of images, is that cognitive informa-
tion is unique to each individual. Researchers interested in determining 
the extent, organization, or other characteristics of an individual's 
knowledge of the environment, face a very fundamental problem in trying 
to extract that information from the individual. This ~xtractionprocess is 
perhaps the most critical problem associated with empirical work in this 
area, for the analytical devices subsequently used on extracted informa-
tion rely very much for their validity on the way that the desired know-
ledge is obtained and objectively presented for analysis. If we are to 
penetrate this "unique experience" barrier and to discover the nature 
and content of environmental images we must have satisfactory methodo-
logies to elicit environmental knowledge. 
Initiatives in the study of environmental images have sprung from a 
variety of disciplinary sources, each tending to have its own methodo-
logical and philosophical stance. Studies in environmental images have 
used a wide range of methods devised by numerous disciplines - sociology, 
psychology, geography, architecture and planning. 
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Golledge (1976, pp. 302-310) has classified the enormous range of 
methods used to elicit cognitive information about the physical en-
v~ronment into four main procedures: 1) experimenter observation in 
naturalistic or controlled situations 2) reconstructions of people's 
cognitive representations as manifested in literature, paintings and 
other art forms 3) analysis of external representations of environ-
mental information contained in the minds of subjects 4) the un-
covering of "latent" information about environments through the use 
of indirect judgmental tasks. Golledge has summarized some of the 
major methods used to extract environmental information from subject 
populations. He has tabulated brief summaries of a range of techniques, 
their related procedures and examples of the use of each method (pp. 303-
305). This table is reproduced here. However, it must be pointed out 
that this table does not represent a comprehensive picture of environ-
mental cognition methodology, it merely lists some of the major methods 
that have been used by contemporary researchers. 
TABLE 1 
Methods for Extracting Environmental Cognition Information 
Method 
Experimenter observation 
in naturalistic or con-
trolled situations 
Procedure 
Experimenter observes or 
tracks movements through 
actual environments (e.g., 
crawl patterns, search be-


























TABLE 1 (continued) 
External 
Subject Representational 








Experimenter infers degrees Cognitive Charts Werner 
of cognitive knowledge Concrete Profiles (1948) 
from behavior in unstruc- Motoric Piaget and lnhelder 
tured "clinical" situations (1956) 
Hart 
(1974) 
Subjects reveal environmental Cognitive Lists Downs 
knowledge in the process of Abstract Tables (1970a) 
sorting or grouping elements Relational Composite maps Wish 
of actual or simulated (19_72) 
environments Zannaras 
(1973) 
Golledge et al. 
(1975) 
Subjects adopt roles or per- Cognitive Photographs It tel son 
form acts in simulated Abstract Tables (1951) 






Subjects arrange toys or ob- Cognitive Analog models Piaget et al. 
jects representing environ- Concrete (1960) 
mental elements or model Motoric Blaut and Stea 
environments, and experi- (1969) 
menter observes the Laurendeau and 
sequence of acts in position- Pinard 
ing elements and/or using (1970) 




Experimenter deduces cog- Cognitive Observational Tolman 
nitive information from Psycho- schedules (1948) 
nonhuman activities (e.g., motor Tables Peters 





Method Procedure Skill Form Example 
Historical Experimenter deduces Affective Novels Lowenthal and 
reconstructions environmental knowledge Psycho- Poems Prince 
from written descriptions motor Paintings (1964) 
(novels, poems, etc.) Linguistic Philosophies Heathcote 
and/or past pictorial Sketches (1965) 
representations of environ- Diaries Gleason 
ments, usually from hori- Content (1972) 








Analysis of external Subjects are asked to write Affective Written reports Lynch and Rivkin 
representations- descriptions of what they Psycho- Contact analysis (1959) 
participatory activities are aware of in environ- motor Item analysis Carr and Schissler 
ments Linguistic (19691 
Appleyard 
(1969a) 
Winkel et al. 
(1969) 
Subjects are asked to de- Affective Ora I reports Lynch 
scribe orally a given Linguistic Type (19601 










Subjects draw sketches or Affective Pictorial Lynch 
sketch maps representing Graphic sketches (1960) 
environments Relational Sketch maps Shemyakin 














Method Procedure Skill Form Example 
Subjects arrange toys or Affective Models Piaget et al. 
make models representing Cognitive Arrangements (1960} 
enviroj1lmen ts Concrete of toys Blaut and Stea 
Motoric (1969} 








Subjects show existence, Cognitive Base maps with Lynch 
location, proximity, or Graphic overlays (1960) 
other spatial relations of Abstract Notation Thiel 
environmental elements; Relational systems (1961} 
use of symbols to repre- Appleyard 
sent such elements (1969a) 
Wood and Beck, 
Chap.32 
Subjects asked to identify Affective Verbal Piaget and lnhelder 
photographs, models, etc. Motoric Protocols (1956) 
Abstract Laurendeau and 
Relational Pinard 
(1970) 




Indirect judgmental tasks Selection of constructs which Cognitive Word lists Kelly 
reveal environmental infor- Abstract Tables (1950) 
mation; adjective check- Relational Graphs Downs 
lists, semantic differentials, Grids (1973) 
repetory grid test, etc. Honikman, 
Chap. 7 
Harrison and Sarre, 
Chap. 34 
Golant and Burton 
Chap. 33 
Paired proximity judgments Cognitive Maps Briggs 
and other scaling devices Abstract Tables (1973a) 
that allow specification of Relational Lowrey 
latent structure in environ- (1973) 
mental information Golledge et al. 
(19751 
Cadwallader 
(1973) 224. Golant and Burton, 
Chap. 33 
Projective tests (e.g., T.A.T.) Affective Verbal Burton et al. 
Abstract stories (19691 
Relational Saarinen 
l,1.,P..,:\1-- \ 
Image studies are often limited by the myth that all such studies are 
restricted to making statements about the environmental knowledge of 
one individual. While every mental representation of the environment 
is unique, it also has many shared properties. The more homogeneous 
the group in terms of age and experience, the more overlap we might 
expect between the mental images. Unless used in clinical work, 
such as Kelly's Repertory Grid technique, most research experiments 
to measure the image attempt to generalize from groups of individuals 
in terms of the structure, content and role of their environmental 
images. If research into environmental imagery is to be at all 
applicable to the design profession, such generalization must be 
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This thesis has investigated the man-environment interface using 
a cognitive perspective. A holistic, multidisciplinary approach 
using Talcott Parsons' "human action system" as a frame of refer-
ence has been adopted. A theoretical model of environmental cognition, 
which examines the relations between the built environment, the 
total environment of the cognize~ and the image, has formed the 
focus of study and has provided an overview and explanation of the 
complex transactional nature of man's relationship with the built 
environment. 
This chapter pre~ents a brief summary of the main points 
which support the contention that cognition is the critical link in 
the man-environment relationship and the mental process that underlies 
all behavioural response and experiential reaction with respect to 
the built environment (cf. Chapter 5. 1. 1). Finally, it puts forward some ideas 
regarding the broad implications of these findings for the design 
profession. 
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9. 1 SUMMARY 
Environmental cognition has been defined here as the psychological 
process whereby the person comes to know the physical environment. 
The product of this process, that is, the subjective knowledge of 
the environment, has been identified as the image. Cognition and 
the image are described as a function of the interrelations between. 
physiological, psychological, sociocultural and physical environ-
ment factors. 
Because the image has a multidimensional nature - designative, 
appraisive and prescriptive dimensions - the cognitive model accounts 
for the many levels of environmental response. Images are a compound 
of both abstract and concrete elements as well as having an infer-
ential and predictive component. 
The physical environment has been defined as a source of information 
the environment does not simply stimulate a passive individual's 
senses, but rather it offers information which, in order to be 
comprehended, is actively selected and synthesised by the cognizing 
individual as he acts within his total contextual situation. 
Environmental cognition thus plays a vital roli as an information-
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processing system whereby the objective reality of the physical 
environment is translated into subjective reality. 
Since cognition is the source of all environmental consciousness -
man has no direct access to the objective reality of ~h~ physical 
world but can only "grasp" that reality through an active cognitive 
construction - it follows that the cognitive mechanism is a fund-
amental process in determining man's behavioural, intellectual and 
emotional response to the built environment. 
Further, man's action in the physical environment is inextricably related 
to his cognition of that environment for it is through his active part-
icipation in the environment that the individual comes to know and 
experience that environment. At the same time his behaviour in the 
environment is a function of how he cognizes that environment. It 
follows that man's behaviour in the environment can be explained in terms 
of the cognitive model. 
Cognition is also a forward-looking process which plays a predictive 
role in man's relationship with the physical environment. In the 
process of cognition, the individual makes hypotheses regarding the 
nature of the physical environment and predicts the consequences of 
his actions in that environment. The predictions are then tested and 
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so the individual, through the interplay of action and cognition ~n 
different environmental situations, gradually builds up a knowledge of 
the built environment and a repetoire of appropriate responses to it. 
On the intellectual level, man's inherent need to impose order and mean-
ing on the physical environment is satisfied (at least in part) through the 
cognitive process. This process, whereby the enormous load of information 
provided by an intr~nsically chaotic environment is selected, decoded and 
organized, therefore transforms the world psychologically into a coherent 
and manageable place within which the individual can live a healthy and 
comfortable life. The actual choice of information and the nature of the 
resultant image are a function of a dynamic interaction between the inner 
organismic factors which the individual brings to the situation, and the 
external socio-physical factors, as well as feedback from previous 
cognitive experience. 
Cognition and the resultant image form the basis for design decisions, that 
is, the built environment is designed and built to meet some conceptual 
image of environment held by the designer. The form and structure of man's 
built environment can thus be seen as a physical manifestation of the 
designer's cognitive environment. The inadequacy of much contemporary 
architecture can be explained in terms of this notion of the built, 
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environment as a physical expression of environmental images: the 
images of the architect which underlie his design decisions are often 
at variance with those held by the people who will use his buildings, 
thus such buildings are found to be alien and unpleasant by the users. 
The analysis of cognition and the image in the context of man's 
relationship to the built environment reveals the fundamental role 
that these processes play in determining man's behavioural response 
(including design) and experiential reaction towards the built envir-
onment. It is concluded that the hypothes~s that cognition is the crit-
ical link in the man-environment relationship is a valid assumption and 
one that warrants further investigation as the key to a more profound 
understanding of the man-environment interface. 
9.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DESIGJ PROFESSION 
This study, in examining the role of cognition in determining man's 
environmental experience and behaviour, has reinforced the contention 
(introduced in Chapter 1) that the architect, if he is to act in a 
socially r~s~onsible manner and to be at all effective in contributing 
towards an improved qual{ty of human life, must acquire an understanding 
of the mental constructs by which people experience their total envir-
onment, including the built environment. 
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This section discusses the problem of the professional designer's. role 
in society today, and suggests directives for remedial action. 
9.2.1 The role of the professional designer 
The purpose of building has since its inception been to provide people 
with a physical environment that enhances and enriches the quality of 
life by creating opportunities for the development of human potentials. 
However, today in the Western world, building activity, directed 
largely by the professional architect, has been reduced to the product-
ion of environments, which if not s·ocially destruct-ive, play no part in 
the amelioration of the human condition. Numerous factors have contrib-
uted to this situation; of these, ignorance and a lack of concern for the 
different cognitive and value structures of building users play a signif-
icant role and have led to the current professional arrogance where the 
architect operates solely from his own personal cognitive state and that 
of the elitist professional paradigm, resulting in an alien and incong-
ruent environment. The architect, operating in a counter-productive 
fashioh, thus negates the most fundamental function of architecture. 
This self-defeating activity of the design profession has led to the 
present situation where the public image of the architect has been eroded 
to the point where his credibility is severely threatened. 
Two major factors tend to undermine the effectiveness of the architect 
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in society: firstly, the current professional paradigm stresses t~e 
positivistic, technological and economic dimensions of the building 
operation resulting in a ''univalent" (Jencks, 1973) utilitarian arch-
itecture with very little human content for the building users. Secondly, 
and even more problematic, the very nature of the architect - his middle-
class social background (that is, in most cases), his elitist education -
tends to alienate him from those people for whom he designs. His cognitive 
structures and images which form the basis of his design decisions are 
usually incongruent with those held by the layman. The architect can thus 
be seen as an obstacl~, rather than· contributor, to human development. 
A rapprochement between architecture and social reality is necessary so 
that the "applied art ~f architecture [author's italic;_) can be resurrected 
and made again part of the human experience from which the Modern Movement 
seems to have divorced it" (Blake, 1977, p. 162). 
An alternative to specialist-designed buildings is spontaneous or· vernacular 
architecture. The humaneness and "good fit" of these non-professionally 
designed environments can be attributed to their being 
not produced by a few intellectuals or specialists 
but by the spontaneous and continuing activity of 
a whole people with a common heritage, acting under 
a community of experience. (P. Belluschi, as quoted 
by Rudofsky, 1964, p. 3) 
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However, although due to the complex nature of our Western civili~ation, it 
is not feasible to return wholly to this form of building production, the spec-
ialist designer has much to learn from "architecture without architects". 
The practise of professional architecture is by its very nature a socio-
political activity insofar as the architect, as "omniscient specialist" holds 
the power to prescribe and determine what h~ considers to be the appropriate 
environment for particular people. However, it is essential that this power be 
wielded in a socially responsible manner which recognizes and accommodates the 
different world views, beliefs and values of those for whom the architect des-
igns.If the architectural profession is to reg~in its status in society, it is 
expedient for the architeit to relinquish his current role as 'dictator' and to 
realign himself as agent of the people, thereby using his skills to concretize 
the needs and aspirations of the people. This new role demands that the archi-
tect recognize and accept his social responsibilities and adopt a more human-
istic approach to architectural problems. Peter Shepherd (quoted by MacEwan, 1974) 
refers to the current crisis in architecture and the need for a more responsible 
professional attitude. 
they [architects] seem oblivious or even contemptuous 
of the fact that much of their work is hated by the 
people who live with it; they tend to accuse the pub-
lic of lack of taste for not appreciating the formal 
qualities of brutal and inhumane buildings which one 
can only assume to have been built for the admiration 
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of other architects. Nothing is more urgent 
for the future of architecture than that arch-
itects should develo a deeper sense of respon-
sibility [italics adde as the creators of a 
large part of our environment ••• (p. 5) 
In adopting a socially responsible attitude, one of the urgent 
tasks for the profession is the critical examination of its 
current paradigm and mode of practise in the context of the 
larger society within which it operqtes as a sub-culture. 
Running parallel with this is the need to develop a conscious 
awareness of the cognitive constructs held by the people for 
whom the buildings are designed. The designer needs some under-
standing of how the various user groups "will comprehend and 
use the buildings he designs" (Hershberger and Cass, 1974, p.118). 
Unless architectural design decisions are informed by a basic 
understanding of images, it is doubtful if the techniques of 
contemporary architectural practise can ever be effective in 
producing buildings which are meaningful and relevant to those 
people who use them. Thus it is important that architects search 
for the means to identify and understand, and to reinforce or 
transform the mental images which people have of the built environ-
ment. 
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It is in this respect that the study presented in the preceding 
chapters offers a contribution to alleviating the current crisis 
· in architecture. This study, which draws on the theories and 
research findings from a wide range of human sciences, represents 
an attempt to gain insight into the cognitive dimensions of ma~'s 
interaction with the built environment, so that the knowledge thus 
acquired might ultimately feed through to inform the design 
process and so contribute towards the realisation of a more 
humane and socially supportive buil~ environment. It is apprec-
iated that a theoretical discourse of this nature is clearly 
not directly applicable to decision-making in specific 
architectural problem situations. However, it does form a fund-
amental and essential step in that direction in that it forms a 
part of the necessary theoretical background for the practise of 
a socially responsible architecture. 
It must be noted that the purpose of using research from the 
human sciences as a tool in the design process, is not to 
reduce the role of the architect but to allow him to become more 
effective and innovative in fulfilling his role. However, one 
must not over-estimate the value of incorporating ~he findings 
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of the human sciences in the design process - no miracle solutions 
will automatically ensue. It remains the function of the arch-
itect to evaluate the data and to interpret it creatively in 
physical form. 
9.2.2 Re-examination of the design process 
However, the exploration of environmental cognition together 
with the re-assessment of the operant architectural ideology 
cannot on their own provide the means to achieve an improved 
quality of built environment. Numerous other factors intervene, 
of which one of the most important is the need for new professional 
methods of design. 
The current linear model emphasizes those activities involved 
in solving problems and those involved with the construction of 
buildings. Relatively little attention has been directed towards 
the definition of the problem and the evaluation of the solution in 
use. An approach is needed which recognizes that there is "considerable 
feedback and feedforward in the development of any architectural 
solution" (Lang and Burnette, 1974, p.43). 
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The program, or brief, in which the problem is defined is, in the 
current solution-orientated approach of architectural prqctise, 
usually nothing more than an inventory of metric dimensions applied 
to the number of people to be accommodated; the profile of the people 
is usually limited to simple sociological terms of sex, age and role, 
and their needs and activities are ennumerated and interpreted in 
terms of a set of minimum dimensions.Qualitative aspects are of 
secondary importance and are usually stated in terms of performance 
standards such as thermal comfort l_evel, decibel ratings, etc. The 
so-called "objective" scientific analysis does not suffice as it 
fails to reveal the subjective, experiential aspect of man in the 
built environment. The importance of understanding how people 
perceive, conceptualize and evaluate the built environment is borne 
out by the main theme of this thesis, namely, that environmental 
cognition forms the basis of man's interaction with the built 
environment. An amplified program would provide the architect with 
a directive for design which, in acknowledging the realities beyond 
his personal experience, intuition and heresay, takes into account 
the subjective mental images of the potential users. 
The design profession has never established and maintained channels 
that would accommodate a ready flow of feedback from the lay public. 
With no systematic process for testing the acceptability of design 
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solutions in terms of user satisfaction, no cumulative body of know-
ledge about buildings in use has been built up. The assumptions and 
design criteria upon which the architect bases his design decisions 
are seldom checked and are rightly or wrongly re-used again and again, 
often perpetuating inadequate design solutions. Robert Sommer (1972) 
discussing the inadequacies of the design product and the consequent 
need for an evaluation phase in the design process, states: 
The lack of evaluational data not only causes the 
neglect of good design features, and encourages an 
attitude of novelty for its own sake, since no one 
knows what items are good or bad, but it also re-
sults in the perpetuation of bad design solutions. 
Reinventing the wheel for each problem is bad 
enough, but reinventing a square or lopsided wheel 
is even worse. (p.90) 
As has been discussed earlier, the success of the vernacular arch-
itecture of primitive societies-can largely be attributed to contin-
ual feedback from the building users who react directly to any 
deficiency in their buildings. The feedback is automatic and direct; 
remedial action is taken immediately it becomes necessary. 
Post-construction evaluation needs to become an integral part of 
the design process. Each new building then becomes an "hypothesis" 
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about the relationship between people and the designed environment -
an hypothesis which is tested empirically in a process of evaluation. 
Evaluation, in addition to testing design decisions and validating 
programming data, generates new information for future programs. 
These programs are in turn tested when the completed building is 
evaluated. Thus evaluation and program formulation are interdependent 
activities which should form part of a dynamic ongoing design 
process. 
9.3 EPILOGUE: 
However small the impact of architecture might be in the lives of 
people, it does play~ part in contributing to the quality of 
iife. As Constance Perin (1970) has put it: 
Creating and recreating the physical environment may 
not be the most important thing a society does for 
enriching the p~tentialities of its members, but as 
long as it is being done, an integrity appropriate 
to it should be sought. (p.25) 
This thesis has stressed the need for architects to be fully aware of 
the human implications of the buildings they design; this awareness 
must necessarily include an understanding and recognition of the 
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subjective dimensions of human existence. By understanding the prin-
ciples of environmental cognition, the architect can play a positive 
role in creating built environments which serve society in a construct-
ive manner. 
Vitruvius, the Roman authority on architecture, in defining the 
necessary attributes of the ideal architect, wrote: 
Let him be educated, skilful with pencil, instructed 
in geom~try, know much history, have followed the 
philosophers with attention, understand music, have 
some knowledge of medicine, know the opinions of the 
jurists, and be acquainted with astronomy and the 
theory of the heavens. (Translated by Morgan, 1914; 
quoted by Broadbent, 1974, p.4) 
This list of qualities recognizes the necessity for architects to 
have an all-round knowledge of human life. However, it fails to 
specifically mention the need for the architect to have a ~lear 
understanding of the internal processes of the human being in his 
intercourse with the socio-physical environment. It is suggested by 
this thesis that the above quotation may be expanded by adding: 
"and let him understand the nature of the phenomenal dimension of 
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